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This thesis focuses on the exercise of State jurisdiction online and the fulfilment of 
freedom of expression in the cyberspace. In particular, the thesis aims to answer the 
following research questions: when and under what conditions can online acts be 
considered to have happened within a State’s jurisdiction according to human rights law? 
Is the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction to regulate online content compliant 
with the freedom of expression provisions contained in human rights law? These 
questions are investigated through the analysis of key domestic Internet-related cases 
where States have exercised jurisdiction over cross-border online content 
extraterritorially. This analysis highlights the negative implications of these 
extraterritorial exercises of State jurisdiction on freedom of expression online. On the 
other hand, the thesis investigates the meaning of State jurisdiction online according to 
the European Convention of Human Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The aim of this analysis is to understand how the jurisdictional 
models developed by the human rights courts work in an online environment. The 
analysis highlights the difficulties presented by the application of the spatial and personal 
models of jurisdiction to online acts and investigates the extraterritorial effects model, 
which might be better suited to deal with online acts. Finally, the thesis explores whether 
the extraterritorial exercises of State jurisdiction examined in the first part of the thesis 
are compliant with the accessibility and foreseeability requirements of the ‘prescribed by 
law’ criterion of the human rights conventions. The analysis of this point concludes that, 
although the domestic laws authorising these exercises of jurisdiction are compliant with 
these requirements, their interpretation by the Courts should evolve to take into account 
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This thesis focuses on the exercise of State jurisdiction online and on the fulfilment 
of freedom of expression in the cyberspace. This chapter will introduce the research 
questions and objectives, illustrate the research methodology and the theoretical 
framework, and review the themes explored by the authors who have investigated the 
subjects on which the thesis focuses, with a view to identifying the knowledge gaps that 
this thesis endeavours to fill. 
 
1.1 Research questions and objective  
This thesis focuses on the exercise of State jurisdiction online and on the fulfilment 
of freedom of expression in the cyberspace. The aim of the thesis is twofold: on the one 
hand, the thesis aims to shed light on the extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction over content published online. In particular, the thesis explores whether this 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction is compliant with the freedom of expression 
obligations contained in regional and international human rights conventions such as the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the American Convention of Human 
Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On the other hand, the 
thesis investigates the meaning of online State jurisdiction according to human rights law. 
The objective of this analysis is to understand whether and how the concept of State 
jurisdiction according to the human rights conventions changes when acts are committed 
online instead of in the physical environment. 
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. When and under what conditions can online acts be considered to have happened 
within a State’s jurisdiction according to human rights law?  
 
2. Is the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction to regulate online content 
compliant with the freedom of expression provisions contained in human rights law? 
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The decision to focus on the fulfilment of freedom of expression online is due to the 
fact that freedom of expression is one of the fundamental human rights most affected by 
multiple and conflicting exercises of State jurisdiction online. This is because, due to the 
global and immediately accessible nature of online content, content published online 
becomes available in multiple States simultaneously. However, States have different laws 
and what is legal in the country of upload might well be illegal in the places where the 
content is downloaded or simply accessed. This means that when States exercise 
jurisdiction over online content that is not linked to their country, because, for example, 
the content has been published by foreign parties from abroad, they affect the freedom of 
expression of foreign Internet users who have the right to access content that is perfectly 
legal in their country. 
Overall, through focussing on the two research questions, the thesis aims to explore 
the meaning of fulfilling freedom of expression online according to the human rights 
conventions. This objective is achieved by clarifying the jurisdictional sphere of 
application of the human rights conventions to online acts and examining whether the 
obligations contained in the human rights conventions regarding freedom of expression 
change when applied to acts committed online. 
 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
research by introducing the research questions and objectives, by illustrating the research 
methodology and the theoretical framework, and by reviewing the themes explored by 
the authors who investigated the subjects on which the thesis focuses. Chapter 1 also 
identifies the knowledge gaps that this thesis endeavours to fill.  
In order to answer the two research questions, Chapters 2 and 3 introduce specific 
instances of extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction online, namely the access-based 
jurisdictional approach and the global application of domestic laws to content published 
online. In particular, these chapters examine the main characteristics of these 
extraterritorial exercises of State jurisdiction online through the analysis of key Internet-
related cases discussed before domestic and regional Courts. The aim of Chapters 2 and 
3 is to ultimately highlight the problems that these exercises of State jurisdiction online 
pose to State sovereignty and the fulfilment of freedom of expression on the Internet. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction online 
according to both public international law and human rights law. The aim of Chapter 4 is 
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to set the scene for the analysis conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 which will address the first 
and second research questions respectively. Chapter 4 therefore highlights the differences 
between the meaning of State jurisdiction according to public international law and 
human rights law and underlines some grey areas that exist as far as the jurisdictional 
rules are concerned.  
Chapter 5 addresses the first research question by investigating the meaning of online 
State jurisdiction according to human rights law. In order to achieve this objective, 
Chapter 5 first explores the meaning of State jurisdiction online according to public 
international law and then focuses on an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Inter-
American Court and Commission on Human Rights and the African Court and 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the aim of understanding how these 
Courts have approached the subject of State jurisdiction online. Chapter 5 then concludes 
by examining the application of the spatial, personal and extraterritorial effects models of 
State jurisdiction to online acts.  
Finally, Chapter 6 answers the second research question which aims at understanding 
whether the exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction examined in Chapters 2 and 3 are 
compliant with the freedom of expression provisions of the human rights conventions. In 
particular, the analysis conducted in this chapter focuses on whether the extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws to regulate online content meets the accessibility and 
predictability requirements of the ‘prescribed by law’ criterion with which restrictions on 
freedom of expression must comply to be considered legitimate in human rights law. In 
order to answer this question, Chapter 6 illustrates the regime for the protection of 
freedom of expression both online and offline according to the human rights conventions 
and examines the conditions that restrictions to freedom of expression must meet to be 
justified according to the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR. In particular, 
the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 focuses on the meaning of prescribed by law 
according to the human rights conventions and on an analysis of the criteria used by the 
human rights courts to define when restrictions to freedom of expression can be 
considered as accessible and predictable. Finally, the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 
concludes with examining a series of extra-legal factors that affect the how the 
accessibility and predictability requirements of the laws that apply to online acts 
committed by foreign parties work in an online environment. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 7 which summarizes the main conclusions reached in 
the previous chapters.     
 4 
1.3 The concept of extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction 
The background on which this research is set stems from two arguments. First, the rules 
related to the exercise of State jurisdiction online are uncertain according to both public 
international law and human rights law. Secondly, multiple States have and still are 
exercising their jurisdiction extraterritorially to regulate content published online. The 
first question that this thesis aims to answer centres on whether the extraterritorial 
exercise of State jurisdiction over online content is compliant with the freedom of 
expression provisions contained in the human rights conventions. To answer this 
question, this research focuses on two specific ways in which States have exercised their 
jurisdiction extraterritorially over content published online: jurisdiction based on access 
to online content (access-based jurisdictional approach), and jurisdiction based on the 
existence of a territorial connection between the country exercising jurisdiction and the 
party responsible for the publication of content online (the territorial connection 
approach). 
The first approach, the access-based jurisdiction, is characterised by the exercise of 
State jurisdiction over content published online but uploaded from and hosted in a foreign 
State by a foreign defendant based on the fact that that content is accessible from within 
the territory of the country exercising jurisdiction (ex. a party located in State X uploads 
content online from that State, where the content is also hosted. State Y exercises 
jurisdiction over that content based on the fact that it has been published online and is 
therefore accessible within the territory of State Y). In the access-based jurisdictional 
approach the extraterritorial dimension of the exercise of State jurisdiction arises by the 
combination of two criteria: the fact that the defendant is foreign (location of the 
defendant) and the fact that the content published online has been uploaded from and is 
hosted outside the domestic forum (location of uploading and hosting).   
In the second approach, the territorial connection approach, the exercise of State 
jurisdiction is based on the existence of a territorial connection between the country 
exercising jurisdiction and the defendant. In other words, in this approach, the courts 
exercise jurisdiction over defendants that are located or operate within their territory. 
However, the extraterritorial dimension of this exercise of jurisdiction is represented by 
the fact that the courts extend the application of domestic laws to regulate either online 
content that is hosted within the jurisdiction of other States or actions that are committed 
online outside the domestic borders (ex. State X requires access to data that are stored in 
State Y because the party responsible for administering the data is located in State X; or 
State X applies its domestic laws to regulate certain online acts controlled by a defendant 
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located in that State not only when these acts are committed within the borders of State 
X but also when they are committed abroad). 
These two ways of exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially do not exhaust all the 
possible ways in which States exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially over online content. 
Exercising jurisdiction based on the targeting test, for example, could be interpreted as an 
extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction over content published online. Indeed, 
according to the targeting test, a State exercises jurisdiction over content published online 
by a foreign defendant in a foreign forum based on the fact that the online content targeted 
an audience located in the State exercising jurisdiction. In that case, the location of the 
defendant and the location of the uploading and hosting of the online content are the 
extraterritorial elements. The exercise of State jurisdiction in the targeting test case could 
be interpreted as an application of the effects doctrine, since targeting an audience located 
in the State exercising jurisdiction could be considered as an act that produced effects in 
that State. Notwithstanding the fact that there are multiple ways in which States exercise 
jurisdiction extraterritorially over content published online, this research focuses on the 
access-based jurisdiction and on the territorial connection because these two approaches 
have particularly relevant implications as far as fulfilling freedom of expression online is 
concerned. Ultimately, this research is focussed on understanding whether the 
extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction online is compliant with the freedom of 
expression obligations of the human rights conventions. Therefore, the research examines 
the two approaches that seem to be particularly problematic in this regard. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis relies on the doctrinal analysis method. The doctrinal analysis method is 
particularly suitable to the thesis’ research objectives. Indeed, the first research question 
investigates the meaning of online State jurisdiction according to the human rights 
conventions. As to the second research question, this aims at understanding whether 
territorial connection and the access-based jurisdictional approaches are compliant with 
the freedom of expression requirements of the human rights conventions. Therefore, this 
research aims at critically evaluating whether some forms of the law as it currently stands 
are compliant with the requirements of other areas of law as well as at investigating what 
the current law is. For this reason, this research is a ‘research in law’, rather than being a 
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‘research about law’.1 This study locates and analyses ‘the primary documents of the law 
in order to establish the nature and parameters of the law’.2 In other words, this is a 
doctrinal research because it shares the same objectives and characteristics that have been 
used to describe the doctrinal research method. According to some commentators, this 
research method is the best placed to understand the law as it stands, because it ‘adopts 
language and concepts that are internal rather than external to the law’ and ‘advance[s] 
the sorts of arguments that, roughly speaking, a court might be willing to listen to’.3 
However, the very possibility to determine the law as it stands as if the law were an 
‘“objective reality”’ is contested by exponents of various legal theories.4 According to 
critical legal theory, for example, the law does not exist as an objective reality and the 
main characteristic of the legal language is law’s indeterminacy.5  Nonetheless, as 
observed by Hutchinson and Duncan, ‘if we take legislation as an example, the laws are 
passed by parliament and the words are written down. In that sense there is a positive 
statement of the law’.6 It is this positive statement of the law, in particular primary and 
secondary sources of both domestic and international law, that this research investigates. 
Consistent with the doctrinal research method, this research has first identified the 
primary and secondary sources examined throughout the thesis and then has analysed 
these sources by relying upon the techniques of deductive logic, inductive reasoning and 
analogy.7 The technique of deductive logic has been used to deduce whether a given norm 
applies to a specific situation. Deductive logic, for example, has been used to analyse 
whether and how the requirements of the freedom of expression clauses of human rights 
conventions apply to the two jurisdictional approaches identified by the research. 
Inductive reasoning and analogy have been applied to infer the existence of a general rule 
from the analysis of specific cases and to identify similar situations respectively. An 
example of the use of these techniques can be found in the selection and analysis of the 
case-law examined in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis, where both inductive logic and 
analogy have allowed to identify similar patterns arising from the various cases examined 
 
1 Arthurs, H.W. (1983) Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Information Division, Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Ottawa (as cited in Paul Chynoweth, 'Legal 
Research' in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (ed), Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment 
(Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 30). 
2 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan ‘Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 
17 Deakin LR 83, 113. 
3 Stephen A Smith ‘Taking law seriously’ (2000) 50 U. Toronto L.J. 241, 255. 
4 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 2) 110.  
5 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the editors of the symposium’, (1999) 93 AJIL 351, 354. 
6 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 2) 110. 
7 Chynoweth (n 1) 32-33; Hutchinson and Duncan (n 2) 111. 
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and infer the existence of a common denominator between the cases, i.e. the fact that 
these cases belonged to the same jurisdictional approach.  
The line of enquiry followed by this research is both descriptive and interpretive. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the thesis aims on the one hand at clarifying the meaning of 
online State jurisdiction according to the human rights conventions. In this regard, the 
thesis is descriptive as it is focussed on elucidating what the existing human rights law 
rules are with regard to the meaning of online State jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 
research is interpretive as it aims at critically evaluating whether some forms of the law 
as it currently stands (the two jurisdictional approaches identified) are compliant with the 
requirements of other areas of law (freedom of expression clauses of the human rights 
conventions).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this thesis is also centred on the interconnection 
between public and private international law. Indeed, the thesis analyses inter alia some 
key private international law Internet-related cases and examines the exercise of State 
jurisdiction by the domestic country through the lenses of the public international law 
jurisdictional criteria. The deep connection between private and public international law 
has been increasingly recognised throughout the years. In this regard, Mills has observed 
that there is ‘a functional and doctrinal overlap’ between public and private international 
law and that private international law constitutes a ‘hidden (‘private’) dimension of 
international law’.8 This is because the question of whether an exercise of State 
jurisdiction is allowed by the domestic rules of private international law must be 
distinguished by the question of whether such an exercise of jurisdiction is justified by 
public international law.9 Ultimately, as underlined by Mills, 
 
‘[n]ational courts may take a range of distinct policy considerations into account in 
determining whether domestic ‘jurisdiction’ may or should be exercised, including 
factors which are not reflected in international rules of jurisdiction. Domestic law 
might even compel a national court to breach international limits, giving rise to non-
compliance with international law. But the presence of additional domestic 
considerations does not deny the relevance of international limits, and the existence 
of those limits has shaped and continues to shape national rules of private 
international law’.10 
 
The interconnection between private and public international law is therefore central 
to the analysis of the cases examined in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
8 Alex Mills ‘Rethinking jurisdiction in international law’ (2014) 84 BYIL 187, 200. 
9 ibid 202. 
10 ibid. 
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1.4.1 Case selection 
This research has relied on three inclusion criteria to select the cases that are examined in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The first criterion is the online nature of the action brought before the 
domestic courts. This criterion has been defined quite broadly, to include both the act of 
uploading content online (e.g. publishing content on a website) and acts where at least 
one constitutive element happens online (e.g. online search queries performed using a 
Search engine). Throughout the thesis, the expressions “online action/act” and “content 
uploaded online” are therefore used interchangeably. The second case inclusion criterion 
is the extraterritorial dimension of the case and, more specifically, the extraterritorial 
dimension of the online act or content upon which jurisdiction is exercised. This criterion 
is defined by the fact that this online act/content is linked to the territory of a foreign State 
or multiple States. This extraterritorial element can take different forms: e.g. the content 
has been uploaded in a foreign State or is hosted in a foreign State or the online action 
that the domestic court tries to regulate is performed by individuals in foreign States (such 
as search queries performed on a search engine by Internet users located in foreign States). 
The third case inclusion criterion is the language of the case: the cases included in the 
research are only those cases in English or for which an English translation could be 
identified. This inclusion criterion has resulted in the fact that the majority of the cases 
selected are related to a specific geographic area, corresponding mainly to Europe, North 
America and Australia. These geographic areas, however, also correspond to those 
jurisdictions for which data related to Internet case-law are relatively readily available. 
Indeed, the sources that this research relied upon to select the cases analysed (see below) 
have a sizeable amount of information related to the above-mentioned countries. 
The combination of the first two selection criteria has allowed to identify only those cases 
where the national courts had to determine whether an online act linked to a foreign State 
could be brought within the jurisdiction of the courts examining the case. In other words, 
the domestic courts in the cases analysed in the thesis had to determine the minimum 
contacts that had to occur between an online act linked to a foreign State and the domestic 
forum for the domestic court to have jurisdiction over the act. Therefore, the cases that 
were not included in the research are those Internet-related cases where, although an act 
happened online, it was so clearly linked to the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction 
(for example because the content had been uploaded there from a person living in that 
State) that there were no doubts that the domestic court had jurisdiction. In other words, 
the cases included in this research are ‘[…] only […] (those) cases in which the 
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distinguishing features of the Internet create uncertain results when deciding’.11 The 
expression ‘distinguishing features of the Internet’ in this context refers to the 
extraterritorial dimension of the online act upon which jurisdiction is exercised.  
As mentioned above, in the two jurisdictional approaches on which this research 
focuses, the two inclusion criteria have taken different forms. In the access-based 
jurisdictional approach, the extraterritorial dimension of the exercise of State jurisdiction 
is given by the combination of two elements: the fact that the defendant is foreign 
(location of the defendant) and the fact that the content published online has been 
uploaded from and is hosted outside the domestic forum (location of uploading and 
hosting). In the territorial connection criterion, the extraterritorial dimension of the 
exercise of jurisdiction is represented by the fact that the domestic courts exercise 
jurisdiction over content that is hosted within the jurisdiction of other States or over online 
actions committed outside the domestic borders. In that case, however, unlike the access-
based jurisdictional approach, the defendant is located within the territory of the State 
exercising jurisdiction. 
The cases examined in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis have been collected by relying 
on two different sources: the database Internet & Jurisdiction and the journal Leading 
Internet Case-Law. The Internet & Jurisdiction database is an open-access resource whose 
purpose is to monitor jurisdictional trends around the world. The cases added to the 
database date back to February 2012 and are selected by Internet jurisdiction experts that 
are members of the I&J Observatory. The I&J Observatory is currently composed of 30 
members from a variety of academic institutions and research centres around the world.12 
According to the I&J website, the members of the I&J Observatory select the top 20 cases 
to be added to the database on a monthly basis after having ranked them.13 The cases’ 
ranking criteria relied upon by the I&J Observatory members are not specified. As to the 
Leading Internet Case-Law journal, it is a journal for Internet law practitioners that 
publishes legal analysis of Internet-related case law from various countries. The Journal’s 
contributors are legal and industry professionals. The UK, US, Germany, China, Italy, 
 
11 University of Geneva ‘Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution Policies 1.0’ (Geneva Internet Disputes 
Resolution Policies 1.0) <https://geneva-internet-disputes.ch/> accessed: July 2017), 3. 
12  The full list of the I&J Observatory members can be found at Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network, 
‘I&J Observatory Members’ (Internet & Jurisdiction) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/work/observatory/members> accessed: 03 September 2020. 
 13 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network, ‘I&J Observatory’ (Internet & Jurisdiction) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#eyJ0byI6IjIwMjAtMDcifQ==> accessed 21 
May 2018. 
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France and the Netherlands are among the jurisdictions covered by the journal.14 
Similarly to the Internet & Jurisdiction database, the cases selection criteria relied upon 
by the journal’s contributors are not specified.   
The cases analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis have been selected by searching 
the above-mentioned databases using keywords or filters. The keyword used for the 
journal Leading Internet Case-Law is ‘jurisdiction’. As to the Internet & Jurisdiction 
database, the database provides pre-determined filters that can be used to select relevant 
cases. The filter relied upon to select the cases examined in the thesis is “Court” in the 
filter category named “Actor”. 
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
This research draws on modern positivism as a theoretical framework.  
Modern positivism is particularly suitable to this research due to the “deeply 
pragmatic nature” of this thesis, which is oriented towards understanding where existing 
human rights law stands as far as the subject of online State jurisdiction is concerned. In 
other words, this research builds on the analysis of the law as it is (lex lata), rather than 
suggesting how this should be (lex ferenda). The distinction between lex lata and lex 
ferenda is the distinction upon which the modern positivist method is constructed. 
The positivist method (both in its classical and modern versions) has attracted the 
views of many scholars.15 Some of them have emphasised the advantages of this research 
method, among which figure its clarity and legitimacy.16 Many authors have, on the other 
hand, critiqued positivism. Among the disadvantages that have been identified figure its 
indeterminacy and lack of objectivity, especially in relation to asserting the existence of 
customary international norms.17 Another critique that has been made to positivism refers 
to its inaccuracy when it comes to determining what the current law is. This inaccuracy 
 
14 Wildy & Sons Ltd ‘Leading Internet Case Law’ (Wildy & Sons Ltd) <https://www.wildy.com/isbn/2399-
0015/e-commerce-law-reports-print-online-law-reports-online-cecile-park-publishing> accessed: 03 
September 2020. 
15 Anne-Marie Slaughter and Steven R Ratner, ‘The method is the message’ (1999) 93 AJIL 410; Bruno 
Simma and Andreas L Paulus, ‘The responsibility of individuals for human rights abuses in internal 
conflicts: a positivist view’ (1999) 93 AJIL 302; Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R Willard, ‘Policy-
oriented jurisprudence and human rights abuses in internal conflict: toward a world of public order of 
human dignity’, (1999) 93 AJIL 316; Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘New International Legal Process’, (1999) 93 
AJIL, 334; Koskenniemi (n 5), 351; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist method in international law’, (1999) 
93 AJIL 379. 
16 ‘As an adjunct to positivism, classic ILP shares positivism's great advantage, its claim to legitimacy not 
found in other methods, including new ILP. Positivism can arguably demonstrate its legitimacy’. O’Connell 
(n 15) 349. 
17 ibid 350. 
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has been considered a direct consequence of the fact that positivism does not take into 
account the factors that influence the creation and application of the law, such as ‘the 
personality, political inclinations, gender and cultural background of the decision makers, 
as well as the mood of the times, and other societal factors’.18 
In this perspective, one of the major advantages of the positivist method, pragmatism, 
is at the same time one of its core limits. Indeed, it can be argued that pragmatism is one 
of positivism’s strongest assets because it allows scholars to develop a clear research path 
that is centred on a rigorous analysis of international law norms. At the same time, though, 
this advantage can become a limitation. Indeed, the positivist analysis builds on the notion 
that States are the main subjects of international law and that international law norms are 
mainly expression of States’ will. In doing so, positivism fails to take into proper account 
the role that actors other than States, such as private citizens, corporations, and third sector 
organisations, play in influencing the creation and the application of international law 
norms. In other words, the positivist approach is, to an extent, too simplistic. Indeed, it 
can be inadequate to reflect the complexity of the interactions between the various 
stakeholders that populate today’s international sphere. This is especially true in relation 
to cyberspace, where States’ sovereignty finds a limit in the power and the technological 
expertise of the Internet Service Providers. Another example of the complexities that the 
modern positivist framework does not allow to capture, especially in regard to the law 
applicable to cross-border online acts, is found in the way that the accessibility and 
foreseeability requirements of the ‘prescribed by law’ criterion of the human rights 
conventions have been so far interpreted. Indeed, as will be examined in Chapter 6, the 
classic interpretation of these requirements that derives from an analysis of the human 
rights norms and the case-law interpreting these norms shows that the way in which these 
two criteria have been interpreted is short-sighted. This is because it does not take into 
account some extra-legal factors that influence the accessibility of domestic laws to 
foreign parties. These extra-legal factors, such as common knowledge and intermediaries, 
are exactly the kind of factors that, due to their extra-legal nature, are not taken into 
account in a positivist framework, notwithstanding the fact that they have repercussions 
on how the legal concepts of accessibility and foreseeability work online. 
Despite the limitations that are necessarily connected with adopting a positivist 
approach, modern positivism is particularly suited to answer the above-mentioned 
research questions. This is because this analysis is primarily centred on understanding the 
 
18 Wiessner and Willard (n 15) 320. 
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role played by States in granting the fulfilment of human rights online according to the 
human rights conventions. 
 
1.6 Literature review  
In the current debate concerning State jurisdiction and human rights in cyberspace, 
there are many questions that have been addressed. In particular, the debates in the 
scholarly community have focussed on issues ranging from the concept of sovereignty 
and State jurisdiction in cyberspace to common jurisdictional principles arising from 
Internet-related cases to the way in which jurisdiction has been interpreted according to 
human rights treaties.  
The ongoing debate among the scholars who have examined the concept of State 
jurisdiction on the Internet shows that there is currently no agreement as to how States 
should exercise jurisdiction online.19 Notwithstanding this, some authors have argued that 
some common principles of jurisdiction are emerging through the analysis of State 
practice.20 However, the limit that has emerged from the analysis of the literature 
produced on this subject is that the theme of online State jurisdiction according to human 
rights treaties seems relatively unexplored. Indeed, some authors have focused on the 
analysis of the jurisdictional issues arising from the online violation of a specific human 
right. Others have analysed the meaning of State jurisdiction online according to public 
international law. However, there are not many studies that bring these two areas together 
by investigating the overall theme of online jurisdiction according to the human rights 
conventions. This research aims at contributing to filling this knowledge gap. 
In relation to the meaning of State jurisdiction according to the multilateral human 
rights treaties, some scholars have argued that the concept of State jurisdiction according 
to human rights treaties differs from the concept of State jurisdiction according to general 
 
19 Alisdair Gillespie, ‘Jurisdictional issues concerning online child pornography’ (2012) 20 Int J Law Info 
Tech 151; Mika Hayashi, ‘Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine? Jurisdiction and Cyberspace’ 
(2006) 6 In.L. 284; Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Principles of International Internet Law’ (2010) 11 
German L. J. 1245; Bernhard Maier, ‘How has the law attempted to tackle the borderless nature of the 
internet?’ (2010) 18 Int J Law Info Tech 142; Mohammad Mahabubur Rahman and others ‘Cyberspace 
claiming new dynamism in the jurisprudential philosophy’ (2009) IJLMA, 51, 274; Joanna Kulesza, 
International Internet Law (1st edn, Routledge 2012); Joanna Kulesza and Roy Balleste, ‘Signs and Portents 
in Cyberspace: the Rise of a Jus Internet as New Order in International Law’ (2013) 23 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1311; Pardis Moslemzadeh Therani and Nazura Abdul Manap ‘A rational 
jurisdiction for cyberterrorism’ (2013) 29 Com. L & S Rev 689; Dina I. Oddis ‘Combating Child 
Pornography on the Internet: The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime’ (2002) 16 Temp. Int’l & 
Comp. L. J. 477. 
20 Maier (n 18); Gillespie (n 18); M Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Operations (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 55, Rule 9; Michael A Geist ‘Is There a 
There There - Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction’ (2001) 16(3) Berkeley Tech LJ 1345. 
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international law.21 This thesis further explores this topic with the aim of understanding 
if the concept of cyberspace jurisdiction according to human rights conventions is 
different from the concept of jurisdiction according to international law. 
1.6.1 The international law rules applicable to cyberspace: State sovereignty 
and State jurisdiction online 
One of the themes that have been explored regarding the international law rules 
applicable to cyberspace is the meaning of State sovereignty online. The view whereby 
the principle of State sovereignty applies to acts that happen online and States must not 
violate the sovereignty of other States when conducting these acts has received the 
approval of various academic and governmental experts, especially in the field of 
international security.22 This argument is based on the assertion that sovereignty is an 
enforceable rule of international law whose violation constitutes an international illicit 
act. However, there is an opposing view according to which, rather than being an 
international law rule enforceable per se, sovereignty is merely reflected in specific 
international law norms, such as the rules against the use of force and the prohibition of 
intervention.23 Despite the disagreement, the ‘“sovereignty-as-a-rule”’24 view seems to 
be prevailing in the field of international security, where it received the approval of 
various experts, including the Group of International Experts that produced the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber-Operations and the UN Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Communication Technologies.25  
There is, however, no agreement as to how the international law norms related to 
sovereignty should be interpreted in cyberspace. For example, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
argues that a State that conducts cyber-operations against another State while physically 
 
21 Marko Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human 
Rights Treaties’ (2008) 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 411. 
22 Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Insights and Highlights’ (2017), 48 Geo J Int'l L 735, 741; 
UN. Secretary-General and UN. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security : note / by the Secretary-General, (22 July 2015) A/70/174; Michael Schmitt ‘US 
Transparency Regarding International Law in Cyberspace’ (Just Security, 15 November 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/34465/transparency-international-law-cyberspace/> accessed 12 June 2018; 
Gary Corn ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 – Advancing the Conversation’ (Just Security, 15 February 2017) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancing-conversation/#more-37812> accessed 
12 June 2018. 
23 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 741; Schmitt (n 22); Corn (n 22). 
24 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 741; 
25 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 741; Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (n 22) 12. 
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present on the territory of that State infringes the latter’s sovereignty.26 What remains 
unclear is whether the same act would constitute a violation of sovereignty if the cyber-
operation was conducted remotely (i.e. from the territory of the State launching the 
operation) rather than on the territory of the State against which the operation is directed. 
In this regard, some have claimed that a remote cyber-operation does not constitute a 
violation of State sovereignty per se.27 However, there is disagreement on the factors that 
should be taken into account to determine when a violation of State sovereignty arises as 
a consequence of a remote cyber-operation. According to some commentators, the way 
in which the operation is conducted and the effects that it produces on the targeted State 
should be the factors that determine when a violation of State sovereignty occurs.28 In any 
case, various sources have highlighted the lack of State practice in this area and the overall 
need for States to clarify their views on sovereignty in cyberspace.29 In this regard, 
sovereignty appears to be one of the areas that are most likely to evolve in the immediate 
future.30  
Another debate that is related to the international law rules regarding State 
sovereignty in cyberspace is that concerning whether States should exercise sovereignty 
over the delegation of country code Top-Level Domain names (ccTLD). The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the private not-for-profit 
organisation registered in California responsible for assigning Top Level Domain names 
(TLDs) to operators. This operation is known as delegation of the TLD to a delegee. TLDs 
are divided into generic TLDs, such as .com, and country code TLDs, such as .us. While 
both TLDs function in the same way, they are administered differently.31 Indeed, generic 
TLDs are assigned to a given operator through a contract with ICANN. However, the 
delegation of ccTLDs is less regimented and is mostly left to ‘consensual relationships 
between ICANN, the delegee and governments’.32 Some States have claimed the right to 
exercise control over the related ccTLD as an expression of their sovereignty.33 In 
particular, some documents adopted by ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC) and by the stakeholders of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 
expressed the belief that no State should be involved in decisions regarding another 
 
26 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 741. 
27 Schmitt (n 22). 
28 ibid; Talbot Jensen (n 22) 756-757. 
29 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 743-744; Corn (n 22); Schmitt (n 22). 
30 Talbot Jensen (n 22) 743-744; Schmitt (n 22). 
31 Milton L Mueller and Farzaneh Badiei ‘Governing Internet Territory: ICANN, Sovereignty Claims, 
Property Rights and Country-Code Top Level Domains’ (2017) 18 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 435, 445. 
32 ibid 443. 
33 ibid 439-440; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 16) 1256-1258. 
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State’s ccTLDs. Those documents also stated that public policy decisions regarding 
ccTLDs rested with the respective government.34  
The State sovereignty claim over ccTLDs has found the approval of some 
commentators, who have observed how the principle of territorial sovereignty has adapted 
to cyberspace and has extended to ccTLDs which can be considered as part of State 
territory.35 However, other authors have rejected this sovereignty claim as unfounded.36 
In particular, they have observed that, while it is true that ccTLDs refer to geographical 
areas that in most cases can be reconducted to States, they do not necessarily correspond 
to sovereign States (ex. the Isle of Man, which is part of the UK, has its own ccTLD, 
.im).37 Instead, these areas match the geographical territories identified by an international 
standard, the ISO-3166-1 which was used to develop ccTLDs.38 In addition, the mere 
correspondence between a ccTLD and a given State is not enough according to 
international law to justify the exercise of sovereignty.39 These arguments seem 
particularly convincing. Indeed, the territorial jurisdiction principle establishes that States 
can control any business located within their territory, including domain names registries. 
However, there is no international law rule that establishes that merely referring to a 
geographical area that can be reconducted to a given State is enough for that State to 
exercise jurisdiction.40 
Closely related to the theme of State sovereignty online is the meaning of State 
jurisdiction in cyberspace according to international law. This theme has been approached 
by various scholars from different angles. Some authors have focussed on the well-
 
34 ‘It is recalled that the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) to ICANN has previously adopted the 
general principle that the Internet naming system is a public resource in the sense that its functions must be 
administered in the public or common interest. The WSIS Declaration of December 2003 states that “policy 
authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and 
responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.” This is in the context that, 
“Governments, as well as private sector, civil society and the United Nations and other international 
organizations have an important role and responsibility in the development of the Information Society and, 
as appropriate, in decision-making processes. Building a people-centred Information Society is a joint effort 
which requires cooperation and partnership among all stakeholders’, Governmental Advisory Committee 
‘Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration of Country Code Top Level Domains’ 
(ICANN Archives, 5 April 2005) <https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/gac/gac-cctld-principles.htm> 
accessed: 11 September 2020, [1.6]; ‘Countries should not be involved in decisions regarding another 
country’s countrycode Top-Level Domain (ccTLD). Their legitimate interests, as expressed and defined by 
each country, in diverse ways, regarding decisions affecting their ccTLDs, need to be respected, upheld and 
addressed via a flexible and improved framework and mechanism’, World Summit on the Information 
Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (18 November 2005) WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-
E, [63]; Mueller and Badiei (n 30) 451-454, 464; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 16) 1258. 
35 Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 16) 1256.  
36 Mueller and Badiei (n 30) 459-460. 
37 ibid 444. 
38 ibid 459-460. 
39 ibid 462. 
40 On this point see also Mueller and Badiei (n 30) 489. 
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established public international law principles of jurisdiction, in order to understand 
whether and how these principles change when applied to cyberspace. In this regard, some 
authors have examined the way in which the objective territorial principle and the effects 
doctrine function online. These two jurisdictional principles can be interpreted as two 
extensions of the principle of territorial jurisdiction.41 According to the objective 
territorial principle, a State can exercise jurisdiction over a given act when at least one of 
the latter’s constitutive elements, its effect, takes place physically within the State’s 
territory.42 As to the effects doctrine, this can be described as the exercise of State 
jurisdiction over acts that produce significant effects within the national territory, even if 
they have happened entirely abroad.43 In this case, the link between the exercise of State 
jurisdiction and the act upon which jurisdiction is exercised is represented solely by the 
latter’s effects. The absence of a territorial connection between the State exercising 
jurisdiction and the act upon which jurisdiction is exercised is one of the main reasons 
why the effects doctrine has been criticised for not offering a clear limit to the exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.44 In contrast, the objective territorial principle can be seen 
as offering such a limit.45 However, according to some commentators, in Internet-related 
cases the difference between the objective territorial principle and the effects doctrine 
loses significance since the former tends to merge with the latter.46 This is because it is 
very difficult to establish when an online act happens within the territory of a given State 
and when it produces adverse effects there. Therefore, both principles have been 
interpreted as offering uncertain limits to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.47 
However, some authors have argued that there is a tendency on national courts’ part to 
limit the effects doctrine by looking at whether other connecting factors exist that could 
link a webpage to the country exercising jurisdiction. An example of this point can be 
found in the reliance of the Federal Court in the Töben case on the fact that the Holocaust 
affected Germany in a special way.48  
The way in which States have tried to adapt to the apparently borderless nature of the 
Internet is another theme that has been debated in the scholarly community. Some authors 
 




45 ibid 289. 
46 Hayashi (n 16) 298-301; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 16) 1255. 
47 Hayashi (n 16) 289, 301. 
48 Bundesgerichtshof, Toeben (Federal Court), Judgment of 12 December 2000, case 1 StR 184/00, 46 
Entscheidungen Des Bundesgerichtshoifns Strafsachen(B Ghst) 212 (2001) = 54 Neue Juristischew 
Ochenschrift (NJW) 624 (2001), also available through http://www.bundesercht hofd/, 628 (2001) (as cited 
in Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 16) 1255-1256). 
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have focussed on the role played by the domestic courts in dealing with Internet-related 
cases. In particular, some commentators argue that there is a tendency on the domestic 
courts’ part to identify the virtual space by relying on the same criteria that are usually 
applied to the physical space.49 According to this view, Courts have not tried to invent a 
new rule of jurisdiction applicable to Internet-related cases and have rather maintained a 
sense of territory.50 Other authors have identified some common principles of jurisdiction 
that arise from the analysis of the criteria that different legal systems rely upon to establish 
jurisdiction in Internet-related cases.51 Some authors, for example, have selected three 
areas of law, namely defamation law, data protection and privacy law, and gambling and 
have identified some themes that are common across the various legal systems 
examined.52 Among the principles identified are the country of origin approach, location 
of the equipment, destination at which the publication of online material was directed, 
effects doctrine and creation of artificial borders.53 The conclusion reached in this regard 
is that different areas of law have used differing approaches according to the policy 
objective to be achieved.54 
The comparative approach has been adopted also by those authors that have focussed 
on how different legal systems have regulated one specific Internet-related crime. For 
example, some commentators have compared the criteria used in England and Wales to 
allocate jurisdiction in relation to online child pornography with the criteria in force in 
the United States.55 In this regard, the theory brought forward is that in England and Wales 
the terminatory principle has been replaced by the ‘“substantial measure”’ principle, 
according to which British courts have jurisdiction over a crime when a substantial part 
of the activities that constitute that crime takes place in Britain.56 As to the US 
 
49 Hayashi (n 16) 297-298, 302. 
50 ibid 302. 
51 Maier (n 16). The legal systems Maier he has taken into account in his article differ according to the area 
of law examined. In regard to the criteria used to allocate jurisdiction in the field of defamation law, Maier 
has compared the approach used in the Brussels Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters [2001] OJ L012 (as cited in Maier (n 16) 150) with the approach used in the United Kingdom, 
Australia and United States. In reference to the law of data protection and privacy, Maier has examined the 
European Data Protection Directive 1995 (Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31, 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html (as cited in Maier (n 16) 157-158). Finally, 
in relation to gambling, the legal systems taken into account by Maier are the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the EU system represented by the Electronic Commerce directive (Council Directive 2000/31/EC 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), [2000] OJ L178 (as cited in Maier (n 16) 165). 
52 ibid 160-174. 
53 ibid 172-174. 
54 ibid 175. 
55 Gillespie (n 16). 
56 ibid 161. 
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jurisdictional approach, these commentators have referred to the criteria employed to 
assess federal jurisdiction over online child pornography. This approach has been defined 
it as the ‘“per-se approach”’, whereby the Internet is considered as an instrument of 
interstate commerce per-se, irrespective of whether or not the data are transmitted 
between servers located in different States.57  
Another theme that has been explored is the possibility of considering cyberspace as 
a new jurisdictional area. Some scholars have examined whether the jurisdictional regime 
reserved to international spaces - such as the high seas and outer space – could be applied 
to the Internet. According to this view, cyberspace could be considered as a fourth 
international space and should be governed by rules that are similar to those applicable to 
the other three international spaces.58 According to the proponents of this argument, one 
of the advantages of this approach is that this way the ‘“sovereign-less character”’ of 
cyberspace could adequately be addressed.59 The idea of cyberspace as an international 
space has, however, attracted critiques. The main objection to this theory is that 
cyberspace is intrinsically different from the other international spaces and that it does 
not share their same characteristics: being a physical territory, being completely separate 
from the territory of sovereign States, and not trespassing the national borders.60 At the 
same time, however, it has been pointed out that, although cyberspace cannot be regarded 
as a physical territory in itself, it nonetheless retains some physical characteristics. Indeed, 
it is a network of computers and servers that are located within the States’ territories. 
Therefore, it would be unrealistic to believe that the States would renounce to ‘their 
sovereign rights to establish cyberspace as a form of international space’.61 
Finally, other authors have called for the rise of a new branch of international law, 
namely Ius Internet, establishing an a-territorial and supranational space of interactions 
between people located in different territories. According to this view, the only way to 
regulate cyberspace would be through international law.62 Kulesza refers to the few global 
acts, soft law documents, and theses presented in the international law doctrine regarding 
cyberspace, affirming that until now these instruments constitute the body of International 
Internet Law (IIL).63 In Kulesza’s opinion, IIL can be defined as the public international 
framework for Internet governance, covering issues ranging from civil law, trade law, 
 
57 ibid 165. 
58 Rahman and others (n 16). 
59 ibid 287. 
60 Gillespie (n 16) 157-158. 
61 ibid 158. 
62 Kulesza (n 16); Kulesza & Balleste (n 16); Therani & Manap (n 16). 
63 Kulesza, (n 16) 137. 
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administrative law, financial law, and criminal law. Finally, the author explores the 
possibility of creating an Internet Framework Convention that would incorporate the 
emerging IIL principles, tackle the issues related to electronic communication, and 
propose a multi-stakeholder regime.64 
1.6.2 The concept of State jurisdiction according to the multilateral human 
rights conventions 
Another theme that has been explored by scholars relates to the concept of State 
jurisdiction according to some of the existing human rights conventions. In particular, 
these scholars aim to determine whether the concept of State jurisdiction differs between 
human rights conventions and public international law.65 
In this respect, Milanović has analysed the jurisdictional clauses contained in eight 
human rights conventions66, by dividing them into two categories: single jurisdiction 
clauses that define the applicability of the treaty as a whole, and multiple jurisdiction 
clauses related to specific rights or obligations under the treaty. The thesis expressed by 
Milanović is that the meaning of the term jurisdiction under human rights treaties is 
related to ‘a sort of factual power that a State exercises over persons or territory’.67 This 
concept does not include the notion of legal competence and is different from the 
definition of jurisdiction according to general international law, which defines the right 
of each State to regulate conducts and events.68 
Milanović has examined the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) regarding the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In his opinion, not only 
has the ECtHR developed a concept of jurisdiction that is different from the one according 
 
64 ibid. 153. 
65 M Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights: territorial focus 
in the age of globalization’ (2005) 52 Netherl I L Rev 349. 
66 Milanović (n 21). The human rights conventions examined by Milanović are: Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) (ETS 5), 213 UNTS 222, entered 
into force 3 September 1953 (as cited in Milanović (n 21) 412); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 (as cited in Milanović n 
(21) 412); Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at 
the abolition of the death penalty, (1990) 29 ILM 1464, entered into force 11 July 1991 (as cited in 
Milanović (n 21) 413); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families 1990 (Migrant Workers Convention) 2220 UNTS 93, entered into force 1 
July 2003 (as cited in Milanović (n 21) 413); American Convention on Human Rights 1989 (ACHR) OAS 
TS 36, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (as cited in Milanović (n 21) 413); UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) 1577 UNTS 3, entered into force 2 September 1990 ( as cited in 
Milanović (n 21) 413); Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (CERD) 
660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4 January 1969 (as cited in Milanović (n 21) 414); Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT) 1465 UNTS 85, 
entered into force 26 June 1987 (as cited in Milanović (n 21) 414). 
67 Milanović (n 21) 417. 
68 ibid 417, 422. 
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to general international law, but it has done so assuming that this concept equates to the 
concept of jurisdiction as established in general international law.69 In order to explain 
Milanović’s thesis, it is useful to briefly summarise the ECtHR’s jurisprudence regarding 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. According to the Loizidou70 ruling, one State 
militarily occupying another State’s territory exerts its jurisdiction and must therefore 
respect the European Convention. In other words, the Court affirmed that the contracting 
State’s ‘obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it is exercised directly, through 
its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration’.71 In contrast, in the 
Banković case, the Grand Chamber of the Court stated that, due to the regional nature of 
the ECHR, a State that bombs another State that is outside the legal space of the 
Convention is not exercising jurisdiction according to Article 1.72 In 2004, in the Issa 
decision, the Court referred to military operations conducted in a six-week period by 
Turkey in Northern Iraq against an alleged terrorist who had fled there.73 The Court 
maintained that, in principle, these operations could be considered as being conducted in 
the jurisdiction of the perpetrating State rather than the State on whose territory these 
operations are occurring. However, the perpetrating State must have full control over the 
territory in question, regardless of the fact that this territory does not fall in the juridical 
space of the contracting States.74 Milanović has observed that exercising effective overall 
control over a territory does not necessarily correspond to exercising jurisdiction 
according to international law. Indeed, in his opinion, to exercise jurisdiction, a State 
would need to extend the application of its domestic laws to the occupied territory.75 The 
author also observed that, although in the Banković case the Court apparently reached a 
different conclusion than the one adopted in the Loizidou case, this case ‘did not go far 
enough in bringing the Court’s case law back into conformity with general international 
law’.76 
 
69 ibid 417. 
70 Loizidou v. Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECHR, 18 December 1996). 
71 Loizidou v. Turkey App no 15318/89 Preliminary objections (ECHR, 23 March 1995) para. 62. 
72 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001) para 80. 
73 Issa and Others v. Turkey App no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 30 March 2005). 
74 ibid paras 69, 71, 74. 
75 Milanović (n 21) 423. 
76 ibid 425. 
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In this regard, it is worth mentioning an argument that is partially linked to the theme 
of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR: the development of positive obligations under the 
ECHR arising from the jurisprudence of the Court.77  
Mowbray has observed that, rather than articulating a specific theory of the positive 
obligations arising from the Convention, the ECtHR has developed implied positive 
obligations across the articles of the ECHR. The Court relied upon two justifications to 
explain why this approach was adopted. The first justification is the necessity to ensure 
that the relevant rights are practical and effective in their exercise. The second is the 
Court’s intention to reduce the number of long and expensive fact-finding missions by 
imposing the positive obligations on States to conduct effective investigations into crimes 
such as killings and disappearances.78  
The author defines the positive obligations developed by the Court as forms of 
positive actions that the States are required to take in order to effectively guarantee the 
fulfilment of the rights enshrined in the Convention. In other words, “passive non-
interference by governmental authorities with persons’ Convention rights is not sufficient 
to ensure that many of those rights are fully and effectively respected”.79 
Mowbray has identified two main groups of positive obligations: those related with 
different stages of the criminal system, and those concerned with the duty of States to 
conduct effective investigations into claims that serious violations of Convention rights 
have occurred. In his opinion, the Court’s case law regarding positive obligations has 
eroded the “generational gap between Convention rights and later generation of 
international human rights”.80 
 
1.7 Novel elements of the research 
The analysis of the literature produced around the concept of online State jurisdiction 
and the respect for human rights in cyberspace shows that there are some gaps in the 
scholarly debate regarding these areas.  
First, most of the research that has been produced and published so far reveals that 
there is currently no agreement as to what jurisdiction means when it is applied to 
cyberspace. By investigating the concept of cyberspace jurisdiction according to human 
 
77 Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2004). 
78 ibid 221-222. 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid 231. 
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rights conventions, my research will contribute to clarifying the meaning of this term in 
the field of human rights law. By fulfilling this objective, the thesis will contribute to 
clarifying the meaning of online jurisdiction in the broader field of international internet 
law. 
The second knowledge gap that can be identified in the literature is that the authors 
who have analysed the meaning of cyberspace jurisdiction have not properly investigated 
the meaning that this term acquires as it applies to human rights treaties. Instead, most 
authors have primarily analysed the jurisdictional issues that derive from online violations 
of a specific human right. Therefore, the overall theme of cyberspace jurisdiction 
according to the human rights conventions is considerably unexplored. Equally, the 
scholars who have investigated the concept of State jurisdiction in human rights 
conventions have not properly clarified the meaning of the concept of online State 
jurisdiction in terms of these conventions. Therefore, the novel element that my research 
will introduce is an explanation of the connection between State jurisdiction online and 
State jurisdiction according to human rights conventions. These two fields have so far 
mostly been approached separately. 
In conclusion, by developing this research, the thesis will contribute to adding clarity 
and robustness to a field of study, international internet law, in which multiple areas 
remain relatively new and unexplored. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This thesis focuses on two specific ways in which States are exercising jurisdiction 
extraterritorially in relation to content published online: the access-based jurisdictional 
approach and the territorial connection requirement. The research aims at answering the 
following two research questions: first, are these two extraterritorial jurisdictional 
approaches compliant with the freedom of expression requirements of the human rights 
conventions? Secondly, what does online State jurisdiction mean according to the human 
rights conventions? This research relies on the doctrinal analysis research methodology 
and on the modern positivist theoretical framework. The analysis of the literature 
produced in this chapter around the concept of online State jurisdiction and respect for 
human rights in cyberspace shows in particular two knowledge gaps that this research 
aims to fill. The first gap is related to the uncertain meaning of State jurisdiction online. 
The second is the fact that two areas, the meaning of State jurisdiction according to human 
rights conventions and the meaning of State jurisdiction according to public international 
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law have so far been examined separately. Consequently, the meaning of online State 
jurisdiction according to the human rights convention has been relatively unexplored. 
The next chapter will focus on the access-based jurisdictional approach and will 
illustrate the key characteristics of this approach together with the implications that it has 
on the fulfilment of freedom of expression in cyberspace. 
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This chapter discusses the key characteristics of the access-based jurisdictional 
principle and explores the main critiques that this approach has attracted. The main claim 
put forward in this chapter is that the access-based jurisdictional approach impacts 
negatively on the freedom of expression of foreign-based Internet users and it represents 
an unpredictable exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. To substantiate this claim, 
section two will introduce the main characteristics of the access-based approach, while 
section three will provide an outline of some key cases where national courts in Europe, 
North America and East Asia established jurisdiction based on the accessibility of online 
content. Section four will critically analyse this jurisdictional approach, while section five 
will focus on the implications that this approach has on the fulfilment of freedom of 
expression in cyberspace. Finally, section six will summarize the main conclusions of the 
analysis conducted in the previous sections. 
 
2.2 The access-based jurisdictional approach  
The Internet has posed multiple challenges to the human rights protection regime, 
one of which involves the definition of the concept of State jurisdiction in cyberspace. 
Jurisdiction, according to some authors, is the area of international law most affected by 
cyberspace.1 Indeed, currently there is a high level of uncertainty as to the meaning of 
State jurisdiction online, as interpreted by both general international law and human rights 
law. 
One of the reasons why it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of State jurisdiction in 
cyberspace is the apparently borderless nature of the Internet. Indeed, as observed by 
many commentators, traditionally State jurisdiction has been established by relying 
primarily on the territorial criterion i.e. a State can exercise jurisdiction over acts 
 
1 Some of the issues explored in this chapter were addressed in Sara Solmone ‘Establishing Jurisdiction 
Online: the Problem of the Access-based Jurisdictional Principle’ (RIPE Labs, 16 October 2017) < 
https://labs.ripe.net/Members/sara_solmone/establishing-jurisdiction-online> accessed: 14 September 
2020. Mika Hayashi, ‘Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine? Jurisdiction and Cyberspace’ 
(2006) 6 In.L. 284. 
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committed within its territory and over people located within its borders.2 However, the 
acts committed online happen in a prima facie non-physical environment, where it is not 
always possible to clearly identify both the perpetrator of an unlawful act and the territory 
in which the act originated. It is also equally unclear where the unlawful act produced its 
adverse effects. Indeed, once published online, content becomes immediately accessible 
to everybody everywhere. For all these reasons, it appears particularly difficult to 
establish which State would be entitled to apply its own laws to regulate acts committed 
online. 
Currently, multiple and conflicting national laws are simultaneously being applied by 
States to regulate content published online.3 Indeed, as stated in an issue paper published 
in 2014 by the Council of Europe High Commissioner for Human Rights, several States 
have simultaneously applied their national laws to regulate ‘activities of individuals who 
are not nationals of those States and who live outside their respective territories’.4 Due to 
the uncertainty as to the rules governing the exercise of State jurisdiction online several 
national courts have established jurisdiction over content published online and hosted 
abroad on the basis of the fact that that content could be accessed from within the territory 
of the States where the courts are located. 
This phenomenon can be described as the access-based jurisdictional approach. 
According to this approach, the accessibility from within the territory of a given State of 
content published online from abroad is deemed to be a sufficient link for the national 
courts of that State to establish jurisdiction over it.  
The distinctive characteristic of the access-based jurisdictional approach is that when 
establishing whether they have jurisdiction over the content published online the courts 
are not concerned with establishing where that content was uploaded from or which 
country it was targeting. Indeed, according to general international law, a State can 
exercise jurisdiction over acts committed in full or in part within its territory, or over acts 
directed against its nationals or carried out by them. A State can also exercise jurisdiction 
over acts that were committed elsewhere but produced negative effects within its territory. 
The peculiarity of the access-based jurisdictional approach is that no jurisdictional link 
exists between the content published online and the country exercising jurisdiction other 
than the fact that that content can be accessed by Internet users located within the territory 
 
2 Hayashi (n 1) 284; Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Principles of International Internet Law’ (2010) 11 
German L. J. 1245, 1253. 
3 Uta Kohl, ‘Ignorance is no Defence, but is Inaccessibility? On the Accessibility of National Laws to 
Foreign Online Publishers’ (2005) 14 Info.& Comm.Tech.L. 25. 
4 Douwe Korff, The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital world, Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014, 56. 
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of the State exercising jurisdiction. Indeed, as explained below, the parties responsible 
for the publication of the material online are usually foreign parties located in foreign 
States where they claim that the material has been uploaded from and is stored. Besides, 
the content is perfectly legal in the country where the party responsible for its publication 
operates. 
Another important characteristic of the access-based jurisdictional approach is that, 
as some authors rightly observe, this principle seems to incorporate both the objective 
territorial principle and the effects doctrine.5 In other words, the rationale behind its 
application by national courts is not always clear. More specifically, it is unclear whether 
the act of publishing content online is equated to having committed an act within the 
territory of the State where that content can be accessed or whether publishing content 
online, although occurring abroad, has produced an adverse effect within the territory of 
the country establishing jurisdiction. In this regard, the authors arguing that the objective 
territorial principle and the effects doctrine tend to merge when applied to cyberspace are 
correct.6 
Having introduced the main characteristics of the access-based jurisdictional 
approach, the next section will provide an overview of key cases discussed before national 
and regional courts where this approach has been adopted. 
  
2.3 Case selection 
The cases examined in the next paragraphs are heterogeneous: they are related to 
different jurisdictions and different areas of law. These cases have been discussed before 
the national courts of Australia, US, Ireland, Canada, Hong Kong, UK, France and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Eight out of nine cases are civil cases 
while the remaining one, R v Perrin, is a criminal one.7 Seven cases deal with defamation 
(Dow Jones v Gutnick,8 Young v New Haven Advocate,9 Coleman v MGN Limited,10 
Breeden v Black,11 Yeung v Google Inc.,12 eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier 
 
5 Hayashi (n 1) 298-301; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 2) 1254-1255. 
6 ibid 298-299, 301. 
7 R v Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747. 
8 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575. 
9 Young v New Haven Advocate et al, 184 F. Supp. 2d 498 (W.D. Va. 2001); Young v New Haven Advocate 
et al, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
10 Coleman v MGN Limited [2012] IESC 20 [4] (Denham CJ). 
11 Breeden v Black 2012 SCC 19 666. 
12 Yeung, Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc. HCA 1383/2012 (5 August 2014). 
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Martinez Robert Martinez v MGN Limited 13 and Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid 
Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB14), and two with the publication of content that violates 
criminal law (R v Perrin and UEJF et Licra v Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France15). Moreover, 
while eight out of nine cases are related to acts committed by defendants located in a 
foreign State, the case of Young v New Haven examines an inter-state dispute between 
parties situated in two different States within the United States. 
Notwithstanding these differences, these cases all outline the difficulties that national 
courts face when establishing jurisdiction in Internet-related disputes over defendants 
located outside the domestic forum. Indeed, the national courts in these cases were faced 
with the same challenge: establishing when an act committed online by defendants 
located in another State can be said to have happened within the domestic court’s 
jurisdiction. More importantly, the national courts in these cases have all given the same 
answer to this question: jurisdiction can be exercised in the country where the content 
published online can be accessed.  
The case selection was conducted by relying on a theoretically informed, research 
question-driven approach. Indeed, the cases that were selected are those in which the 
access-based jurisdictional approach was adopted. The rationale behind this choice lies 
in the fact that this research aims to shed light on the distinctive characteristics and 
critiques of the use of the access-based jurisdictional criterion. These aspects emerge from 
the analysis of the cases where this approach has been adopted, irrespective of the country 
in which it was used, the area of law affected and the civil or common law nature of the 
legal system in place. 
Establishing jurisdiction based on access would appear to be quite common among 
national courts, at least in the geographic areas covered by the cases selected. Indeed, 
many scholars investigating this subject agree that establishing jurisdiction based on 
access has become an increasingly popular and acceptable way for States to exercise 
jurisdiction over content posted online.16 An example of this point can be found in the 
 
13 Joined Cases C–509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez Robert 
Martinez v MGN Limited [2011] ECR I–10269. 
14 Case C‑194/16 Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:766. 
15 TGI Paris, référé, 22 mai 2000, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France as reported in Juriscom.net 
‘TGI Paris, référé, 22 mai 2000, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France’ (Juriscom.net) < 
http://juriscom.net/tgi-paris-refere-22-mai-2000-uejf-et-licra-c-yahoo-inc-et-yahoo-france/> accessed 19 
February 2017. 
16 Kohl ‘Ignorance is no Defence’ (n 3) 25-26, 37; Korff (n 4) 56. According to the Geneva Internet Disputes 
Resolution policy, the accessibility criterion has been mostly discredited and abandoned outside the EU 
community law. To substantiate this claim, the policy at page 4 refers to a series of national cases in 
England, France and the United States where this approach has been rejected, University of Geneva 
‘Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution Policies 1.0’ (Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution Policies 1.0) 
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CJEU eDate Advertising case which shows that according to EU law the accessibility of 
online content from within the territory of a Member State can be a sufficient basis for 
that State to exercise jurisdiction over the content.17 In addition, some authors underline 
how the access-based jurisdictional approach has been adopted by States transversally 
across different areas of law, rather than being associated with (or confined to) a specific 
area. Khol, for example, refers to a variety of documents and national laws that span from 
consumer protection to gambling and from defamation to obscenity when outlining some 
instances where this approach was adopted.18 However, other commentators highlight 
how the access-based approach appears to be particularly common in a specific area of 
law, such as defamation.19 
2.3.1 The Dow Jones v Gutnick case 
The case of Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick was decided in December 2002 
by the High Court of Australia (HCA). The defamation proceedings were initiated in 
October 2000 by Mr. Gutnick, an Australian businessman and resident, who brought a 
case before the Supreme Court of Victoria. Mr. Gutnick sought compensation for damage 
to his reputation that he alleged had happened in Victoria. The harm to reputation was 
said to be caused by the publication of a defamatory article by the US-based Dow Jones 
on the subscription website WSJ.com, where the allegedly defamatory article was 
published as part of the Barron’s Online journal.  
Dow Jones applied to Hedigan J from the Supreme Court of Victoria asking for the 
current proceedings to be set aside and any further proceedings on the matter to be 
 
<https://geneva-internet-disputes.ch/> accessed: July 2017), 4. However, this point is debatable. Indeed, 
the cases examined in this chapter show that as of 2017 this approach was still in use at least in the countries 
mentioned in the chapter. This view is also confirmed by other scholars, such as Michael Geist, who 
underline how some States have recurred to the access criterion to establish jurisdiction in cross-borders 
cases. See Michael Geist ‘Courts adopt aggressive approach in cross-border Internet jurisdiction cases’ 
(The Star.com, 5 January 2013). 
<https://www.thestar.com/business/2013/01/05/courts_adopt_aggressive_approach_in_crossborder_intern
et_jurisdiction_cases.html#.UOrJtuIHp7w.twitter> accessed 15 November 2017. 
17 eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (n 13). See section 
2.3.6 for an analysis of the eDate case. 
18 Kohl ‘Ignorance is no Defence’ (n 3) 26, 37. The documents cited by Khol are: European Council 
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, OJ L 012, 16/01/2001 p. 1-23 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37); US 
v. Ross [1999] WL 782749 (SDNY) (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37); National Sporttotaliser Foundation v. 
Ladbrokes Ltd District Court, The Hague, 27 January 2003 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37); Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, Offers of Securities on the Internet, Policy Statement 141 (10 February 1999, 
reissued 2 March 2000), PS 141.5, 141.14, 141.16 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37); Dow Jones & Co Inc v. 
Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37); R v. Perrin [2002] EWCA 747 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 
37); R v. Tdben BGH, Urt. v. 12.12.2000-1 StR 184/00 (LG Mannheim), reproduced in Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift, 8, p. 624 (as cited by Kohl (n 3) 37). 
19 Bernhard Maier, ‘How Has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet?’ (2010) 
18 (2) Int J Law Info Tech 142, 149-157. 
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stayed.20 Dow Jones claimed that the Supreme Court of Victoria did not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case as the publication of the allegedly defamatory article had happened in the 
United States, and more specifically in New Jersey, where the article was uploaded on 
the Dow Jones’ servers. Hedigan J dismissed Dow Jones’ appeal since he found that the 
defamation of Mr. Gutnick had happened in Victoria, where the article could be 
downloaded and was therefore comprehensible by readers located there.21 The Court of 
Appeal of Victoria, dismissed Dow Jones’ appeal and upheld the primary judge’s 
decision.22 The case was therefore brought to the High Court of Australia (HCA). 
In its judgment, the HCA explained that Australian common law choice of law 
requires the judges to apply the law of the place of the tort, which in the present case is 
defamation. The judges then explained the main elements of the tort of defamation. They 
stated that under Australian law defamation is defined as damage to reputation due to the 
publication of defamatory material. The HCA also added that the tort of defamation is 
usually located at the place where the damage to reputation occurs. In addition, the judges 
clarified that since the actionable wrong is the damage to reputation, for the tort of 
defamation to exist, not only has the material to be published, it must also be made 
available to the reader in comprehensible form.23 This is because it is only when the 
material is comprehended by a third party that the damage to reputation occurs.24 Indeed, 
the Court specified that publication of defamatory material must be interpreted as ‘a 
bilateral act - in which the publisher makes it available and a third party has it available 
for his or her comprehension’.25 Therefore, the Court found that the respondent’s claim 
that the damage to his reputation had happened in Victoria was correct. Indeed, Mr. 
Gutnick had a reputation in Victoria and it was in Victoria that the material published 
online could be downloaded and was therefore comprehensible to readers. As stated by 
the Court  
 
‘[i]n the case of material on the World Wide Web, it is not available in 
comprehensible form until downloaded on to the computer of a person who has used 
a web browser to pull the material from the web server. It is where that person 
downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done. Ordinarily then, 
that will be the place where the tort of defamation is committed’.26  
 
 
20 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (n 8) [5]. 
21 ibid [7]. 
22 ibid [8]. 
23 ibid [25]-[26]. 
24 ibid [26]. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid [44]. 
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2.3.2 The Young v New Haven Advocate case 
Legal proceedings in the case of Young v New Haven Advocate were initiated by Mr. 
Young, an American citizen who lived and worked in Virginia as a warden in the Wallens 
Ridge State Prison.27 On 12 May 2000 Mr. Young sued two Connecticut-based 
newspapers, the New Haven Advocate and the Hartford Courant, their editors, and two 
journalists who worked for the newspapers. The appellant’s claim was related to the 
publication of some allegedly defamatory articles on the newspapers’ respective 
websites.28 The articles were focused on the transfer of some inmates from Connecticut 
to Virginia. Mr. Young claimed that the articles contained allegations that he was a racist 
and favoured the mistreatment of the Wallens Ridge inmates.29 The proceedings were 
brought before Virginia Western District Court.  
The defendants asked the Court to dismiss the proceedings due to lack of personal 
jurisdiction over them. Indeed, the defendants, who were based in Connecticut, claimed 
that they did not operate in Virginia and neither their articles nor their websites targeted 
a Virginia audience. On the other hand, Mr. Young contended that the fact that the 
defendants maintained the websites and had published the articles online equated to 
conducting business activities in Virginia.30 Therefore, according to the plaintiff’s claim, 
Virginia Western District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. 
In its decision of 10 August 2001, the District Court found that it had jurisdiction 
over the Connecticut-based defendants pursuant to section 8.01-328(A) (3) of the Code 
of Virginia.31 Point (3) establishes that Virginian courts have jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants who cause tort or injuries by an act or omission committed in 
Virginia.32 The District Court found that the defendants had acted within the territory of 
Virginia because they had published allegedly defamatory articles on their websites, 
which were accessible in Virginia.33 In addition, the judges found that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants did not violate the requirements of due process 
because of two main facts.34 First, the articles published online were related to events that 
had happened in Virginia and at least one of those articles expressly mentioned Mr. 
 
27 Young v New Haven Advocate et al W.D. (n 9) 500. 
28 Young v New Haven Advocate et al, 4th Cir. (n 9) 501. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid 502.  
31 Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1(A) (3). 
32‘A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause 
of action arising from the person's […] Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth’ 
ibid. 
33 Young v New Haven Advocate et al W.D. (n 9) 508. 
34 ibid 511. 
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Young, a Virginia resident.35 Secondly, when posting those articles online, the defendants 
knew that that material was accessible to Virginia residents and that therefore any 
potentially defamatory content related to a Virginia resident was going to produce harm 
in Virginia.36 In this regard, the Court added that since content published online is 
accessible to a worldwide audience, it is ‘physically “present” in different locations at 
one time’ and can therefore be subjected to multistate jurisdiction.37 Finally, the Court 
found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was legitimate because Virginia had a 
proper interest in preventing its residents being subjected to online defamation.38 
Therefore, the District Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.39 
The defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which issued its 
decision on 13 December 2002. Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeal accepted 
the defendants’ claim that Virginia courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them and 
therefore reversed the District Court’s order.40 Indeed, the judges found that Virginia 
Courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants since neither their 
websites nor their articles were directed at a Virginia audience. In this regard, the Court 
stated that the mere publication of content online by people living outside a given State 
is not sufficient to bring them within the jurisdiction of that State or within the jurisdiction 
of any State from which that content is accessible. The consequence of adopting this 
jurisdictional approach would be to violate the due process principle, which regulates the 
exercise of State jurisdiction over out-of-State residents.41 The judges found that 
‘[s]omething more than posting and accessibility is needed’ for a State to establish 
jurisdiction over online content posted by Internet users located in another State.42 More 
specifically, ‘an intent to target and focus’ on the audience located in a given State is 
necessary for that State to establish jurisdiction over the person responsible for the 
publication of that content online.43 
The criteria relied upon by the Court to establish whether the two newspapers had 
intentionally targeted Virginia were the absence of advertisement aimed at a Virginia 
audience, Connecticut-based weather and traffic information, and links to Connecticut 
 
35 ibid 508. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid 509. 
38 ibid 510. 
39 ibid 511. 
40 Young v New Haven Advocate et al 4th Cir. (n 9) 3. 




institutions.44 The judges then turned to the content of the allegedly defamatory articles 
to determine whether the articles targeted Virginia. In this case as well, the Court found 
that the articles were focussing on events and policies that affected Connecticut, rather 
than Virginia.45 Therefore, because both the websites and the articles were not manifestly 
targeting Virginia, the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendants did not have 
‘sufficient Internet contacts with Virginia to permit the district court to exercise specific 
jurisdiction over them’.46 
2.3.3 The Coleman v MGN Limited case 
John Coleman, an Irish citizen living in Ireland, brought legal proceedings against 
MGN Limited, the England-based editorial group which publishes, sells and supplies the 
newspaper Daily Mirror. The proceedings were brought before the High Court of Ireland. 
Mr. Coleman alleged that he had been defamed by MGN due to the publication of two 
articles and a photograph of him accompanying the articles. The articles and the picture 
appeared in March and September 2003’s printed editions of the Daily Mirror. Although 
Mr Coleman’s name was not mentioned in the articles, he claimed that he had been 
defamed due to the juxtaposition of the picture and the articles. Since the articles talked 
about excessive alcohol consumption in the UK, Coleman claimed that it could be 
inferred that their content was referring to him. 
Originally, Mr Coleman’s claim was confined to the circulation on the Irish territory 
of printed copies of the Daily Mirror.47 MGN asked the High Court to decline jurisdiction, 
but Charleton J dismissed the defendant’s request. MGN appealed to the Supreme Court 
against the High Court’s decision. The company argued that Irish Courts lacked 
jurisdiction because the alleged defamation had happened in England, where MGN was 
established.48 In addition, the appellant pointed out that there was no evidence of the 
circulation of the relevant printed editions of the Daily Mirror on the Irish territory.49 
In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, however, Mr Coleman’s claim changed 
to focus exclusively on the publication of the said articles and picture on the Internet. 
More specifically, the plaintiff’s argument was that the damage to his reputation had 
happened on the Irish territory because the Daily Mirror was published online at the time 
 
44 ibid 10-11. 
45 ibid 11. 
46 ibid. 
47 Coleman v MGN Limited (n 10) [4]. 
48 ibid [7]. 
49 ibid. 
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of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, in 2012.50 It could therefore be assumed 
that in 2003 the defamatory material had been published online as well, and was 
accessible from within Ireland’s territory.51 The Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Coleman’s 
argument because it evidenced several ‘fatal flaws’.52 Indeed, although the appellant’s 
claim shifted from the publication of printed copies of the newspaper to its online 
publication, it was never pleaded that the relevant material had been published online.53 
More importantly, the Court found that for the tort of defamation to be established, it is 
essential to produce evidence of publication of the defamatory material within the 
domestic jurisdiction. However, the Court stated that no evidence had been produced 
showing that the defamatory content or the Daily Mirror itself had been published online 
in 2003. In addition, there was no evidence that the defamatory material had been 
accessed from within the territory of Ireland. For these reasons, the Supreme Court 
established that it did not have jurisdiction on the subject matter of the case.54 
The approach followed by the Supreme Court to deny jurisdiction over this case 
seems to confirm the access-based jurisdictional criterion. Indeed, had Mr. Coleman 
produced evidence of both the online publication of the defamatory material and actual 
access to it within the Irish territory, the Supreme Court would have held that the tort of 
defamation had happened in Ireland. This is irrespective of where the material had been 
uploaded from, or where it was hosted. 
2.3.4 The Breeden v Black case 
Lord Black is a businessman with an established reputation both in Canada and 
internationally. He was a Canadian citizen until 2001, when he abandoned the citizenship 
to become part of the House of Lords in the UK.55 Between 2004 and 2005, Lord Black 
brought six libel actions in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against ten defendants.56 
The defendants were directors, advisors and vice-president of the company International, 
of which Lord Black was a chairman. International was both incorporated and 
headquartered in the United States.57 All the defendants lived in the United States, except 
for two of them who lived in Ontario and Israel respectively.58  
 
50 ibid [10]. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid [14]. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 Breeden v Black (n 11) [3]. 
56 ibid [1], [5]. 
57 ibid [3]. 
58 ibid [8]. 
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Lord Black claimed that he had been defamed due to the publication on the 
company’s website of some reports and press releases containing allegations that he had 
received illegitimate payments from International. The plaintiff brought the libel actions 
in Ontario since the defamatory content published on the website was accessed, read and 
republished in Ontario by three newspapers.59  
The defendants asked the motion judge to stay the case because there was no real and 
substantial connection between the actions and Ontario. Alternatively, they maintained 
that US courts were a more appropriate forum.  
The motion judge dismissed these arguments and found that the defamation had 
happened in Ontario due to three main reasons. First, the content published on the website 
was accessible in Ontario, where it was republished by the three newspapers. Second, 
Lord Black had a reputation in Ontario. Finally, it was reasonably foreseeable for the 
defendants to anticipate that the publication of that content would have caused damage to 
the plaintiff’s reputation in Ontario.60 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s decision because it found 
that the clear and substantial connection requirement was satisfied. In addition, the Court 
stated that it was not necessary to determine whether a targeting approach should be 
adopted in Canadian law.61 In other words, according to the Court, it was not necessary 
to determine whether the content published online was targeting a Canadian audience. 
Notwithstanding this, the judges emphasized that the relevant content did target Ontario 
because the press releases contained contact information directed at Canadian media.62 
The defendants appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision and brought the case 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. They maintained that in transnational libel claims 
jurisdiction should be exercised only in the forum that has a real and substantial 
connection with the ‘substance of the action’.63 The defendants claimed that the 
‘substance of the action’ could be found in Lord Black’s actions, which constituted the 
subject matter and conduct giving rise to the case. Since these actions had happened in 
the United States, the defendants claimed that there was no real and substantial connection 
between Canada and the case.64  
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The Supreme Court found that the appellants were liable for the tort of defamation in 
Canada because the defamation had happened there.65 Indeed, it was in Ontario that the 
defamatory content displayed on the website was published to a third party: the three 
newspapers which accessed the material, read and republished it.66 The Court added that 
according to Canadian law, each republication of a defamatory statement can be 
considered as a new publication. Besides, the original publisher of the defamatory 
statement is responsible for its republications if it authorizes them or if the republication 
‘is the natural and probable result of the original publication’.67 Finally, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Ontario was a convenient forum because the appellants had failed 
to unequivocally show that US courts constituted a clearly more appropriate forum.68 
2.3.5 The Yeung v Google Inc. case 
Albert Yeung, a businessman and managing director of the Hong Kong-based 
Emperor Group, brought a defamation complaint against Google Inc. before the High 
Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.69 The complaint was related to 
the Google Search Autocomplete search function.  
Yeung alleged that when searching for his name on Google.com, Google.com.hk and 
Google.com.tw the autocomplete suggestion “triad” came up.70 The plaintiff therefore 
claimed to have been defamed by Google Inc. and asked for compensation, adding that 
the company had failed to remove the defamatory content notwithstanding the several 
requests received.71  
Google Inc. argued that the Hong Kong Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. 
Besides, the defendant maintained that there was no good arguable case or serious issue 
to be treated on the merits of the case brought by the plaintiff.72 For this reason, Google 
Inc. asked the Court to either declare that it had no jurisdiction over the case or 
alternatively to refuse to exercise any jurisdiction it may have. 
Due to the scope of this analysis, the only part of the judgment that will be examined 
in this chapter is that related to establishing where Mr. Yeung’s alleged defamation 
happened. 
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Yeung argued that the tort of defamation had happened in Hong Kong, since the 
damage to reputation had either been sustained there or it had happened following an act 
committed in Hong Kong.73 More specifically, the plaintiff maintained that the 
defamation had occurred in Hong Kong because it was there that the defamatory content 
could be accessed (i.e. downloaded) and was therefore published to a third party.74 
The Court confirmed this view, by stating that in defamation cases the damage to 
reputation occurs when the defamatory content is published or made available to a third 
party. When the defamatory content is published online, the content is believed to have 
been published in the place where the material is ‘viewed/downloaded’.75 The other 
condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the domestic forum is that the plaintiff has a 
reputation there.76 Therefore, the Court concluded that ‘an internet publisher who places 
material on the internet will be responsible for the effects of his action whenever the 
damage occurs’.77  
Google accepted the principles set out by the Court regarding defamation through 
online publication.78 However, it contended that the plaintiff had failed to prove that there 
had been publication to a third party. In this regard, Yeung argued that the proof of 
publication to a third party was represented by the fact that the IT department of his 
company had been able to download and print the defamatory words. Google’s counter 
argument was that the IT department could not be considered as a genuine third party, 
since the people in the IT department worked for Yeung and had been expressly tasked 
to find the defamatory material.79 
The Court dismissed Google’s point and found that the IT department did constitute 
a genuine third party, irrespective of the fact that its members were employed by Yeung. 
Indeed, the people working for Mr. Yeung could still be considered as a party other than 
Yeung that accessed the defamatory content.80 
Overall, the Court dismissed all Google’s claims and awarded the costs to the 
plaintiff.81 In September 2014, Google filed a motion for the Leave to Appeal Against the 
Order, which was granted by the Court in October 2014.82 In particular, Google argued 
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that, due to the lack of sufficient publication to a third party, allowing the libel action to 
proceed before the domestic Court would have been a disproportionate exercise of 
jurisdiction.83 The High Court granted Google’s leave to appeal because it found that, due 
to the novelty of this area of law, the Court of Appeal’s guidance was needed on how to 
proportionally exercise jurisdiction and avoid unnecessary expensive and lengthy 
defamation proceedings.84 There has been no decision regarding Google’s appeal to 
date.85 This case is therefore still ongoing.  
2.3.6 The CJEU approach to establishing jurisdiction based on access: the 
eDate Advertising and the BOÜ case 
The eDate Advertising case is a joined case discussed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) on 25 October 2011.86 The case concerns the interpretation of 
article 5(3) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
matters and article 3(1) and (2) of the Directive 2003/31/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects on information society 
services.87 This case was referred to the CJEU by the German Federal Court of Justice, 
the Bundesgerichtshof, and the Paris Regional Court, Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI). 
The case concerns the liability of the Austria-based eDate Advertising and the England-
based MGN Limited before the German and French courts respectively for an alleged 
infringement of personality rights due to the publication of content online. In particular, 
the Austrian company eDate Advertising was asked by X, a German resident, to refrain 
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from using his full name when reporting on the website administered by the company 
about a crime that X committed in 1990.88 As to MGN, the company was accused by the 
French actor Olivier Martinez and his father of having violated their right to private life 
and the actor’s right to his image. These violations had resulted from the posting of an 
article on the Sunday Mirror website giving details about a meeting between Olivier 
Martinez and Kylie Minogue and alleging that the actor had resumed his relationship with 
the singer.89 Both eDate Advertising and MGN claimed that the German and French 
courts lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a sufficient connecting link between the 
content published online and the damage produced on the German and French territory.90  
With regard to the interpretation of article 5(3) of the EU Council Regulation on 
jurisdiction, the CJEU was asked by the Bundesgerichtshof and the TGI to clarify how 
the expression ‘the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ contained in 
article 5(3) can be interpreted when content is published online.91 According to the 
Regulation, jurisdiction is generally based on the place of domicile of the defendant. 
However, article 5(3) establishes that in the case of a tort a person domiciled in a given 
Member State can be sued in another Member State if the harmful event occurs there.92 
The CJEU first clarified that the place where the harmful event occurs can be both the 
place giving rise to the event, and the place where the damage occurs. Both these criteria 
constitute ‘a significant connecting factor’ as far as jurisdiction is concerned.93 In 
addition, the Court found that in the case of an infringement of personality rights due to 
the publication of online content, the place where the harmful event occurs can be 
interpreted as the place where the victim has his or her centre of interest. This is usually 
the place where the person resides, however it can also be the place where they conduct 
professional activities, irrespective of whether they live there. In other words, when 
defamatory material is published online, the victim might choose to initiate legal 
proceedings in the Member State where they have their centre of interest. That State, as 
underlined by the Court, will have jurisdiction in respect to all the damage caused by the 
publication.94 According to the CJEU, the criterion of the place where the victim has their 
centre of interest is respondent to the principles of the ‘sound administration of justice’ 
and predictability of jurisdiction.95 This is because a court in the place where a person has 
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their centre of interest is best placed to assess the impact of the online publication of 
defamatory content on that person’s reputation. As to predictability, the CJEU stated that 
the publisher is or should be in a position to know where the person to whom the online 
content refers has their centre of interest. In other words, this criterion has the benefit of 
both being predictable for the defendant and easily allowing the applicant to know where 
they might be able to initiate legal proceedings.96 
However, the CJEU added that there is another choice available to victims of online 
defamation. They can also initiate legal proceedings in the Member States where the 
content published online can be accessed. In that case, however, the national courts will 
have jurisdiction only in respect to the damage to reputation that happened locally.97 
In sum, according to the EU Regulation on jurisdiction, in case of defamation 
committed trough the publication of content online, jurisdiction can be exercised by the 
Member State where the publisher is established or the Member State where the victims 
have their centre of interest in regard to all the damage caused by the publication. 
Jurisdiction can also be exercised by all the Member States where the online content can 
be accessed in regard to the damage to reputation that happened within that Member State, 
provided that the victims have a reputation there.98 
In October 2017, the CJEU had the opportunity to further clarify the application of 
the access-based jurisdictional approach to torts committed online in the case 
Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB (the BOÜ case).99 In this 
case, the Court was asked to pronounce on the application of article 7(2) of the Regulation 
(EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters.100 This Regulation entered into force in January 2015 replacing the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000. Article 7(2) and article 5(3) 
mentioned above are however identical in wording.  
The applicants in the BOÜ case, the Estonian company BOÜ and a company’s 
employee Ms Ingrid Ilsjan, brought an action against the Swedish company Svensk 
Handel before the Harju Court of First Instance in Estonia. The applicants asked the 
Estonian Court to order Svensk Handel to rectify the incorrect and allegedly defamatory 
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information that the Swedish company had published on its website regarding the 
Estonian company, to delete the related comments published on a discussion forum of the 
website and to pay compensation for the damages caused to both the applicants.101 In 
particular, the applicants argued that the damage to their reputation had happened in in 
Sweden, since, following the publication of the defamatory information, BOÜ’s turnover 
in Swedish kronor was reduced.102  
The Estonian Harju Court of First Instance, however, found that article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1215/2012 was not applicable in this case. Indeed, according to article 7(2) in 
cases related to tort a party domiciled in a Member State can be sued in the Courts of 
another Member State if the harmful event occurred there or if it has its centre of interest 
in that State. However, the Court underlined that the damage to the applicants’ reputation 
had happened in Sweden, rather than in Estonia, as the comments had been published in 
Swedish, and were therefore incomprehensible to an Estonian audience without 
translation. In addition, the fact that the loss in turnover was referenced in Swedish kronor 
rather than Euro supported the finding that the damage had not happened in Estonia.103 In 
other words, the Court found that the mere accessibility of the website in Estonia did not 
justify the initiation of legal proceedings there. For this reason, the Court of First Instance 
declared that the case was inadmissible.104 After multiple appeals by the applicants, the 
case reached the Estonian Supreme Court which decided to refer it to the CJEU. In 
particular, the CJEU was asked to clarify inter alia whether a victim of online defamation 
can bring requests for rectification of the incorrect information and removal of 
defamatory comments before the courts of every Member State where that content is 
accessible in reference to the damage suffered in that Member State.105  
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The CJEU stated that, as far as rectification and removal requests are concerned, the 
accessibility criterion is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Indeed, the judges found 
that, unlike a request for damages which by its nature can be locally circumscribed to the 
damages that the victim suffered in each Member State where the illegal content can be 
accessed, the application for rectification and removal of online content is indivisible. 
This is due to the ubiquitous nature of online content and to its universal distribution. For 
this reason, the only court that can exercise jurisdiction on an application for rectification 
and removal of online content is the court that can rule on the entirety of a request for 
damage, therefore either the court of the domicile of the defendant or the court of the 
victim’s centre of interest.106  
Overall, the eDate Advertising and the BOÜ case show that, although exercising 
jurisdiction based on access to online content is still legitimate according to EU law, that 
exercise must be limited to requests for local damages only. 
2.3.7 The Perrin case 
Mr. Perrin, a French national who lived in the United Kingdom, was one of the major 
shareholders of the US-based Metropole News Group, the company administering the 
website www.sewersex.com.107 On 25th October 1999, a police officer of the Obscene 
Publications Unit in the UK accessed during the course of his duty some pictures of a 
sexual nature which had been published on the above-mentioned website.108 More 
specifically, the pictures were on a preview page available free of charge on the website. 
The images available on the preview page were deemed to violate section 2(1) of the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 which prohibited the publication of obscene material.109 
As a result, Mr. Perrin was arrested. During an interview with the police, he accepted the 
responsibility for the publication of the pictures.110 On 16 October 2000 he was convicted 
by Southwark Crown Court for the publication of an obscene article.111 On 6 November 
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2000 Southwark Crown Court sentenced Mr. Perrin to 30-month imprisonment.112 Mr. 
Perrin appealed against his conviction to the Criminal Division of the England and Wales 
Court of Appeal (EWCA). The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed both Mr. Perrin’s 
appeal against the conviction and his subsequent appeal against the sentence.113 Mr. 
Perrin therefore filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to 
bring a case against the United Kingdom. His main claim was that the UK had violated 
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by convicting and 
sentencing him for the publication of the pictures on the website www.sewersex.com.114 
The ECtHR, however, dismissed Mr. Perrin’s claim and declared the application 
inadmissible.115 
Mr. Perrin stated in his application to the ECtHR that due to ‘the worldwide nature 
of the internet, it was unreasonable for publishers to foresee the legal requirements in all 
the individual states where the material could be accessed’.116  He therefore suggested 
that it should only be possible for English courts to convict ‘if major steps towards 
publication had taken place in a location over which they had jurisdiction’.117 Besides, 
Mr. Perrin claimed that the publication of the pictures did not happen within the territory 
of the United Kingdom.118 In fact, it happened in the United States, where the pictures 
were legal as the Obscene Publications Act 1959 did not apply.119 For this reason, section 
2 of the 1959 Act was neither sufficiently foreseeable nor sufficiently precise to be 
considered as “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the 
Convention.120  
As to the approach adopted by the EWCA regarding establishing jurisdiction on the 
case, the judges found that ‘a mere transmission of data constitutes publication’.121 The 
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Court also added that, as established in the R v Waddon case, ‘there is publication for the 
purposes of section 1(3) both when images are uploaded and when they are 
downloaded’.122 In addition, the judges rejected the appellant’s claim that there should be 
prosecution against a publisher only when the major steps towards the publication had 
happened within the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction. The EWCA also rejected 
Mr. Perrin’s claim according to which the Crown should have shown where the major 
steps towards the publication were taken. In this regard, the Court accepted the 
respondent’s argument that adopting Mr. Perrin’s approach would have had the effect of 
encouraging publishers to publish only in countries where there were less chances of 
being prosecuted.123 Overall the Court of Appeal concluded that ‘the publication shown 
by the evidence was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Court’.124 
As to the admissibility decision of the ECtHR, the judges of the European Court 
clarified that section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 had been already examined 
by the Court in the cases Handyside and Hoare and that it had been found in compliance 
with article 10 of the ECHR.125 Although those cases did not involve publication on the 
Internet, the Court stated that section 1(3) of the 1959 Act makes it clear that the law also 
applies to transmission of data stored electronically.126 Besides, the Court observed that 
Mr. Perrin was a UK resident and could therefore not claim that the UK laws were not 
reasonably accessible to him. Moreover, since he was carrying out a professional activity 
through his website he should have acted more cautiously than normally expected and 
should have sought legal advice.127 In addition, the Court found that the fact that the 
images available on Mr. Perrin’s website were legal in the US did not mean that the UK 
had exceeded its margin of appreciation by proscribing the circulation of those images 
within its territory and by prosecuting and convicting the applicant.128 Finally, in 
assessing the proportionality of the conviction and sentence by the UK domestic courts, 
the ECtHR gave particular relevance to the fact that Mr. Perrin was conducting a 
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professional activity whose services were available upon payment. In this regard, the 
Court concluded that 
 
‘it would have been possible for the applicant to have avoided the harm and, 
consequently, the conviction, while still carrying on his business, by ensuring that 
none of the photographs were available on the free preview page (where there were 
no age checks). He chose not to do so, no doubt because he hoped to attract more 
customers by leaving the photographs on the free preview page’.129  
 
Ultimately, the ECtHR found that Mr. Perrin’s application was inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded since its conviction could be considered as necessary in a 
democratic society to protect morals and or the rights of others.130 
2.3.8 The LICRA and UEJF v Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France case 
The LICRA and UEJF v Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France case (hereafter the Yahoo! 
case) was initiated in France in May 2000 by two French associations combating racism 
and anti-Semitism, the Ligue Contre la Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (LICRA) and the 
Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF). LICRA and UEJF brought a case before the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) of Paris accusing Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France of 
having violated article R.645-1 of the French penal code, according to which the display 
of Nazi-related items for sale is a criminal offence.131 More specifically, the two 
companies were accused of having violated the French penal code because Internet users 
located in France could access the Yahoo! Auction webpages where Nazi memorabilia 
were displayed for sale. The Yahoo! Auction website was maintained by Yahoo! Inc. and 
could be accessed by all Internet users via the Yahoo.com portal or through a link to 
Yahoo.com available on Yahoo.fr. The fact that the Yahoo! Auction webpage containing 
the Nazi-related items could be accessed by users located in France was equated by the 
plaintiffs to having committed a crime within the French territory. Therefore, LICRA and 
UEJF asked the TGI to issue an order requesting the defendants to prevent Internet users 
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located within the French territory from accessing the Nazi memorabilia displayed for 
sale on the Auction website.132  
The defendants rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, Yahoo! Inc. stated that the 
French court lacked jurisdiction since the display and sale of the Nazi items had happened 
in the United States, where both the company and its servers were based.133 Moreover, 
Yahoo! Inc. claimed that any restrictions on the accessibility of the items on sale would 
have violated the First Amendment of the US constitution in addition to being technically 
impossible to realize.134 As to Yahoo France, which was accused of promoting anti-
Semitism due to the link to Yahoo.com, it denied liability since the auction was not hosted 
on Yahoo.fr.135  
In its order of 22 May 2000, the TGI established that it had jurisdiction over the case 
pursuant to article 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 46 establishes that in tort 
matters a plaintiff may bring a case before ‘the court of the place of the event causing 
liability or the one in whose district the damage was suffered’.136 Gomez J found that 
making it possible for users in France to access a website where Nazi memorabilia were 
displayed for sale equated to committing a wrong within the French territory that 
produced harm in France.137 The judge therefore accepted LICRA and UEJF claims and 
ordered Yahoo! Inc. to ‘“take all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible”’ 
from within the French territory ‘“any access via Yahoo.com to the Nazi artefact auction 
service and to any other site or service that may be construed as constituting an apology 
for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi crimes”’.138 At the same time, Yahoo France was 
ordered to issue all the Yahoo.fr Internet users with a warning that if they were to continue 
their search on Yahoo.com and were provided with search results that included sites that 
violated French law they should stop their search. Failure to do so would expose them to 
liability under French law.139 
Following the 22 May order, Yahoo France modified its terms of use and introduced 
a banner reproducing the warning issued in the order.140 On the other hand, Yahoo! Inc. 
 




136 Art. 46 nouv. C. pr. civ, English translation as reported in Legifrance ‘Code Of Civil Procedure’ 
(Legifrance) <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1962/13735/version/3/.../Code_39.pdf> 
(Accessed: 20 February 2017), 5. 
137 TGI Paris, référé, 22 mai 2000, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France (n 15). See also Greenberg 
(131) 1208-1209. 
138 Yahoo! inc v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme et al, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), 
1185. 
139 TGI Paris, référé, 22 mai 2000, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France (n 15). 
140 Akdeniz (n 131) 4. 
 46 
contested the order and stated that applying filtering procedures to block French Internet 
users from specific websites was technically impossible as well as disproportionately 
expensive.141 However, on 20 November 2000 the TGI ordered Yahoo! Inc. to comply 
with the May order within 3 months from the November order being issued and to pay 
100000 Francs per each day of delay once the 3-month compliance period expired.142  
One important aspect of the November order is related to the TGI’s considerations as 
to the audience targeted by Yahoo!. Indeed, the company claimed that its services were 
predominantly directed at an American audience. In replying to this argument, Gomez J 
mentioned a series of factors related to the Auction website, such as the items on sale, the 
method of payment, the delivery terms, the language and the currency used. He found 
that these elements validated the claim that the Auction site was mainly directed at an US 
audience. However, Gomez found that the same could not be said of the sale of Nazi 
memorabilia, which could have interested anyone.143 In addition, the judge found that 
Yahoo! was aware that it was addressing a French audience because the users that 
accessed Yahoo.com from France were shown advertising banners in French.144 
Therefore, Gomez concluded that a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction had 
been established.145 
 
2.4 Case analysis 
The cases examined in the previous paragraphs outline the difficulties that national 
and regional courts face when establishing jurisdiction in Internet-related disputes over 
defendants located outside the domestic forum. As mentioned above, the courts in these 
cases were faced with the same challenge: establishing when an act committed online by 
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 47 
defendants located in another State can be said to have happened within the domestic 
court’s jurisdiction. Overall, four conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of these 
cases.  
First, the domestic courts have used the accessibility of online content within the 
national territory as a basis to establish jurisdiction over that content.146 More specifically, 
the accessibility of online content from within the territory of a given State has been used 
to justify the application of both the objective territorial principle and the effects doctrine: 
e.g. online content X is accessible within the territory of State A therefore content X was 
published in State A (objective territorial principle: the act happened in State A); online 
content Y is accessible in State B therefore it produced negative effects there (effects 
doctrine: the act was committed elsewhere but produced negative effects in State B).  
The Perrin case and the Virginia Western District Court’s decision in Young v New 
Haven offer an example of how the objective territorial principle has been applied to 
online content. Indeed, in the Perrin case, the EWCA found that online content is 
published in the UK both when material is uploaded and when it is downloaded (or merely 
accessed) from within the territory of the UK.147 Similarly, Virginia District Court 
established that the accessibility of an online article from within the territory of Virginia 
meant that the defendants had acted in Virginia by publishing that article on their 
website.148 More specifically, as previously mentioned, the Court found that since content 
published online is accessible to a worldwide audience, it is ‘physically “present” in 
different locations at one time’ and can therefore be subjected to multistate jurisdiction.149 
On the other hand, an example of how the effects doctrine has been applied to online 
acts can be found in the Dow Jones v Gutnick case and the CJEU cases eDate Advertising 
and BOÜ, where the Victoria Supreme Court and the CJEU respectively found that in 
defamation cases content published online produces adverse effects in the place where 
the content is accessed.150 The Yeung v Google case offers another example of this point, 
since the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region established that 
‘an internet publisher who places material on the internet will be responsible for the 
 
146 The only exception to this point is represented by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in the Young v New 
Haven case. Indeed, the judges openly rejected the accessibility criterion and relied exclusively on a 
targeting test to establish whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction over the article published on the 
defendants’ websites. 
147 R v Perrin, (n 7) [18]. 
148 Young v New Haven Advocate et al W. D. (n 9) 508. 
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150 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (n 8) [44]; eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez 
Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (n 13) para 51; Bolagsupplysningen OÜ and Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel 
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effects of his action whenever the damage occurs’.151 The emphasis placed by the Court 
on the negative effects produced by content published online on the territory where that 
content is accessed seems to confirm that the court relied on the effects doctrine when 
establishing jurisdiction on it. 
The second conclusion that stems from the cases analysed is that the distinction 
between the objective territorial principle and the effects doctrine is not always clear-cut 
when these two principles are applied to cyberspace.152 Indeed, some of the cases 
examined can be interpreted as an example of the application of both principles. All the 
defamation cases, for instance, can be interpreted as saying that an act of online 
defamation happens within a State’s territory both because the content published online 
is found to have been published there (objective territorial principle) and it produces 
negative effects within that country (effects doctrine). This is because in the legal systems 
analysed, defamation happens in the place where the damage to reputation occurs. This 
place is identified with the place where content is published to a third party which, in the 
case of online content, is the territory from where it can be accessed. Therefore, it does 
appear that content published online from foreign States is considered as both having been 
published and capable of exercising negative effects in the States where it is accessible. 
For this reason, both the effects doctrine and the objective territorial principle appear as 
an equally plausible basis for exercising jurisdiction. The Yahoo! case offers another 
example of this point. In this case, Gomez J seemed to confirm both the objective 
territorial principle and the effects doctrine 
 
‘[by] permitting these objects to be viewed in France and allowing surfers located in 
France to participate in such a display of items for sale, the Company YAHOO! Inc. 
is therefore committing a wrong in the territory of France […] Whereas, the damage 
being suffered in France, our jurisdiction is therefore competent to rule on the present 
dispute under Section 46 of the New Code of Civil Procedure’.153  
 
Besides, confirmation of this point can be found in the different interpretation given 
by some authors of the jurisdictional basis relied upon by the TGI to establish jurisdiction. 
Indeed, while some commentators found that the TGI had relied on the effects doctrine, 
others interpreted Gomez J’s decision as an example of the application of the objective 
territorial principle.154 Overall, this point can be concluded by observing that on the 
 
151 Yeung, Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc (5 August 2014) (n 12) [37]. 
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153 Pl.'s Compl. for Decl. Relief, ex. A, at 5 (as cited in Greenberg (n 131) 1208-1209). 
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Internet the distinction between these two principles seems to lose importance, since, as 
has been pointed out by Hayashi, ‘[t]he extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction justified by 
the objective territorial principle seems to be as limitless as the one justified by the effects 
doctrine’.155   
The third conclusion is that in addition to the objective territorial principle and the 
effects doctrine, some national courts carried out a targeting test to reinforce the finding 
that they had jurisdiction over the defendants.156 The extent of this targeting test was, 
however, quite limited. Indeed, the courts established the defendant’s intent to target an 
audience located within the domestic forum based on a very limited number of factors. In 
the Young v New Haven case, for example, Virginia Western District Court referred to 
the content of the allegedly defamatory article. The judges found that the fact that the 
article mentioned a Virginia resident and was related to events that had happened in 
Virginia proved that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants respected the due 
process requirement.157 Another example of this point can be found in the TGI’s reliance 
in the Yahoo! case on the language of the advertising banners shown to the users that 
accessed Yahoo.com from France. Gomez J found that the fact that Internet users located 
in France were shown advertising banners in French proved that Yahoo! Inc. was 
targeting a French audience.158 Such reliance on the targeting test as an additional basis 
of jurisdiction could be interpreted as a desire on the Courts’ part to justify the application 
of national laws to foreign defendants by showing a further link, however feeble, between 
the country exercising jurisdiction and the events happening online. 
The last conclusion that can be drawn is related to the limits to the exercise of 
jurisdiction based on access. The access-based jurisdictional approach seems to give all 
States where certain content published online can be accessed the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over it. However, the cases examined show that two limits have emerged. The 
first is related to defamation cases. This limit is the requirement that national courts 
establish jurisdiction over a defamation claim only if the claimant has a reputation in the 
domestic forum.159 The reputation requirement limits the number of States that can 
exercise jurisdiction over content published online from a foreign State. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that a person has a reputation in every country where the allegedly defamatory 
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content can be accessed.160 In addition, the BOÜ case has introduced another limitation 
to the application of the access-based jurisdictional approach in online defamation cases 
as far as the EU law on jurisdiction is concerned. In particular, the BOÜ case has 
established that, although exercising jurisdiction based on access is legal according to the 
Regulation of the European Parliament on jurisdiction, this exercise is limited exclusively 
to requests for damages caused by the publication of defamatory content online, rather 
than requests for the removal of that content. Indeed, the CJEU has clarified that access 
alone is not a sufficient basis for any State where the online content can be accessed to 
order the removal of that content. Given the ubiquitous and international nature of content 
online, the only State competent to adjudicate on a removal request is the Member State 
where the victims have their centre of interest.161 
The second limit to the application of the access-based jurisdictional approach is 
related to the proof of actual access to the content published online within the domestic 
forum. More specifically, in the cases examined, the national courts have established 
jurisdiction over online content that could be accessed from within their territory when 
the party making this argument proved that that was the case.162 In other words, proof of 
actual access to content published online is required, while the presumption that content 
published online can and was accessed within the domestic forum is not deemed enough 
to exercise jurisdiction.163 The Coleman v MGN Limited case illustrates this point 
particularly well. Indeed, in that case the Supreme Court of Ireland established that it did 
not have jurisdiction over the content published by MGN because no evidence had been 
produced showing that that content or the newspaper where it appeared had been 
published online in 2003. In addition, there was no evidence that the defamatory material 
had been accessed from within the territory of Ireland.164 Due to the worldwide nature of 
the Internet, the actual access requirement does not limit significantly the exercise of State 
jurisdiction based on access. Indeed, it appears relatively easy to prove that a website can 
be accessed within a given national territory, especially if the website does not filter users 
based on their geographical location. Nonetheless, the actual access requirement 
constitutes an important characteristic of the access-based approach and it contributes to 
shedding light on this jurisdictional criterion. 
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2.5 The implications of the access-based jurisdictional approach on the 
fulfilment of freedom of expression online 
The access-based jurisdictional approach has attracted many critiques. The first 
critique that has been made of this approach is that it impacts negatively on the freedom 
of expression of Internet users located in foreign States and subjected to foreign 
jurisdictions.165 Indeed, if all the countries followed the same approach and claimed that 
the application of their national laws extended globally, the principle of freedom of 
expression and the right to access information, as well as the principle of certain and 
predictable laws could be compromised. Yahoo!’s decision following the TGI’s 
proceedings to amend its terms and conditions and ban the sale of Nazi-related items is 
particularly useful to illustrate this point. Indeed, as observed by Korff,  
 
‘whereas it was always completely out of the question that a US court would impose 
such a ban, Yahoo! was put in a position by the ruling of a foreign court in a foreign 
jurisdiction that led it to decide “voluntarily” to impose a ban on US citizens using 
its US-based services to buy and/or sell Nazi memorabilia, a ban that US courts could 
most probably not have imposed’.166 
 
Another example of the implications of the access-based jurisdiction on the rights of 
foreign citizens is represented by the Perrin case. In that case, the EWCA made it clear 
that the content published on Mr. Perrin’s website was illegal in the UK.167 Therefore, as 
observed by some commentators, if the person who manages a website hosting similar 
content from a foreign country were to enter the territory of the UK, he would be liable 
for prosecution there.168 As stated above, this would happen regardless of whether the 
content displayed on the website is legal in the country where the website is hosted.  
Freedom of expression concerns have also been raised regarding the use of the access-
based approach in defamation cases. On the one hand, as observed by Maier, some 
commentators have pointed out that this approach encourages forum shopping and 
exposes publishers to liability in virtually all the countries where the online content can 
be accessed.169 On the other hand, other authors and some of the courts that adopted the 
access-based approach have underlined that the requirement that the claimant has a 
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reputation in the forum exercising jurisdiction effectively limits the number of countries 
where the publishers are liable.170 Another limitation to the risk of forum shopping has 
been identified in the fact that the claimants might be inclined to pursue a defamation 
case only in those forums where the damage to their reputation has been substantial, in 
the hope of receiving a significant compensation.171 However, both the above-mentioned 
points are controversial. Indeed, as observed in the Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution 
Policy ‘practical evidence in the field of online defamation has shown that forum shoppers 
are not actually concerned with the quantum of damages as they rely on the mere threat 
of a lawsuit made abroad to pressure websites into settlement or into compliance’.172 
Therefore, it can be observed that the mere threat of legal action on multiple jurisdictions 
can have a negative impact on freedom of expression. 
Another critique made of the access-based approach is related to the lack of a 
thorough analysis of the link between the perpetrator of the unlawful act, the illegal 
content published online and the State that exercises jurisdiction, as observed by Korff.173 
This analysis could have helped the national courts to limit the exercise of their 
jurisdiction only to cases that have a close nexus with their country. The targeting test 
applied by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in the Young v New Haven case offers an 
example of this point. Indeed, in that case the Court stated that ‘an intent to target and 
focus’ on the audience located in a given State is necessary for that State to establish 
jurisdiction over the person responsible for the publication of that content online. 
In relation to the necessity of conducting such an analysis there are, however, 
contrasting opinions. Indeed, in the R v Perrin case, Mr. Perrin’s counsel accepted that 
there was no European or English authority that supported the theory that only the country 
where the major steps for publication had been taken had jurisdiction.174 However, this 
statement was related to the position of European or English authorities as interpreted by 
Mr. Perrin’s counsel and the EWCA up to 2002, which is when the R v Perrin case was 
held. There is, however, a 2011 document that outlines a more recent position on the 
criteria according to which a State can exercise jurisdiction over content published online. 
This is the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet issued by the 
Special Representatives for freedom of information and freedom of the media of the 
United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
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the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).175 According to the Joint Declaration  
 
‘[j]urisdiction in legal cases relating to Internet content should be restricted to States 
to which those cases have a real and substantial connection, normally because the 
author is established there, the content is uploaded there and/or the content is 
specifically directed at that State’.176  
 
A similar opinion has been expressed by the Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). 
Indeed, in the document Freedom of Expression and the Internet published in 2013 the 
Office of the Special Rapporteur stated that 
 
In order to prevent the existence of indirect barriers that disproportionately 
discourage or directly limit the right to freedom of expression on the Internet, 
jurisdiction over cases connected to Internet expression should correspond 
exclusively to States to which the cases are most closely associated, normally 
because the perpetrator resides there, the expression was published from 
there, or the expression is aimed directly at a public located in the State in 
question.177  
 
These two documents define the criteria for establishing jurisdiction in Internet 
related cases in a slightly different way. More specifically, while the Joint Declaration 
explicitly refers to the place from where ‘the content is uploaded’178, the document 
produced by the Office of the Special Rapporteur of the IACHR refers more generically 
to the State from where ‘the expression was published’.179 The latter is more generic than 
the former because it does not explain what publication consists of and whether it 
encompasses downloading content in addition to uploading it, as stated in the Perrin 
case.180 This point is particularly relevant. Indeed, defining the act of publishing content 
online in a way that encompasses only the uploading of content has the effect of reducing 
the number of national courts that could legitimately exercise jurisdiction over that 
content. On the other hand, if the place of publication is the place where the content is 
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uploaded or downloaded, then potentially all the countries in the world where that content 
can be accessed could have jurisdiction, which is the core of the reasoning in Perrin.  
Overall, following the 2011 Joint Declaration and the 2013 IACHR document some 
conclusions can be drawn. First, some consensus at the international level exists - at least 
among some international authorities in the field of freedom of expression - on limiting 
State jurisdiction only to cases were a close nexus can be found between the State 
establishing jurisdiction and the content published online/person publishing it. Second, 
some criteria for establishing which State has the right to exercise jurisdiction online in a 
way that is compatible with freedom of expression have been identified by the 
international authorities.181 These are: the place where the author/perpetrator is 
established, the place where the content has been uploaded/published and the 
place/people targeted by the content published/uploaded on the Internet. The third 
conclusion stems from observing that the first two of these criteria refer to the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction, while the last one is related to a targeting test. It can therefore be 
argued that even in a borderless environment such as the Internet, territory is seen as a 
central element in establishing jurisdiction. On the other hand, however, the territorial 
principle will be not very useful in all those cases where the place where the content has 
been uploaded, or even who uploaded it, cannot be established. Therefore, the targeting 
test seems better suited to establish which State has jurisdiction in a non-physical 
environment such as the cyberspace. Indeed, the targeting test permits to by-pass the 
obstacles represented by the unknown location of the person who uploaded some content 
online or the place where the content was uploaded from. This is because for the targeting 
test to be satisfied it is sufficient to establish that the content published online was 
targeting an audience located within a given State, regardless of where the content was 
originally uploaded from or who uploaded it. However, the difficulty associated with the 
targeting test is that so far there is no consensus as to the criteria upon which this test 
should be based.182 In other words, it is unclear which factors must be considered when 
establishing whether content published online from a given State targets an audience 
located in a foreign country. The debate regarding this issue is currently ongoing within 
the scholarly community investigating State jurisdiction online and is likely to continue 
in the forthcoming years. 
 
181 See Chapter 5 sections 5.2 and 5.3 for a discussion of the international law principles applicable to acts 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main characteristics of the access-based jurisdictional approach 
have been examined through the analysis of some key cases discussed in various 
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the heterogeneous nature of the cases examined, several 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the access-based jurisdictional approach. 
First, the accessibility of online content from within the territory of a given State has 
been used to justify the application of both the objective territorial principle and the 
effects doctrine.  
Moreover, in addition to these two jurisdictional principles, some national courts 
carried out a targeting test to reinforce the finding that they had jurisdiction over the 
defendants. The extent of this targeting test was, however, quite limited, since the courts 
established the defendant’s intent to target the domestic forum based on a small number 
of factors. Such reliance on the targeting test could be interpreted as the courts’ desire to 
justify the application of national laws to foreign defendants by showing a further link, 
however feeble, between the country exercising jurisdiction and the events happening 
online. 
Furthermore, the cases examined show that the distinction between the objective 
territorial principle and the effects doctrine is not always clear-cut when these two 
principles are applied to cyberspace. Indeed, some courts’ decisions can be interpreted as 
an example of the simultaneous application of both principles. Some authors have 
observed that a consequence of this point is that the scope of the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction justified by these two principles becomes limitless.183 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this chapter is 
that there seems to be two limits to the exercise of jurisdiction based on access: the 
reputation requirement, which is related to defamation cases, and the actual access 
requirement. However, the efficacy of these requirements on limiting the exercise of 
jurisdiction based on access is debated. This is especially true regarding the reputation 
requirement, since the threat of lawsuits in multiple legal systems is still a possibility and 
constitutes a phenomenon that can negatively impact freedom of expression online. 
The curtailing effect of the access-based approach on freedom of expression is one 
of the main critiques that have made of this jurisdictional criterion. Indeed, the cases 
analysed in this chapter could be interpreted as having the same overall effect: imposing 
restrictions on Internet users located in foreign countries and subjected to foreign 
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jurisdictions. This is because if other countries followed the same approach and claimed 
that the application of their national laws extended globally, the principle of freedom of 
expression, the right to access information, and the principle of certain and predictable 
laws could be compromised. Indeed, following the court’s decision in the Yahoo! case, 
Yahoo! introduced a ban on the sale of Nazi-related items among its terms and conditions. 
Therefore, Internet users in the US could not view, buy or sell material that was perfectly 
legal there according to US law. In addition, following the logic of the Perrin case, if a 
person living outside the UK and managing a website hosted in a foreign country 
published on that website content illegal in the UK, he could be prosecuted there if he 
were ever to enter British territory. 
Another criticism of establishing jurisdiction based on access is that no thorough 
analysis of the link between the perpetrator of the unlawful act, the illegal content 
published online and the State that exercises jurisdiction has been conducted by the courts 
adopting this approach. This analysis could have helped the national courts to limit the 
exercise of their jurisdiction only to cases that have a close nexus with their country. In 
relation to the necessity of conducting such an analysis there are, however, contrasting 
opinions. Nevertheless, there seems to be some consensus among international authorities 
in the field of freedom of expression on limiting State jurisdiction only to cases where a 
close nexus can be established. Besides, some criteria for determining which State has 
the right to exercise jurisdiction online have been identified by the above-mentioned 
authorities. These are: the place where the author/perpetrator is established, the place 
where the content has been uploaded/published and the place/people targeted by the 
content published/uploaded on the Internet. There are, however, some difficulties 
associated with these criteria. Indeed, the territorial principle is not useful in all those 
cases where the place where the content has been uploaded or even who uploaded it 
cannot be established. On the other hand, while the targeting test permits to by-pass these 
obstacles, there is no consensus as to the criteria upon which this test should be based. 
The debate regarding this issue is currently ongoing within the scholarly community 
investigating State jurisdiction online and is likely to continue in the forthcoming years. 
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This chapter deals with the extraterritorial application of national laws to regulate 
content published online. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the negative 
implications that the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction over online content has 
on both the respect for foreign States’ sovereignty and for freedom of expression of 
foreign Internet users.  
This chapter argues that, while the domestic courts in the cases analysed had 
jurisdiction over the defendants, these courts had no authority to impose measures with 
extraterritorial effects, such as global de-listing. Overall, the main problem represented 
by the jurisdictional approach adopted in these cases is that it equates to applying 
universal jurisdiction over acts that are not international crimes. 
This claim will be developed through three main steps. Section two will introduce the 
domestic cases examined and will provide an outline of the main jurisdictional issues 
discussed before the national courts. Section three will critically analyse these cases with 
a focus on highlighting the problems that the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction 
poses to the principle of international comity and freedom of expression online. Finally, 
section four will summarize the main conclusions of the analysis. 
 
3.2 Case selection 
This chapter focuses of four main Internet jurisdiction cases: Google Inc. v CNIL,1 
Google Inc. v Equustek Solutions Inc.,2 A.T. v Globe24H.com3 and Microsoft v. the United 
States.4 These cases deal with two areas of law: data protection and access to data in a 
criminal investigation. These two fields have been selected because the way in which 
 
1 Case C-507/17 Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:772; Decision no. 2016-054 of March 10, 2016 of the Restricted Committee of the French 
Data Protection Authority issuing Google Inc. with a financial penalty < 
https://sites.les.univr.it/cybercrime/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2016-google.pdf> accessed 8 September 
2020. 
2 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack 2014 BCSC 1063; Google Inc. v Equustek Solutions Inc. 2017 SCC 34. 
3 A.T. v Globe24H.com 2017 FC 114. 
4 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 58 
States exercise jurisdiction over online content in these sensitive areas highlights the 
difficulties faced by national courts in reconciling domestic interests with the respect for 
other States’ sovereignty and for foreign Internet users’ rights. In particular, the national 
courts in the cases examined in this chapter have all been presented with the same 
problem: establishing whether they can apply domestic laws extraterritorially to regulate 
the online activities of foreign defendants or to access data stored in foreign countries.  
The cases examined in this analysis belong to different jurisdictions in two main 
geographic regions: Europe and North America. These cases are quite controversial and 
have received widespread international coverage attracting the opinions of many 
scholars.5 International NGOs in the field of freedom of expression as well as many ISPs 
and technology companies have taken part in the proceedings in these cases and have 
submitted their observations to the Courts as amicus curiae.6 This shows how topical 
these cases are in connection with clarifying the expectations of different stakeholders 
regarding the rules regulating the exercise for State jurisdiction online. 
3.2.1 The Google LLC. v CNIL case 
In May 2016, the US-based Google Inc. (now Google LLC) filed a complaint against 
the French Data Protection Authority (DPA), the Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), before the Conseil d’Etat. The complaint was 
 
5 Michael Geist ‘Global Internet Takedown Orders Come to Canada: Supreme Court Upholds International 
Removal of Google Search Results’ (Michael Geist, 28 June 2017) 
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-internet-takedown-orders-come-canada-supreme-court-
upholds-international-removal-google-search-results/> accessed: 08 September 2020; Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘US Court issues preliminary injunction to block enforcement in the US of 
Google de-indexation ordered by Canadian Supreme Court’ (Internet & Jurisdiction Retrospect Database, 
November 2017) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#eyJxIjoiZXF1dXN0ZWsiLCJmcm9tIjoiMj
AxMi0wMiIsInRvIjoiMjAxOC0wMSJ9> accessed 08 September 2020; Daphne Keller ‘Global Right to 
Be Forgotten. Delisting: Why CNIL is Wrong’ (Stanford Center for Internet and Society, 18 November 
2016 <http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/11/global-right-be-forgotten-delisting-why-cnil-wrong> 
accessed 12 March 2018; Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Canada’s Federal Court applies national 
data protection law against Romanian website’ (Internet & Jurisdiction Retrospect Database,  February 
2017) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#eyJmcm9tIjoiMjAxNy0wMSIsInRvIjoiMjA
xNy0xMiJ9> accessed 12 March 2018; Teresa Scassa ‘Federal Court Orders Romanian Website Operator 
to Take Down Canadian Court Decisions Under Privacy Statute’ (Teresa Scassa, 21 February 2017) 
<http://www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=242:federal-court-orders-
romanian-website-operator-to-take-down-canadian-court-decisions-under-privacy-statute&Itemid=80> 
accessed 12 March 2018; Jennifer Daskal ‘Three Key Takeaways: The 2d Circuit Ruling in The Microsoft 
Warrant Case’ (Just Security, 14 July 2016) <https://www.justsecurity.org/32041/key-takeaways-2d-
circuit-ruling-microsoft-warrant-case/> accessed 12 March 2018. 
6 As an example, see the amicus curiae briefs submitted in the Microsoft case, Microsoft ‘Resources: 
Microsoft’s Search Warrant Case’ (2014) (Microsoft, December 2014) < 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/resource/initiative/microsofts-search-warrant-case/page/3/> accessed: 
12 March 2018; Written Observations of Article 19 and Others, 29 November 2017, case C-507/17 Google 
Inc. v Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL).  
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related to a €100000 financial penalty that the CNIL had issued against Google in March 
2016. In particular, the CNIL had found the company in violation of articles 38 and 40 of 
the French Data Protection Act for not granting the de-listing requests that it had received 
from some French Internet users.7 Articles 38 and 40 of the French Data Protection Act 
establish the data subjects’ right to object to the processing of personal data and the right 
to erasure of incomplete or inaccurate data (right to de-listing) respectively.8 The duty to 
de-list for search engine operators was established by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in the 2014 Google Spain case.9 De-listing is an operation carried out by 
search engine operators, such as Google, and consists of the removal from the list of 
search results associated to a person’s name linking to a webpage containing private 
information about that person. De-listing does not involve the removal of the undesired 
information itself. Indeed, the information remains online and is accessible when other 
search terms are used other than the requestor’s name.10  
The dispute between the CNIL and Google is related to the number of domain names 
which should be affected by de-listing and the geographical scope of the de-listing 
operations. Indeed, the CNIL’s position is that de-listing is effective only when carried 
out in regard to all the geographical extensions of a search engine and all the search 
queries that are made worldwide using a person’s name. In other words, according to the 
 
7 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 9. 
8 The Loi Informatique et Libertes Act N°78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files 
and Civil Liberties is the French Data Protection Act. It incorporates the provisions contained in the 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ 
L281/31 (the Data Protection Directive). This Directive was repealed by the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJL 119/1 (see n 24). An English translation of the 
Loi Informatique et Libertes can be found at https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/Act78-
17VA.pdf accessed 12 March 2018. 
9 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario 
Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
10 The grounds on which delisting can be requested are currently listed in article 17.1 of the Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJL 119/1: ‘The data subject shall have 
the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue 
delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of 
the following grounds applies the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which 
they were collected or otherwise processed; the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is 
based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal 
ground for the processing; the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are 
no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant 
to Article 21(2); the personal data have been unlawfully processed; the personal data have to be erased for 
compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; the 
personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Article 
8(1)’. 
 60 
French authority, following the request of a French Internet user, Google should remove 
the unwanted search result from all Google Search geographical extensions and in respect 
to all the search queries that are made globally. The consequence of this position is that 
the undesired link is no longer accessible worldwide when searching for the requestor’s 
name. The French DPA justified the extraterritorial application of de-listing with the need 
to ensure that European data subjects’ rights to object and to erasure are applied ‘without 
circumvention’.11  
Google’s position, on the other hand, is that de-listing should be carried out only in 
regard to the European extensions of its search engine and only when search queries are 
made from Europe.12 
The debate between Google and the CNIL regarding the lawfulness of global de-
listing is particularly relevant to this analysis. In opposing to the CNIL’s request for global 
de-listing, Google claimed that the French DPA was acting outside the scope of its powers 
by trying to impose the extraterritorial application of the French Data Protection Act. This 
Act, according to Google, does not apply to search queries that are made outside the 
French territory because these queries neither target French Internet users nor are linked 
to the activities of Google France.13 Indeed, the company stated that Google Search 
geographical extensions are to be considered as separate entities, each of which targets 
users located in different countries. Google also claimed that, due to its extraterritorial 
effects, applying de-listing to the entirety of its search engine extensions is a violation of 
the sovereignty of the other States as well as a violation of the right to freedom of 
expression and information.14 
The CNIL responded to Google’s claims with three main counterarguments. First, the 
French Data Protection Law applies to all of Google’s geographical extensions because 
Google France contributes in the French territory to the activities of the US-based Google 
Inc.15 According to the CNIL, Google Search geographical extensions can be considered 
as mere technical paths that refer to the same processing system - Google Search available 
through www.google.com - rather than being single processing systems separated from 
one another. Second, in regard to the alleged violation of other States’ sovereignty, the 
 
11 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 8. 
12 Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) (n 1) para 31. 
13 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 6. 
14 ibid 7-8. 
15 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 6-7. Article 5-I-2 of the French Data Protection Act states that the law applies 
only to the data controller who ‘although not established on French territory or in any other Member State 
of the European Union, uses means of processing located on French territory, with the exception of 
processing used only for the purposes of transit through this territory or that of any other member State of 
the European Union’, Loi Informatique et Libertes (n 8) art 5-I-2. 
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French authority affirmed that its decision is related exclusively to Internet users located 
in France. In particular, such a decision is necessary to ensure that French Internet users’ 
right to complete protection is effective ‘without restrictions for all processing, even if it 
conflicts with foreign rights’.16 Finally, as to the infringement of the right to freedom of 
expression and information, the CNIL stated that the right to erasure and to object are 
only granted when specific conditions are met, such as proof of a legitimate interest and 
the existence of obsolete, incomplete or erroneous information.17 In other words, the 
CNIL grants de-listing requests only if it finds that ‘a tight balance between the respect 
for the right to privacy and personal data protection of individuals and the benefit to the 
public of accessing information’ can be retained.18 
The dispute between the CNIL and Google before the Conseil d’Etat was put on hold 
on 21 August 2017, when the French Court decided to stay the proceedings and presented 
its request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.19 The French Court asked three questions 
to the EU judges. The first is whether search engine operators should carry out de-listing 
on all the domain names of a search engine, and in respect to all the search queries that 
are made using a person’s name.20 This equates to asking whether de-listing should be 
applied globally, as stated by the CNIL. Alternatively, the Conseil d’Etat has asked 
whether de-listing should be limited to the domain name corresponding to the State from 
where the de-listing request is made or, more generally, domain names corresponding to 
EU member States.21 The French Court’s last question is whether de-listing should be 
applied to search queries made from the country of residence of the person requesting de-
listing or more generally from EU member States irrespective of the domain name used 
by Internet users.22 In other words, the Conseil d’Etat has asked whether de-listing should 
be applied to search queries made from within the EU even when the queries are made 
on non-European versions of the search engine, such as google.com. 
Following the request for a preliminary ruling, however, Google changed the way in 
which the national versions of its search engine operate. In particular, the domain name 
entered by Internet users is not the factor that determines which national version of 
 
16 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 7. 
17 ibid 8. 
18 ibid. 
19 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘France’s highest administrative court refers Google right to be 
de-indexed case to CJEU’ (Internet & Jurisdiction Retrospect Database, December 2017) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/publications/retrospect#eyJjYXRlZ29yaWVzIjpbIjE2NiJdLCJ0byI
6IjIwMTctMTIiLCJmcm9tIjoiMjAxMi0wMiJ9> accessed 17 January 2018. 
20 Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) (n 1) para 39 (1). 
21 ibid para 39 (2). 
22 ibid para 39 (3). 
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Google Search engine can be accessed by the user. Indeed, Google now uses geo-location 
technology to identify the location of the Internet user and automatically redirects the user 
to the national version of its search engine corresponding to that location.23 The CJEU 
has therefore reinterpreted the questions presented by the Conseil d’Etat as asking 
whether articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive 96/45 and article 17(1) of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)24 establish that, when granting a de-listing request, 
Google should remove the unwanted search result from all the versions of its search 
engine, only from the versions of the search engine that correspond to EU Member States 
or only from the national version of the search engine that corresponds to the Member 
State from where the request has been made. The CJEU was also asked to establish 
whether Google should use geo-blocking techniques to prevent that search queries made 
from the country of residence of the person requesting delisting or from any EU Member 
State access the unwanted search result regardless of the national version of the search 
engine used.25  
The CJEU found that both the Directive 96/45 and the GDPR apply to Google since 
the processing of personal data on Google’s part is carried out on the French territory. 
This is because Google France is linked to the other national versions of Google and it 
conducts advertising activities in France which are linked to the processing of personal 
data operated by Google.26 As to the geographical scope of the right to delisting, the CJEU 
found that a search engine operator is only required to carry out delisting in regard to the 
national versions of its search engines corresponding to the Member States of the EU.27 
However, the search engine operator is required to apply the relevant techniques to 
prevent or seriously discourage Internet users located in the EU Member States from 
accessing the delisted search result when searching for the name of the person who 
requested delisting.28 As to global delisting, the CJEU found that while the right to 
delisting is recognised in EU law, it cannot be said the same for other States which might 
not recognize this right or have a different approach to it.29 In addition, the judges 
 
23 ibid para 42. 
24 On 25 May 2018 Directive 96/45 was repealed by the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJL 119/1. However, since the Directive 96/45 was still in 
force when the request for a preliminary ruling was presented before the CJEU, the Court at para 41 
specified that it would have answered the questions in light of both the directive and the regulation. 
25 Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) (n 1) para 43. 
26 ibid para 52. 
27 ibid para 66. 
28 ibid para 70. 
29 ibid 59. 
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underlined that the right to delisting is not absolute and it must be applied in a way that 
is compatible with the proportionality principle. Besides, a balance must be struck 
between this right and the right to freedom of information of Internet users.30 While, 
however, this balance has been found in EU law, other parts of the world might find a 
different balance between these two rights.31 For this reason, the Court found that EU law 
does not require delisting to be carried out in regard to all the various versions of a search 
engine.32 Interestingly, however, the CJEU did not exclude that global delisting might 
still be ordered. Indeed, the judges found that, based on the effects doctrine, since global 
access to an undesired search result regarding a person located in the EU will have an 
immediate and substantial effect on that person, there is a competence in the EU 
legislature to order global delisting.33 In particular, the CJEU found that, while EU law 
does not currently require global delisting, it does not prohibit it either. It will therefore 
be up to the domestic courts and supervisory authorities of the EU Member States to strike 
a balance on a case by cases basis between the right to privacy of the data subject and the 
right of access to information. Based on that assessment, the national authorities will still 
be competent to order global delisting if they deem it necessary.34 
Overall, as will be shown in the case analysis section, the CNIL’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over Google Inc. does not seem particularly problematic, since the company 
was operating on French territory. The extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction and 
the imposition of global de-listing, on the other hand, which have not been excluded by 
the CJEU, pose problems with regard to the respect for comity between States and 
freedom of expression online. These points will be discussed further below. 
3.2.1.1 The territorial scope of de-listing according to the European Data Protection 
Authorities and the wide jurisdictional reach of the GDPR 
The French DPA’s interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the right to de-
listing is prima facie in line with the guidelines issued by Article 29 Working Party (WP), 
the data protection working party established by article 29 of the Directive 96/45. The 
Working Party, which included representatives of EU member States’ DPAs, was an 
independent advisory body providing the Commission with advice in the field of data 
 
30 ibid para 60. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid para 64. 
33 ibid paras 57-58. 
34 ibid para 72. 
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protection.35  In May 2018, when the GDPR entered into force repealing the Directive 
96/45, the Working Party was replaced by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). 
As the dispute between Google and the CNIL started in 2016 and the request for a 
preliminary ruling was presented before the CJEU in 2017, the guidelines issued by the 
Working Party on delisting could be considered as a relevant authority at the time. 
According to the guidelines issued by Article 29 WP on November 2014, to be effective 
de-listing should be carried out by search engine operators on all their domain names, as 
opposed to the European versions only.36 However, unlike the CNIL, the Article 29 WP 
did not specify the territorial scope of application of de-listing. In particular, the advisory 
body did not clarify whether search engine operators should remove the unwanted search 
result from all their domain names in relation to all the search queries that are made 
globally. In other words, it is unclear whether, according to the EU working party, Internet 
users outside the EU should have been prevented from accessing a search result that could 
be legal in their countries. However, Article 29 WP’s guidelines were issued in 2014, 
soon after the Google Spain judgement and before the Google v CNIL dispute started. 
Therefore, the lack of further elaboration by the EU data protection authority on the 
territorial scope of de-listing could be linked to the fact that the guidelines were issued at 
the beginning of the de-listing era. Following the Google v CNIL judgement of September 
2019, the EDPB which replaced Article 29 WP, published an updated version of the 
Guidelines on the right to delisting. However, the territorial scope of delisting is not 
mentioned in these new Guidelines.37 
Before the CJEU issued its judgement in the Google v CNIL case, other DPAs in 
Europe followed Article 29 WP’s approach to global de-listing as far as applying it to all 
the domain names of a search engine is concerned. However, some differences have 
emerged regarding the territorial scope of this operation. The UK DPA, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), for example, on 2 November 2015, announced that it had 
amended a de-listing notice issued against Google where the company was originally 
asked to remove certain search results from Google.uk only. Indeed, in November 2015 
 
35 European Data Protection Supervisor ‘Glossary - Article 29 Working Party’ (European data Protection 
Supervisor) <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/glossary/a_en> accessed 20 January 
2018. 
36 Article 29 Working Party ‘Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union Judgment On “Google Spain and Inc. v Agencia Española De Protección De Datos (Aepd) and Mario 
Costeja González”’ C-131/12 26 November 2014, 3. 
37 European Data Protection Board ‘Guidelines 5/2019 on the criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the 
search engines cases under the GDPR (part 1)’ 2 December 2019 ,https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-
tools/public-consultations-art-704/2019/guidelines-52019-criteria-right-be-forgotten-search_en> accessed 
7 August 2020. 
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ICO asked the company to carry out de-listing on all its domain names when the search 
query appeared to have come from within the UK.38 ICO’s position is therefore different 
from CNIL’s, since ICO did specify that de-listing, although to be applied to non-EU 
domain names as well as European, was to be limited to searches conducted from within 
the UK.  
Global de-listing, however, received the approval of another data protection 
authority, the Swedish Datainspektionen. In May 2017 the Swedish DPA published the 
results of an investigation that it had conducted on how de-listing should be applied. The 
Swedish authority claimed that, in principle, search engine operators should remove 
unwanted search results only when the search queries are made from Sweden. However, 
the DPA found that there are certain circumstances that require the de-listing to be applied 
to queries made from foreign countries as well. This is so when there is a ‘specific 
connection to Sweden and to the data subject’.39 According to the Swedish DPA, this 
special connection exists if the search result to be de-listed is linked to information 
‘written in Swedish, addressed to a Swedish audience, contains information about a 
person that is in Sweden or if the information has been published on the Swedish domain 
.se’.40 The Swedish approach to exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially with regard to 
de-listing is therefore a qualified approach. Indeed, the exercise of State jurisdiction is 
justified only if there are certain connecting factors linking the search result to be de-
listed to Sweden. Overall, the Swedish approach seems preferable to the French, because 
it reflects the country’s need to limit the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction only 
to cases that are closely linked to Sweden. 
As mentioned above, the right to delisting is contained in Article 17 of the GDPR. 
Having examined the territorial scope of delisting, it is also worth mentioning the wide 
jurisdictional reach of the GDPR itself. Article 3 of the GDPR defines its territorial scope 
and it establishes that the Regulation applies to the processing or personal data within the 
establishment of a controller or processor in the EU, regardless of where the data 
processing happens.41 The Regulation also covers the processing of personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union by a controller that is not established in the Union if the 
processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services to the data subjects in 
 
38 David Smith ‘Has the search result ruling stopped the internet working?' (Information Commissioner’s 
Office, 2 November 2015) <https://www.wired-
gov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/Has+the+search+result+ruling+stopped+the+internet+working+0311201515
2000?open> (Accessed: 20 January 2018). 
39 Datainspektionen ‘The right to be forgotten may apply all over the world’ (Datainspektionen, 4 May 
2017) <https://perma.cc/NT8D-42Z3>  accessed: 20 January 2018. 
40 ibid. 
41 General Data Protection Regulation (n 10) art 3(1). 
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the Union or to the monitoring of the behaviour of the data subjects as long as their 
behaviour takes place within the Union.42 Finally, Article 3 establishes that the Regulation 
applies to the processing of personal data by controllers not established in the Union but 
established in places where the law of the Member States applies according to public 
international law.43 As will be explored in section 3.3, article 48 of the GDPR also 
introduces significant limitations to the disclosure of personal data to non-EU states, 
which impacts on the possibility that foreign States access data stored in the EU.44 
Besides, article 27 of the GDPR establishes that a controller that is outside the EU but 
that nonetheless falls within the scope of the GDPR must designate a representative in the 
EU.45  
Some commentators have highlighted the wide extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of 
the GDPR, which imposes obligations on data processors and controllers not just within 
the EU but also outside, since it poses restrictions on data transfers and the obligation for 
processors not established in the EU but falling within the scope of the GDRP to nominate 
a representative there.46 Overall, according to these commentators, the GDPR is 
increasingly seen as standard setting, as it is influencing the way in which countries and 
multinational companies outside the EU approach and structure data privacy laws.47 
Among these countries figure Thailand that in its Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 
(2019) (PDPA) adopted a jurisdictional approach similar to that of article 3 of the 
GDPR.48 For this reason, it has been argued that the biggest impact of the GDPR might 
be that it might encourage other States to carry out progressively broad exercises of 
jurisdiction in the field of data privacy.49 
 
42 ibid art 3(2). 
43 ibid article 3(3). 
44 See section 3.3 for an analysis of this point. 
45 General Data Protection Regulation (n 10) art 27. 
46 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (Internet & Jurisdiction, 2019) 
<https://form.jotformeu.com/93222419949364> accessed: 28 November 2019, 95. 
47 ibid. 
48 ‘The PDPA applies to the collection, usage and disclosure by a data controller or a data processor located 
in Thailand, even if the collection, usage and disclosure of the Personal Data is undertaken outside of 
Thailand. The PDPA also applies to data controllers and data processors located outside Thailand, but only 
in the following cases: When goods or services are offered to data subjects in Thailand, regardless of 
whether there is payment or not; or When monitoring of data subjects’ behaviour is taken place in Thailand’ 
Tassanai Kiratisountorn, Pimchanok Eianleng, Anna Gamvros and Ruby Kwok ‘Thailand Personal Data 
Protection Law’ (The Norton Rose Fulbright Data Protection Report, 28 February 2020) 
<https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/02/thailand-personal-data-protection-law/> accessed 11 
August 2020. The PDPA was due to enter into force on 27 May 2020, however, there are reports that 
Thailand’s government decided to postpone the entry into force of the Act to May 2021 due to the 
difficulties caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, see Dhiraphol Suwanprateep ‘Postponement of Thailand's 
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA)’ (Lexology, 12 May 2020) 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c628a738-f929-4987-b6db-b0ee00e69b30> accessed 
11 August 2020. See also Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (n 46) 96. 
49 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (n 46) 96. 
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3.2.2 The Google Inc. v Equustek Solutions Inc. case  
The dispute between the Canadian company Equustek Solutions and the US-based 
Google Inc. commenced following Google’s refusal to de-list all the websites of 
Equustek’s former distributor, the Canada-based Datalink. Equustek had obtained an 
order and an injunction by the Supreme Court of British Columbia against Datalink due 
to the latter’s unlawful sale and distribution of Equustek’s intellectual property. As a 
result, Datalink had been prohibited from selling Equsteek’s products and, on 13 
December 2012, the company had been ordered to cease operating or carrying out 
business through any website.50 Datalink, however, had not complied with the order and, 
after having abandoned the legal proceedings, it left British Columbia and moved to an 
unknown location from where it continued to sell the plaintiff’s products through its 
websites.51  
Following the December 2012 injunction, Equustek asked Google, which was not a 
party to the legal proceedings, to de-list all of Datalink’s websites. Google, however, 
carried out de-listing only on Google.ca, rather than on the entirety of its search engine’s 
geographical extensions, and only in relation to 345 webpages associated with Datalink, 
rather than all of the company’s websites.52 For this reason, Equustek asked the British 
Columbia court to issue an interlocutory injunction ordering Google not to display any 
part of Datalink’s websites on any of Google Search results worldwide. Fenlon J granted 
the interlocutory injunction. The judge found that by displaying Datalink’s websites 
among Google search results worldwide, Google was involuntarily facilitating Datalink 
in carrying out irreparable harm to Equustek.53 Fenlon J’s order was upheld by both the 
Court of Appeal of British Columbia and Canada Supreme Court. 
The question presented before Canada Supreme Court was whether British Columbia 
courts could issue an interlocutory injunction ordering Google to de-list all Datalink’s 
websites on the entirety of the geographical extensions of its search engine. More 
specifically, the Court had to determine whether granting an interlocutory injunction was 
“just and equitable”.54 Interlocutory injunctions are equitable remedies with a temporary 
validity: they are usually enforceable until trial or until the final determination of the case 
is reached. Their purpose is to ‘ensure that the subject matter of the litigation will be 
“preserved” so that effective relief will be available when the case is ultimately heard on 
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the merits’.55 The Supreme Court found with a majority of seven to two that all the criteria 
that determine whether interlocutory injunctions can be granted were met. Indeed, the 
judges affirmed that there was a serious issue to be tried, that Equustek was suffering 
irreversible harm due to Datalink’s continuing sale of its products online, and that the 
balance of convenience was in favour of granting the injunction. In particular, the Court 
found that Google was ‘a determinative player’ in allowing Datalink to sell Equustek’s 
products and therefore causing the harm to Equustek to continue.56 
Google’s objections to the extraterritorial character of the interlocutory injunction are 
particularly relevant to the scope of this analysis. The Supreme Court found that the 
British Columbia courts had both personal and territorial jurisdiction over Google Inc. 
since the company carried out business in British Columbia through its advertising and 
search operations.57 Google accepted that British Columbia courts had jurisdiction. 
However, the company claimed that the extraterritorial reach of the injunction was 
improper and unnecessary and that Canadian courts should limit the territorial reach of 
the injunction to Canada and Google.ca only.58 The Supreme Court dismissed this claim 
and found that Canadian courts can issue injunctions with extraterritorial effects when 
they have in personam jurisdiction and when the extraterritoriality is essential to ensure 
the injunction’s effectiveness. The Court also mentioned a number of Internet-related 
cases from foreign countries, including the CJEU Google Spain case, as an example of 
the international support towards issuing orders that have extraterritorial effects in 
relation to Internet abuses.59 According to the Supreme Court, the extraterritorial reach 
of the injunction was necessary because the majority of Datalink’s sales happened outside 
Canada.60 Therefore, the injunction was only going to be effective if it had extraterritorial 
effects.61 Indeed, an injunction limited to Canada or Google.ca would have allowed 
consumers outside Canada and Canadian Internet users using any other Google 
geographical extension to access Datalink’s products. The Supreme Court also found that 
the balance of convenience was not in Google’s favour, because ‘[t]here is […] no harm 
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to Google which can be placed on its “inconvenience” scale arising from the global reach 
of the order’.62 This is because, as admitted by Google, it is relatively easy for the 
company to carry out global de-listing. This operation can be done in one location, in the 
place where the search engine is controlled, and does not require Google to take steps in 
multiple countries.63 
Google also raised the argument that a global injunction violated international 
comity. Indeed, according to Google, a global injunction could not have been obtained in 
a foreign country. Alternatively, the company claimed that complying with the injunction 
would have led Google to violate the laws of another country.64  The Court, however, 
found this claim to be theoretical, since, as observed by the judge of first instance, in most 
countries the sale of other companies’ intellectual property is considered illegal as well.65 
Finally, Google stated that the injunction raised freedom of expression concerns 
which should have led the Courts to refrain from granting it.66 The Supreme Court 
dismissed this claim as it found that the injunction had been issued due to an infringement 
of intellectual property rights. Therefore, it was quite unrealistic that the injunction could 
have offended the core values of another country.67 Indeed, in the judges’ opinion, 
protecting freedom of expression does not require condoning the facilitation of the illegal 
sale of other companies’ intellectual property.68 However, the judges stated that in case 
Google had evidence of foreign laws that it would have been required to violate in order 
to comply with the injunction, it could have applied to the British Columbia courts to 
modify the order accordingly.69  
On 24 July 2017, Google started legal proceedings against Equustek before US 
courts. The company asked the US District Court for the Northern District of California 
to declare that the order of the Canadian Supreme Court is not enforceable in the United 
States. Google argued that the Canadian order violates the First Amendment, contrasts 
with the immunity for interactive service providers established by the Communication 
Decency Act and infringes the principle of comity.70 
On 2 November 2017, the Californian Court granted Google’s motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief, which was subsequently confirmed in a final ruling on 14 December 
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2017.71 The US Court found that the Canadian order is not enforceable in the United 
States because it would cause irreparable harm to Google by depriving it of the benefit of 
US federal law. Indeed, according to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
‘“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider”’.72 In 
addition, the Canadian order was found to be contrary to US public interest, since 
Congress had established that freedom of speech in the US would be impaired if ISPs 
were liable for content published by a third party.73 The Court concluded that ‘[b]y forcing 
intermediaries to remove links to third-party material, the Canadian order undermines the 
policy goals of Section 230 and threatens free speech on the global internet’.74 
Based on the favourable ruling obtained before the US courts, Google applied to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia asking to set aside or change the injunction regarding 
global delisting.75 The company argued inter alia that the ruling from the Californian 
court showed that the injunction issued by the Canadian courts violated the core values 
of another jurisdiction.76 On 16 April 2018, however, the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia dismissed Google’s application. The British Columbia Court found that, as 
affirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court, the injunction could only be reconsidered if it 
required Google to violate the laws of another country.77 However, Smith J found that the 
US decision did not establish that Google carrying out global delisting would constitute 
a violation of US law. Indeed, the judge found that the injunction simply restricts 
Google’s freedom to decide whether to list the websites in question. Restricting a party’s 
freedom, however, is not the same as requiring that party to violate the law.78 In addition, 
Smith J found that Google had not shown that the injunction violates core American 
values. Indeed, the judge underlined that the Californian decision did not examine 
Google’s submission that the injunction violated the First Amendment of the American 
Constitution, which can be considered in Smith J’s opinion as an expression of American 
core values.79 Ultimately, according to the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
  
‘[t]he effect of the U.S. order is that no action can be taken against Google to enforce 
the injunction in U.S. courts. That does not restrict the ability of this Court to protect 
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the integrity of its own process through orders directed to parties over whom it has 
personal jurisdiction’.80  
 
Google’s request to set aside or modify the injunction was therefore dismissed by the 
British Columbia Court. Similarly to the CNIL case, in the Equustek case as well the 
exercise of State jurisdiction over Google Inc. is justified by the objective territorial 
principle. Indeed, as observed by the British Columbia Courts, Google Inc. was carrying 
out business activities in Canada through its advertising and search activities.81 However, 
the global de-listing order imposed by Canadian courts violates both the sovereignty of 
foreign States and freedom of expression online, as discussed below. 
3.2.3 The A.T. v Globe24H.com case  
The case A.T. v Globe24H.com was decided by the Ontario Federal Court on 30 
January 2017. It concerns a dispute between A.T., a Romanian citizen living in Canada, 
and Sebastian Radulescu, a Romanian citizen who lived in Romania, from where he 
administered the website Globe24H.com. The website, which was hosted on severs 
located in Romania, republished decisions from various national courts, including 
Canada.82 The Canadian decisions available on Globe24H.com were also publicly 
available on legal websites such as the Canadian CanLII.org. However, unlike the 
Canadian legal websites, Mr. Radulescu had allowed for the decisions republished on 
Globe24H.com to be indexed by third party search engines, such as Google.83 As a result, 
those decisions appeared among the list of search results associated to the parties’ 
names.84 Consequently, personal details related to those parties could be easily accessed 
by Internet users who searched for the litigants’ names on Internet search engines.  
The applicant, A.T., initiated legal proceedings against Mr. Radulescu pursuant to 
section 14 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA).85 In particular, A.T. sought relief for the damages caused by the publication 
of personal information and asked the Court to order, inter alia, the removal of the 
Canadian decisions from the respondent’s website.  
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A.T. had originally filed a complaint against Mr. Radulescu to the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPCC) since a Canadian decision concerning a labour 
case that he was a party to had been republished through Globe24H.com. The applicant 
was concerned that the personal details accessible through Google and other search 
engines would affect his possibility to find a job in the future.86 The OPCC, who was also 
a party in the present case, conducted an investigation into A.T’s and another twenty-six 
complaints received against Globe24H.com. The investigation concluded that Mr. 
Radulescu’s website constituted an organisation whose purpose was to collect, use and 
disclose personal information for commercial purposes within the meaning of PIPEDA.87 
Indeed, Mr. Radulescu had a system in place asking the interested parties to pay a certain 
sum in exchange for the removal of their personal information from Globe24H.com.88  
One of the questions presented by the parties to the Ontario Federal Court was 
whether PIPEDA has extraterritorial application and can therefore regulate the activities 
of a foreign organisation, such as Globe24H.com, that have an impact on people residing 
in Canada.89 The Court first noted that notwithstanding the absence of any reference in 
the Act to its extraterritorial scope, there was no express provision restricting its 
application to Canada.90 For this reason, the judge found that the Statute could be applied 
to all those cases that had a ‘“real and substantial link”’ to Canada, as stated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers (SOCAN).91 In the SOCAN 
case, which dealt with the extraterritorial application of the Canadian Copyright Act, 
Binnie J affirmed that relevant connecting factors for acts committed on the Internet 
included: ‘the situs of the content provider, the host server, the intermediaries and the end 
user’.92 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that a sufficient connection for 
exercising jurisdiction is verified both when Canada is the country of transmission of a 
communication and the country of receipt.93  
In conducting the real and substantial connection test related to the extraterritorial 
application of PIPEDA, the judge in the present case referred to four connecting factors. 
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These are: the location of the target audience of the website, the source of the content on 
the website, the location of the website operator and that of the host server.94 The judge 
found that while the last two criteria pointed at Romania rather than Canada, since both 
Mr. Radulescu and the website server were located there, this fact was not decisive in 
dismissing Canada’s jurisdiction.95 This is because ‘when an organization’s activities take 
place exclusively through a website […] telecommunications occur “both here and 
there”’.96 Ultimately, in establishing jurisdiction over Globe24H.com the judge relied on 
the first two connecting factors mentioned above, the audience targeted by the website 
and the content of the website, as well as on the fact that the website produced negative 
effects on the Canadian public. The content of the website constituted a connecting factor 
in the judge’s opinion since Globe24H.com contained Canadian case-law. In addition, the 
judge found that the website directly targeted a Canadian audience since it explicitly 
advertised that it provided access to domestic case-law. To prove this point, the Court 
referred to the fact that the website was mostly accessed by Canadian visitors. Finally, 
the judge found that the website had a negative impact on the Canadian public due to the 
number of complaints received by the OPCC from people in Canada.97  
The final point examined by the Court regarding the extraterritorial application of 
PIPEDA was whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendant was compliant with the 
principle of comity.98 Indeed, the respondent had been fined by the Romanian National 
Supervisory Authority for Personal Data Processing (RNSAPDP) for violating local data 
protection laws following a complaint that the applicant A.T. had initiated in Romania as 
well.99 Mr. Radulescu had appealed against the fine and the proceedings before the 
RNSAPDP were ongoing when the present case was discussed by the Ontario Federal 
Court. The Court, however, found that the fine issued by the RNSAPDP and the fact that 
the latter had participated in the investigation carried out by the OPCC in Canada was not 
a sufficient reason for the Canadian court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
defendant.100 This is because, given the participation of the RNSAPDP in the OPCC’s 
investigation, the Federal Court’s findings complemented rather than offended any action 
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taken against the defendant in Romania.101 Finally, the Court dismissed Mr. Radulescu’s 
argument that following the Club Resorts v Van Breda decision a Canadian Court cannot 
establish jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the latter did not have an actual presence 
in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there, as opposed to a merely virtual 
presence.102 Indeed, the judge stated that Van Breda did not deal with e-trade but with 
tort claims, and that in fact the Supreme Court was concerned about avoiding the exercise 
of ‘what would amount to forms of universal jurisdiction in respect of tort claims arising 
out of certain categories of business or commercial activity’.103 For this reason, the 
Ontario Federal Court found that the Van Breda reasoning was not relevant to the present 
case.104 Ultimately, the judge ordered Mr Radulescu to pay for the damage caused to the 
claimant and to remove all Canadian decisions containing personal information from 
Globe24h.com.105 
Similarly to the two previous cases examined, the exercise of State jurisdiction by the 
Canadian Courts in this case is justified by the fact that the defendant targeted a Canadian 
audience. This is evidenced by the fact that Mr. Radulescu published Canadian Court’s 
decisions and received payments from Canadian Internet users in exchange for the de-
listing of their personal information. In other words, Mr. Radulescu had put himself 
within Canadian jurisdiction. However, as will be examined below, this case poses 
problems regarding the exercise of freedom of expression online. This is because the 
domestic court, instead of ordering the de-listing of the personal information, ordered the 
removal of the content published on Mr. Radulescu’s website, which was perfectly legal 
in Canada. 
3.2.4 The Microsoft v. the United States case 
On December 2013, a United States Magistrate Judge from the US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York issued a “Search and Seizure Warrant” directed at 
Microsoft at the request of the US government.106 The warrant was issued pursuant to 
section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and was related to an Outlook 
email account maintained by Microsoft.107 The account was believed to be used in 
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conjunction with illegal drug trafficking. The nationality and the location of the user who 
set up the account were unknown.108 Microsoft was asked to seize the email account and 
to disclose its content to the US government.109 However, the company found that most 
of the account content was stored outside the US, in its Dublin datacentre. Therefore, after 
having provided the authorities with the data that were stored in the United States, the 
company asked the Magistrate Judge to quash the warrant in respect to the content stored 
in Dublin.110 The Magistrate Judge denied the motion to quash the warrant and the District 
Court subsequently held Microsoft in contempt for its failure to fully comply with it.111 
Microsoft applied to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On 14 July 2016, 
the Court granted Microsoft’s appeal, and reversed the Magistrate Judge’s decision. The 
US government appealed against the Court of Appeals’ decision, however the appeal was 
rejected and the decision was upheld on January 2017. 
Microsoft argued that a warrant issued under section 2703 of the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) does not have extraterritorial effect and therefore does not 
apply to material that is stored in a foreign country.112 According to Microsoft’s argument, 
disclosing data that are stored abroad would amount to an unlawful invasion of its clients’ 
privacy.113 On the other hand, the US government maintained that an SCA warrant is to 
be equated to a subpoena, rather than a warrant. For this reason, just like a subpoena duces 
tecum, an SCA warrant requires that the service provider disclose the data stored on its 
facilities, regardless of the location of the latter.114 In particular, the US government stated 
that, as acknowledged by Microsoft, the company could retrieve the data contained in its 
Dublin servers directly from the United States by using a database management 
programme.115 This fact showed that the warrant did not require Microsoft to act outside 
the territory of the United States. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the US government’s arguments. Indeed, the Court 
stated that in the SCA the geographical scope of the Act and that of the search warrants 
was not specified.116 However, the judges did underline that there are strong and binding 
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precedents in US case law against the extraterritorial application of US Statutes.117 
Besides, the Court found that the warrant provisions of the SCA did not foresee nor permit 
the extraterritorial application of the Act and that when the Congress approved the SCA 
it did not intend for it to apply extraterritorially.118 Moreover, the Court stated that the 
SCA’s plain meaning, text, framework, procedural aspects and legislative history showed 
that the primary focus of the Act was to protect the privacy of the stored electronic 
communications of Internet users.119 Finally, the Court of Appeal found that compelling 
Microsoft to execute the warrant would amount to unlawfully applying the SCA 
extraterritorially. Indeed, the content to be disclosed was located in Dublin and was 
therefore subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign State. This was true notwithstanding 
the fact that the data could be accessed by Microsoft from the US through a data 
management programme. In other words, the act of accessing data equated to an 
extraterritorial act because it implied an interaction between Microsoft and the data stored 
in Dublin that were subjected to Irish jurisdiction.120 For this reason, the disclosure of the 
data would have taken place outside the United States, irrespective of the location of the 
person who set up the email account or the fact that Microsoft is based in the United 
States. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that there are some practical difficulties 
associated with not granting the extraterritorial effect of the SCA, as stated by the 
Magistrate Judge. Indeed, offenders could easily mislead service providers into storing 
their data outside the US. In Microsoft’s case, for example, data are stored near the 
location that the users indicate as their own when they subscribe to the service.121 In 
addition, the process for obtaining foreign-stored data is cumbersome. This is regulated 
by the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) between the US and other countries. 
Although Ireland is a party to the treaty, there is no formal way of obtaining assistance 
from those countries which have not signed it.122 However, the Court found that these 
considerations do not override its findings against the extraterritorial application of the 
SCA. In particular, the judges highlighted the importance of respecting the principle of 
comity in cross-boundary criminal investigation.123 Specifically, the Court dismissed the 
theory that foreign States’ interests are unaffected by extraterritorial orders that allow the 
 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid 22, 32. 
119 ibid 33. 
120 ibid 40. 
121 ibid 8, 41. 
122 ibid 41. 
123 ibid 41-42. 
 77 
US to access data stored abroad and ‘import’ them in the US just because the service 
provider has a base there.124 
On 23 June 2017, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a petition asking the 
Supreme Court to review the July 2016 decision.125 In October 2017, the Supreme Court 
granted the US DOJ’s petition and in February 2018 it heard oral arguments from the 
parties.126 However, a major legal development led the Supreme Court to declare the case 
moot on 17 April 2018.127 Indeed, in March 2018, while the case was still pending before 
the Court, President Trump signed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act 
(CLOUD Act), which amended the SCA requiring email providers to grant US authorities 
in the course of a criminal investigation access to electronic communication or remote 
computing data in the email providers’ possession, custody or control regardless of where 
the data are stored.128 The CLOUD Act also allows the providers of email and remote 
computing data services to file a motion to quash or modify the legal process if they 
believe that the costumer whose communication the government is trying to get access to 
is not a US person and does not reside in the US and if complying with the disclosure 
request would require them to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.129 In 
particular, a qualifying foreign government according to the CLOUD Act is a government 
with which the US have established an executive agreement pursuant to the Act and that 
provides electronic communication service providers and remote service providers with 
procedural and substantive opportunities similar to those guaranteed in the CLOUD Act. 
Based on this Act, the US government presented Microsoft with a new warrant regarding 
the disclosure of the requested information and this warrant replaced the one issued 
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previously.130 The US Supreme Court, therefore, declared the case moot since there was 
no longer a live dispute between the parties.131 
Overall, the Microsoft case differs from the cases examined so far since, 
notwithstanding their territorial competence over Microsoft, the domestic courts found 
that they did not have jurisdiction to order the extraction of the data. The judges in this 
case did recognize the extraterritorial implications of an act, such as the extraction of data 
from a database, that would at least partially happen from within the national territory. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CLOUD Act subsequently rendered it possible for US 
authorities to access data in possession of a US company regardless of where in the world 
the data are located, this point represents a difference with the other cases examined in 
this chapter and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Case analysis 
The cases examined in this chapter deal with the extraterritorial exercise of State 
jurisdiction to regulate content published online. In three out of four cases, the CNIL, 
Equustek and Radulescu cases, the domestic courts have found that the respective national 
laws can be applied to regulate the online activities committed by foreign defendants. In 
these cases, the exercise of State jurisdiction over the foreign defendants does not seem 
particularly problematic as it is justified by the fact that the foreign defendants were 
operating in those States or targeted an audience located there. It is the extraterritorial 
reach of the measures imposed by these domestic courts that poses problems regarding 
the respect for comity between States and the rights of foreign Internet users. This point 
is illustrated particularly well in the fourth case examined in this chapter, the Microsoft 
case. In that case the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clearly stated that access 
from the United States to data stored in Ireland without the latter’s consent would 
negatively impact on Ireland’s sovereignty. 
In regard to the justification for the exercise of jurisdiction, in the CNIL, Equustek and 
Radulescu cases the exercise of jurisdiction over the US-based Google and the Romania-
based Mr. Radulescu is justified by the fact that the defendants were operating or targeting 
an audience located in France and Canada. In particular, in the Google v CNIL case, the 
CNIL found that the French Data Protection Act is applicable to the US-based Google 
Inc. due to the presence on the French territory of a Google subsidiary and the fact that 
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the data processing happened, at least partially, on the French territory.132 Indeed, the 
CNIL found that Google France is not an independent processing system separated from 
the one operated by Google but rather a mere pathway to the main processing system 
operated by the US company. The French authority therefore relied on the objective 
territorial principle when establishing the application of the French Data Protection Law 
to Google. In particular, the CNIL’s finding regarding the interconnection between the 
activities of Google France and Google Inc. echoed the CJEU’s finding in the Google 
Spain case. In that case, the Court stated that the activities of Google Inc. and its European 
subsidiaries are 
 
‘inextricably linked since the activities relating to the advertising space [carried out 
by Google’s subsidiaries] constitute the means of rendering the search engine at issue 
economically profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means enabling those 
activities to be performed’.133  
 
These findings were also confirmed by the CJEU in its 2019 pronouncement on the 
Google v CNIL case, where the Court found that both the Directive 96/45 and the GDPR 
apply to Google since the processing of personal data carried out by Google LLC happens 
on the French territory.134 
Similarly, in the Equustek case the Canadian courts found that Google Inc. conducted 
business activities in Canada both because it sold advertising space to Canadian 
consumers and because Goole Search activities happened in Canada.135 In this regard, the 
court of first instance stated that Google Search could not be considered as a merely 
passive information website, as claimed by Google. Indeed, its auto-complete function 
generated a list of search suggestions designed to help Canadian Internet users with their 
search queries. In particular, the company collected a wide range of data related to the 
search history of its Canadian Internet users and drew on the data collected to make its 
auto-complete function more responsive to each user’s preferences.136 It can therefore be 
 
132 Decision no. 2016-054 (n 1) 6-7. Article 5-I-1 of the French Data Protection Act states that the law 
applies only to the data controller who ‘although not established on French territory or in any other Member 
State of the European Union, uses means of processing located on French territory, with the exception of 
processing used only for the purposes of transit through this territory or that of any other member State of 
the European Union’. Article 48 of the Data Protection Act establishes that ‘[t]he powers provided under 
Article 44 (on-site investigations), as well as in Section I, in Section II Paragraph 1° and in Section III of 
Article 45 shall be applicable as regards any processing operations carried out, whether fully or partially, 
on the national territory, including where the data controller is established in another Member State of the 
European Union’ Loi Informatique et Libertes (n 8) art 5-I-1 and 48. 
133 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
González (n 9) para 56. 
134 Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) (n 1) para 52. 
135 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack 2014 BCSC (n 2) [51]. 
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argued that the courts in the Equustek case exercised jurisdiction over the defendant based 
on the objective territorial principle: Google Inc.’s sale of advertising space and Google 
Search’s processing of personal data happened, at least partially, on Canadian territory. 
The A.T. v Radulescu case is slightly different from the two cases discussed above since 
the Ontario Federal Court exercised jurisdiction over Mr. Radulescu based on a qualified 
access-based jurisdictional approach. Indeed, the judge found that the content hosted on 
Globe24H.com had been published in Canada since it was accessible there. However, the 
Court also conducted a targeting test and found that the website expressly targeted 
Canadian audience because it advertised that it contained decisions from Canadian Courts 
and because the majority of the website’s visitors were Canadian. However, the extent of 
this targeting test appears quite limited. The Court did not mention other possible 
targeting factors that would have helped the judge to substantiate the finding of a close 
connection between the Romanian defendant and Canada. Examples of these factors are: 
the website’s top-level domain name, its language, its search engine ranking and visibility 
when searched from Canada and whether the website contained any advertisement that 
targeted a Canadian audience.137 Moreover, it would have been particularly useful to 
know which currency was adopted by Mr Radulescu when he asked for payments to 
remove the personal information of Canadian Internet users. However, the limited extent 
of the targeting test conducted by the Ontario Federal Court is not surprising. Indeed, 
there is no international agreement on the factors on which each Court should rely in order 
to establish the existence of a close connection between a foreign website and the 
domestic forum.138 This subject is perceived by many Courts as an internal affair or a 
matter of private international law, rather than the subject of public international law with 
direct repercussions on the relationship between States and the freedom of expression of 
foreign Internet users.  
Notwithstanding the limited extent of the targeting test conducted by the Ontario Federal 
Court, the existence of a close connection between Mr. Radulescu and Canada is 
reinforced by the fact that the defendant was conducting business activities in Canada, as 
stated by the OPCC.139 Indeed, he was receiving payments from Canadian Internet users 
in exchange for the removal of their personal details from the website. This fact suggests 
that the defendant was aware that he was targeting Canadian Internet users, since he 
 
137 University of Geneva ‘Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution Policies 1.0’ (Geneva Internet Disputes 
Resolution Policies 1.0) <https://geneva-internet-disputes.ch/> accessed: July 2017), 7. 
138 See Chapter 5 section 5.3 for an analysis of the targeting test and of the criteria being used to determine 
when a website is targeting an audience located in a given State. 
139 A.T. v Globe24H.com (n 3), [81]. 
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consciously entered into a transaction with them and was obtaining money from them as 
a result of the de-indexing of their personal information. 
However, the fact that the domestic courts in the above mentioned three cases had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants does not mean that those courts had the authority 
to impose measures with extraterritorial effects. The fourth case examined in this chapter, 
the Microsoft case, illustrates this point particularly well. Unlike the other cases 
examined, in the Microsoft case the transnational character of the dispute is not due to the 
location of the parties - Microsoft is an American corporation and the US sovereignty 
over the company is undisputed - but rather due to the location of the data, which were 
stored in Microsoft’s Irish data centre. However, notwithstanding their territorial 
competence over Microsoft, the domestic courts stated that they did not have jurisdiction 
to order the extraction of the data. Interestingly, the judges found that although the act of 
extraction itself could be conducted via computer from the United States and did not 
require the US authorities’ physical presence in Ireland, it still equated to an unlawful 
extraterritorial act. In other words, in this case the judges recognized that an act 
committed online had the potential to violate the sovereignty of other States even if that 
act could be initiated by a domestic company from within the national territory and would 
therefore at least partially happen within the domestic jurisdiction. However, as 
mentioned above, the finding of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have 
been rendered void by the passing of the CLOUD Act, which makes it possible for US 
authorities to access data stored abroad and for foreign States to access data stored by US 
service providers if they meet specific conditions set out in the Act. Interestingly, the 
CLOUD Act has introduced some guarantees to address concerns that accessing data 
stored abroad could violate the rights of foreign Internet users, by allowing the company 
to apply to quash the access request if it believes that the data are related to a non-US 
person not residing in the US and if by granting access to the data the company would be 
required to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.140 In addition, the 
CLOUD Act provides for a comity analysis that US Courts must conduct in case the 
communications service provider argues that it cannot comply with the request for 
disclosure of data as it would require it to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign 
government. In that instance, among the factors that should be taken into account by the 
Courts when deciding whether to order access to the data figure inter alia the interest of 
the US to access the data, the interest of the relevant foreign government to prevent the 
 
140 Jennifer Daskal ‘Unpacking the Cloud Act’ (2018) 4 EUCRIM 220, 221-222. 
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disclosure and the likelihood and the extent of the penalty that could be imposed on the 
service provider.141 Overall, the CLOUD Act has been defined by some commentators as 
a positive development which could incentivise foreign governments to raise the 
standards of protection of the data stored abroad to comply with the security requirements 
imposed by the Act.142 However, some issues remain open, such as the conflict between 
the CLOUD Act and the GDPR, article 48 of which states that any judgement or decision 
from a third country requiring a data controller or processor to transfer or disclose 
personal data can only be recognised or enforced ‘if based on an international agreement, 
such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and 
the Union or a Member State’.143 In this regard in July 2019, the European Data Protection 
Board and the European Data Protection Supervisor conducted a preliminary assessment 
regarding the implications of the CLOUD Act on the GDPR concluding that 
  
‘unless a US CLOUD Act warrant is recognised or made enforceable on the basis of 
an international agreement, the lawfulness of such transfers of personal data cannot 
be ascertained, without prejudice to exceptional circumstances where processing is 
necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject’.144 
 
It will therefore be interesting to see how this issue will develop in the future.   
In any case, the findings of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit differ 
significantly from those of the CNIL and Equustek cases. Indeed, in those cases the 
opposite has happened: the existence of a link between the activities of a foreign 
defendant and a given forum was used as a basis to order measures with extraterritorial 
effects. As stated above, these measures violate the sovereignty of foreign States as well 
as the freedom of expression of Internet users located in foreign countries. Indeed, in the 
CNIL and Equuestek cases, the domestic authorities argued that the de-listing is effective 
only if it is carried out globally. Therefore, according to these cases, in order to guarantee 
the effective enjoyment of the right to de-listing and intellectual property, citizens of other 
countries must be prevented from accessing content that might be legal in those countries. 
This, however, equates to unlawfully limiting the freedom of expression of foreign 
Internet users, who, according to international law, should primarily be regulated by the 
laws of the country where they are located.  
 
141 CLOUD Act (n 128) § 2713 (3). 
142 Daskal (n 140) 220. 
143 General Data Protection Regulation (n 10) art 48. See also Daskal (n 140) 223. 
144 Juan Fernando López Aguilar, LIBE Committee letters to the EDPS and to the EDPB regarding legal 
assessment of the impact of the US Cloud Act on the European legal framework for personal data, 
protection’ 10 July 2019 <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/19-07-
10_edpb_edps_cloudact_coverletter_en.pdf> accessed: 10 August 2020. 
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In addition, this approach violates the sovereignty of foreign States. The CNIL, for 
instance, stated that de-listing that only applies to Google European domain names is not 
effective because French Internet users could still access the unwanted search result if 
they were outside the EU. This point is problematic because, although international law 
does allow for concurring exercises of jurisdiction,145 CNIL’s claim equates to imposing 
the laws of one country on all the other countries, which, as observed by the CJEU, might 
not recognise the right to delisting or have a different approach to it.146 The Equustek case 
is a perfect example of this point. Indeed, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that global de-listing violated the core values of foreign countries. The judges 
found that it was likely that in foreign countries the sale of other companies’ intellectual 
property was illegal as well. This finding, however, has been directly contradicted by the 
US District Court for the Northern District of California which declared that the order of 
the Canadian Supreme Court is unenforceable in the United States. In particular, the 
judges found that the Canadian order was contrary to US public interest, since Congress 
had established that freedom of speech in the US would be impaired if ISPs were liable 
for content published by a third party.147 The Court also stated that the order undermines 
global freedom of speech online.148 As mentioned above, the disagreement between the 
Canadian and the US courts continued when the British Columbia Court refused to 
interpret the Californian District Court’s decision as showing that the delisting ordered in 
Canada violated foreign law.149 This disagreement is concrete proof of the many 
implications on both international comity and freedom of expression of extraterritorial 
measures with worldwide effect. Indeed, notwithstanding the different interpretation of 
the order given by the British Columbia Court, the US Court’s order shows that a 
sovereign State’s interests are affected when a foreign State exercises jurisdiction 
extraterritorially on the Internet. 
Overall, the problem posed by CNIL and the Canadian Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
approach is that it equates to exercising jurisdiction over an act, such as the indexing of 
personal information, that is not internationally unlawful.150 Indeed, imposing the 
worldwide erasure of a search result is a measure with extraterritorial effect that makes it 
impossible for anyone in the world to access that information through a given search 
 
145 See Chapter 4 section 4.2 for an analysis of this point. 
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engine when searching for the name of the person who requested delisting. The 
worldwide implications of such extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction would be justified 
if the indexing of personal information was considered as a delicta iuris gentium, for 
example, a particularly grave crime constituting a concern for the whole international 
community. In that case, the international community would have a vested interest in 
allowing every State to order global de-indexing. However, this is not the case since the 
right to de-listing has only recently been recognised and is mainly a European right, 
although other countries are increasingly following the CJEU’s approach and are 
recognising a right to delisting in their jurisdictions.151 In Canada, for example, the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has stated that the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) already provides for a right to 
deindexing.152 Due to uncertainties in the interpretation of the law, however, in October 
2018 the OPC asked the Federal Court to examine this issue,153 which is currently pending 
before the Court.154 However, a proof of the controversial nature of a global approach to 
delisting can be found in the critique moved to it by the Office of the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In the 
report Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet, the Office of the Special 
Rapporteur stated in regard to the issuing of global delisting orders by domestic courts 
that these global orders can lead to the extraterritorial application of domestic laws and 
that they ‘raise complex questions regarding the future of jurisdiction on the Internet and 
its interplay with national sovereignty’.155 In particular, in the report, which was issued 
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in 2017 and therefore before the 2019 CNIL judgement of the CJEU clarifying the scope 
of delisting, the Special Rapporteur underlined that international human rights law does 
not recognise the right to delisting in the terms expressed by the CJEU. On the contrary, 
if the system that leaves to private parties the decision on how to implement delisting 
were to be applied to the Americas, it would lead to serious problems in regard to the 
protection of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights.156 Besides, the Commission stated that 
  
‘[i]n the Americas, after many years of conflict and authoritarian regimes, individuals 
and human rights groups have maintained a legitimate claim to access to information 
regarding governmental and military activity of the past and gross human rights 
violations. People want to remember and not to forget. In this sense, it is important 
to recognize the particular context of the region and how a legal mechanism such as 
the so-called “right to be forgotten” and its incentive for de-indexation might impact 
the right to truth and memory’ [emphasis added].157  
 
This shows that, as observed by the CJEU in the CNIL case, the global reach of a 
delisting order is problematic as it does not take into account the fact that the right to 
delisting is not globally protected. Therefore, the fact that the CJEU has left the door 
partially open to global delisting orders can be seen as questionable. In this regard, the 
qualified approach to global delisting followed by the Swedish DPA seems a preferable 
alternative. This approach, as mentioned in section 3.2.1.1, consists in granting global 
delisting only when there is a specific connection to the country ordering delisting, in 
particular if the search result to be de-listed is linked to information written in the 
language of that country, is addressed to an audience located there, contains details about 
a person that is in that country or if it has been published on a website containing that 
country code top level domain.158 
As to the Radulescu case, as stated above, this case is slightly different from the CNIL 
and Equustek cases. Indeed, while Ontario Federal Court’s decision does impose 
restrictions on freedom of expression, the order to remove the content published on 
Globe24H.com does not represent an unlawful extraterritorial act. Indeed, as stated 
above, the exercise of State jurisdiction over the foreign defendant was justified by the 
fact that Mr. Radulescu was targeting Canadian Internet users and was conducting 
business in Canada. In other words, because of his actions, Mr Radulescu had put himself 
within Canadian jurisdiction. For this reason, the Ontario Federal Court was competent 
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to order that the defendant de-indexed the personal information of Canadian Internet 
users. However, the problem represented by the Radulescu decision is that the Court did 
not limit itself to order the de-indexing of personal information, but rather it ordered the 
removal of the Canadian decisions themselves. This fact is problematic because those 
decisions were in compliance with Canadian law. Indeed, they were available on 
Canadian legal websites, the only difference being that on those websites the decisions 
were not indexed. Therefore, the Court should have ordered Mr Radulescu to remove the 
indexing of the decisions published on Globe24H.com and to cease requesting money in 
exchange for the de-indexing, rather than to remove the decisions themselves. This is all 
the more so considering the final nature of the act of removal, as the BOÜ case discussed 
before the CJEU and examined in Chapter 2 shows. Ordering the removal of content from 
a website is a definitive act since it is not territorially quantifiable: once removed from 
the Internet, the information disappears worldwide.159 In Mr. Radulescu’s case, however, 
the decisions published on his website remained accessible on Canadian legal websites. 
Notwithstanding this, because the information contained on Globe24H.com was legal in 
Canada, the Ontario Federal Court should have refrained from ordering its removal. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with the extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction in 
transnational Internet-related cases. The argument brought forward in this analysis is that 
the extraterritorial application of national laws and the adoption of measures with 
worldwide implications, such as global de-listing, violate the sovereignty of foreign 
States and the freedom of expression of foreign Internet users.  
In the first two cases examined, the CNIL and Equustek cases, the exercise of State 
jurisdiction over the US-based Google was justified by the fact that Google was operating 
in France and Canada respectively. The national authorities in these cases relied on the 
objective territorial principle to establish jurisdiction over the US-based Google. Indeed, 
the domestic authorities found that Google Search activities, which are conducted in the 
US by Google, happen at least partially on French and Canadian territory as well. This, 
according to the CNIL, the CJEU and the Supreme Court of Canada, is due to a 
combination of factors, including the presence of Google subsidiaries in France and 
Canada respectively and the fact that those subsidiaries are inextricably linked to the 
search activities conducted by Google.  
 
159 For an analysis of the BOÜ case, see Chapter 2 section 2.3.6. 
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However, notwithstanding the fact that the national authorities in these cases had 
jurisdiction over the defendant, these authorities violated the sovereignty of foreign States 
and affected freedom of expression online when they ordered global de-listing. Indeed, 
as stated in the Microsoft case, the fact that a State can exercise jurisdiction over a given 
subject does not justify that State’s adoption of extraterritorial orders.  
Ordering global de-listing infringes the freedom of expression of foreign Internet 
users because such a worldwide measure prevents them from accessing content that might 
be legal in their countries. This global measure is therefore contrary to the international 
law principle that citizens of foreign States should primarily be subjected to the laws in 
force in those States.  
Further important proof of the implications on State sovereignty of global de-listing 
is represented by the order issued by the US District Court for the Northern District of 
California declaring the Equustek order unenforceable in the United States. Interestingly, 
the US judges found the Canadian order to be contrary to US public interest and a threat 
for global freedom of speech online. This fact shows that, as stated in the Microsoft case, 
foreign States’ interests are deeply affected when a State exercises jurisdiction 
extraterritorially on the Internet.  
Ultimately, the problem posed by CNIL and the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional approach is that it equates to exercising universal jurisdiction over an act, 
such as the indexing of personal information, that is not unlawful according to 
international law. As mentioned above, the worldwide implications of such 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction would be justified if for instance the international 
community recognized the indexing of personal information as a crime of exceptional 
gravity and therefore allowed every State to order global de-indexing. This, however, is 
not the case since the right to de-listing has only recently been recognised and is mainly 
a European right (although other States are increasingly recognising a right to delisting 
in their legal systems). The criticism of the right to delisting by the Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights proves this point particularly well. As observed by the Special Rapporteur, in the 
Americas, where a right to delisting could clash with the right to truth and memory, people 
want to remember, rather than forget. This underlines how different legal systems have 
different approaches towards delisting and how therefore a global approach to delisting 
orders is problematic. 
As to the Radulescu case, this case is slightly different from the CNIL and Equustek 
cases since the Ontario Federal Court’s order against Mr. Radulescu has not an unlawful 
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worldwide effect. This is because, as a consequence of the targeting of Canadian Internet 
users, Mr. Radulescu was, or should have been, aware that he had put himself within 
Canadian jurisdiction. For this reason, the domestic Court was competent to order that 
the defendant de-indexed the personal information of Canadian Internet users. However, 
the problem represented by the Radulescu decision is that the domestic Court not only 
ordered the de-indexing of personal information, but also the removal of the content 
published on Globe24H.com. That content, however, was perfectly legal according to 
Canadian law. Therefore, by ordering its removal, the domestic Court violated 
Radulescu’s freedom of expression. 
Finally, the analysis of the cases examined in this chapter highlights a further 
important point: national courts have so far approached the subject of establishing State 
jurisdiction online as either a purely domestic matter or a matter that should be regulated 
by existing rules of private international law. However, as discussed above, the way in 
which States exercise jurisdiction online has direct implications on the principle of State 
sovereignty and international comity as well as the rights of foreign Internet users. 
Therefore, the study concludes that, when establishing State jurisdiction online, national 
courts should apply domestic laws in compliance with public international law. In 
particular, the courts should bear in mind that, due to the apparently borderless nature of 
the Internet, their decisions have the potential to affect the sovereignty of foreign States 
and freedom of expression rights of foreign Internet users.  Ultimately, an international 
agreement on how to balance and reconcile the diverse and apparently conflicting 
domestic and international needs in the jurisdictional field is needed. 
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4. The Rules Regulating the Exercise of State Jurisdiction 




This chapter deals with the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction 
according to international law and human rights law. This analysis will highlight the 
uncertainties as to the rules governing State jurisdiction in these two regimes as well as 
the fundamentally different meaning that State jurisdiction has in these two areas of law. 
This will be achieved by first illustrating the meaning of State jurisdiction in public 
international law in section two, where the rules governing territorial and extraterritorial 
State jurisdiction will be presented. Section three will then turn to human rights law, 
highlighting the personal and the spatial model of jurisdiction developed by human rights 
courts. Finally, section four will summarize the main conclusions of the analysis 
conducted in the previous sections. 
 
4.2 The concept of State jurisdiction according to public international 
law 
The concept of State jurisdiction in public international law is primarily related to the 
legality of State action. The public international law rules of jurisdiction define the criteria 
according to which a State is entitled to regulate a given matter without infringing the 
sovereignty of other States.1  
State jurisdiction is usually divided into prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction. As stated in Chapter 1, this study focuses on the exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, which is related to the right of a State to apply its own laws to regulate certain 
matters. Adjudicative jurisdiction illustrates the right of the domestic courts of one State 
 
1 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (1st, Oxford University Press 2008) 5-6; Ralph Wilde 
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Rev 505, 513; Alex Mills ‘Rethinking jurisdiction in international law’ (2014) 84 BYIL 187, 194; Marko 
Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights 
Treaties’ (2008) 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 411, 423; Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (1st, Oxford University Press 2011) 128. 
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to hear cases that are brought before them, whereas enforcement jurisdiction indicates the 
right of the authorities of a State to compel other parties to comply with the laws and 
regulations of that State.  
The division of State jurisdiction into these three categories however has been 
contested in literature due to the lack of agreement as to whether this division in fact 
reflects customary international law.2 In addition, some commentators have underlined 
how the division between these three categories of jurisdiction is not always clear-cut, as 
some of the categories tend to merge in certain cases. In particular, some authors have 
claimed that adjudicative jurisdiction tends to merge with prescriptive jurisdiction in all 
those cases where the reach of a domestic statute is not clear and the courts are therefore 
said to exercise prescriptive rather than adjudicative jurisdiction.3 Despite the 
disagreement, however, the three categories of jurisdiction are widely accepted 
internationally. Indeed, both scholars and judges refer to these three categories when 
describing the international law rules of jurisdiction.  
Another difference between the categories of jurisdiction is related to the different 
scope of application of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. According to customary 
international law, jurisdiction is primarily territorial, meaning that a State can exercise 
jurisdiction first and foremost within its national borders.4 However, according to the 
Lotus judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), while States 
cannot exercise enforcement jurisdiction outside their national territory, they are free to 
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction regarding events and people located in other States. 
According to this view, the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction outside the national 
territory is limited only if there is a specific prohibitive rule of international law that 
prevents States from doing so.5 The view expressed in the Lotus judgement has received 
 
2 Mills (n 1) 194-195. 
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territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot 
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contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their 
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many critiques. Some commentators consider it outdated and an expression of the theory 
of international positivism that was dominant in the early 20th century, while others 
contest its nature of valid precedent as far as extraterritorial jurisdiction is concerned.6 
The main critique of the Lotus rule, however, is that it is not deemed to reflect customary 
international law anymore.7 International Court of Justice (ICJ) President Bedjaoui in his 
Declaration in the Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
for example, underlined that the ICJ did not interpret the absence of a specific provision 
regarding the use of nuclear weapons as an automatic authorization to use nuclear 
weapons.8 Instead, the theory that some consider as an expression of customary 
international law is that a State can only exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
if a permissive rule of international law establishes so.9 In other words, according to this 
view the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is limited by positive 
international law rules.   
Finally, there are three principles of international law that, according to some 
commentators, might underly the rules of jurisdiction: the requirement of a genuine 
connection between the State and the subject or act upon which jurisdiction is exercised, 
the principle of non-intervention and the principle of reasonableness.10 The requirement 
of a genuine connection establishes that in order for a State to exercise jurisdiction over 
given acts there must be a genuine connection between the State and the act. The principle 
of non-intervention establishes that States should balance their contacts with the situation 
over which they exercise jurisdiction and their interests in exercising jurisdiction with 
other States’ contacts and interests. However, the criteria that States should take into 
account when conducting such a balance remain unclear. Finally, the rule of 
reasonableness establishes that States should not interfere with other States’ sovereignty. 
This rule is part of the US Restatement of the Law (Third), although its status under 
international law is unclear.11 Overall, as observed by Mills, international law does allow 
for concurring exercises of jurisdiction by States, as evidenced, for example, by the fact 
 
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases 
by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards 
as best and most suitable’, The Case of S.S Lotus [1927] PCIJ Series A N.10 18-19. 
6 Mills (n 1) 191; Ryngaert (n 1) 26. 
7 Mills (n 1) 193-194; Ryngaert (n 1) 27. 
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), Declaration of President Bedjaoui 
[1996] ICJ Rep 95 [14]-[15]; See also R Rabinovitch ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia’ (2005) 28 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 500, 505-506.  
9 Ryngaert (n 1) 27; Mills (n 1) 193-194. 
10 Ryngaert (n 1) 35-36; R Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Principles of International Internet Law’ (2010) 11 
German L. J. 1245, 1253. 
11 Ryngaert (n 1) 36; Mills (n 1) 200. 
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that the same offence can be regulated by the laws of the State where the offence started 
but also by the laws of the State where it produced its effects, according to the subjective 
and objective territorial jurisdiction principles which will be examined below.12 Although 
concurring exercises of jurisdiction are accepted in international law, these might become 
problematic especially in the online environment, as Chapters 2 and 3 have shown.13 In 
this regard, for example, the Group of International Experts who produced the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the international law rules applicable to cyber operations in peacetime 
recognised that 
  
‘cyber activities pose a number of challenges to the rational and equitable exercise of 
jurisdiction. […] These factors could lead any number of States to attempt to assert 
different types of jurisdiction over particular cyber activities, thereby generating 
confusion and friction between States. […] Hence, with regard to cyber activities, 
international cooperation in law enforcement is especially important’.14  
 
Having dealt with some general considerations regarding the concept of State 
jurisdiction in public international law, the following section proceeds to look at specific 
international law rules regarding territorial and extraterritorial State jurisdiction. 
 
4.2.1 Territorial Jurisdiction 
In the Lotus case, one of the most quoted cases regarding international law 
jurisdictional norms, the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
stated that “jurisdiction is certainly territorial”.15 As this statement suggests, the territorial 
principle is one of the main jurisdictional principles according to international law.16 In 
regard to prescriptive jurisdiction, the territorial principle establishes that in order for a 
State to apply its laws to acts or subjects there must be a territorial connection between 
that State and the acts or subjects.17 It follows that according to the territorial principle a 
 
12 Mills (n 1) 199-200. 
13 See Chapters 2 and 3 for an analysis of the freedom of expression implications of the access-based 
jurisdictional approach and of the extraterritorial application of domestic laws to regulate online content. 
14 Michael N. Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 54, [15]. See Chapter 5 Section 5.2 for a discussion of the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 and the international law rules applicable to cyber operations in peacetime. 
15 The Case of S.S Lotus (n 5) 18. 
16 Mills (n 1) 197; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 10) p. 1253-1254; Pardis Moslemzadeh Therani and Nazura 
Abdul Manap ‘A rational jurisdiction for cyberterrorism’ (2013) 29 Com. L & S Rev 689, 690; Joanna 
Kulesza, ‘Internet Governance and the Jurisdiction of States. Justifications for the need of an international 
regulation of cyberspace’ (2008) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1445452> 
accessed 07 October 2019, 7. 
17 Mills (n 1) 196-197; Uerpmann-Wittzack (n 10) 1253-1254; Therani and Manap (n 16) 690; Kulesza (n 
16) 7; Rabinovitch (n 8) 504; Kenneth C. Randall ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 
66 Tex L Rev 785, 787. 
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State can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction primarily on its territory and on people located 
within its borders.  
The existence of a territorial connection between a State and a given matter can 
however be interpreted more or less loosely. For example, there are acts that present a 
territorial connection with more than one State, such as cross-border acts. In the field of 
international criminal law, in order for a State to exercise jurisdiction over a cross-border 
offence, it is sufficient that at least one of the constitutive elements of that offence takes 
place within the State’s territory.18 The constitutive elements approach to establishing 
jurisdiction is linked to two jurisdictional heads which are considered to be extensions of 
the territorial principle. In particular, according to the objective territorial principle a State 
can exercise jurisdiction over offences that started abroad but were completed within its 
territory. Conversely, according to the subjective territorial principle, a State can exercise 
jurisdiction if the offence started on its territory but was completed abroad.19  
One of the critiques that have been moved to the constitutive elements approach of 
international criminal law is that it is problematic for public international law because the 
constitutive elements of an offence are defined by domestic rather than international 
law.20 However, both the objective and subjective territorial jurisdictional principles are 
part of conventional international law, since they are contained in two conventions, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeited Currency and the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic of Drugs.21 Notwithstanding this, Ryngaert observes that 
while these two jurisdictional approaches are undoubtedly valid in the field of 
international criminal law, ‘international law seems […] to have satisfied itself with 
requiring that either the criminal act or its effects have taken place within a State’s 
territory for the State to legitimately exercise territorial jurisdiction’.22  
The requirement that the effects of an act take place within a State’s territory in order 
for that State to exercise jurisdiction over the act is a defining characteristic of the effects 
doctrine. This doctrine was developed and applied by US Courts in the application of US 
anti-trust regulations and was mainly concerned with adverse economic effects felt within 
US territory.23 More specifically, according to this doctrine, the US can exercise 
jurisdiction over cartel arrangements that did not happen on its territory but whose adverse 
 
18 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd, Oxford University Press 2015) 78. 
19 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 78-79; Mills (n 1) 196; Therani and Manap (n 16) 690; Rabinovitch (n 8) 504. 
20 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 78. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 Mika Hayashi, ‘Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine? Jurisdiction and Cyberspace’ (2006) 
6 In.Law 284, 288. 
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economic effects were felt there. The difference between the objective territorial principle 
and the effects doctrine is that the first requires a territorial connection between the act 
and the State whereas the second does not require this connection at all, since this 
principle is based purely on adverse effects being felt within the State exercising 
jurisdiction.24 
The effects doctrine can be described as ‘a further extension of the territorial 
principle’, and, according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the rules of international law 
applicable to cyberoperations, this doctrine is part of customary international law.25 
However, the application of this theory poses some problems.26 The main difficulty 
associated with it is that the definition of what constitutes an adverse effect is left to each 
State that claims jurisdiction. In other words, there is no international agreement on what 
constitutes an adverse effect and on how to ascertain when an act produces adverse effects 
within a given State if those effects are non-physical. The same Tallinn Manual 2.0, for 
example, has recognised that the conditions according to which this doctrine could be 
applied are not fully settled in international law, and that therefore this doctrine remains 
in some ways controversial. Besides, according to the Manual, the unqualified application 
of the effects doctrine has been a cause of controversy among States.27 Arguably, the 
unqualified use of the effects doctrine equates to exercising universal jurisdiction. This is 
because it allows States to exercise jurisdiction over an act that has no connection with 
those States other than its non-physical harmful effects. However, unlike universal 
jurisdiction, in the effects doctrine’s case the acts over which States exercise jurisdiction 
are not international crimes. This means that, unlike international crimes, those acts are 
not deemed by the international community as so egregious to justify an exercise of 
jurisdiction in absence of any of the other recognised jurisdictional heads. Ultimately, as 
observed by some commentators, the effects doctrine removes the limits to the exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction that were introduced thanks to the objective territorial 
principle.28 
Both the objective territorial principle and the effects doctrine are strictly linked to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is examined below. 
 
24 Hayashi (n 23) 288-289; Thomas Schultz, ‘Carving up the Internet: jurisdiction, legal orders, and the 
private/public international law interface’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 75, 812. 
25 See respectively Hayashi (n 23) 288 and Schmitt (n 14) 57-58, [11]. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 explicitly 
refers to the application of the effects doctrine to cyber operations. See Chapter 5 section 5.2 for a discussion 
of the international law rules related to cyberoperations. 
26 Hayashi (n 23) 288; Schultz (n 24) 812-813. 
27 Schmitt (n 14) 57, [11]. 
28 Hayashi (n 23) 289. 
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4.2.2 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The term extraterritorial jurisdiction indicates jurisdiction exercised by a State over 
acts that happen outside the territory of that State and that therefore do not present a 
territorial connection with it. The term extraterritorial is, however, controversial. Some 
authors have observed that this term often has a negative connotation, since it is used as 
a synonym for unlawful exercise of jurisdiction or is often not accurate.29 Indeed, the term 
has sometimes been associated to acts that do have a territorial connection with the State, 
although not an exclusive one, such as acts that happened abroad but produced negative 
effects within the territory of another State and could therefore in principle be justified 
by the objective territorial criterion.30 It is therefore preferable to use the term 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to refer to acts that are ‘“not exclusively territorial”’ or to 
assertions of jurisdiction over acts that happened abroad.31 
The principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction are the personality, protective and 
universal jurisdiction principles. 
Jurisdiction based on the personality principle is centred on nationality and therefore 
on the personal relation between the State and the individual over which jurisdiction is 
exercised.32 According to the personality principle, a State can exercise jurisdiction over 
its nationals regardless of where in the world they are located.33 In this regard, it has been 
observed that ‘state authority does not end at the national border but attaches to people 
and effectively travels with them’.34 This is a further example of the fact that, as 
mentioned above, international law does accept concurring exercises of jurisdiction.35 
The personality principle is divided into active and passive personality. The active 
personality principle is a well-established international law jurisdictional principle that is 
especially relevant in the field of international criminal law. This principle gives States 
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals if they have committed a crime, 
regardless of where the crime was committed.36 The active personality principle is also 
used in international family law as well as in the domestic tax law of some States.37  
As to the passive personality principle, it establishes that States have jurisdiction over 
their nationals if they are victims of crimes, irrespective of where the crimes were 
 
29 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 7-8. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid 8. 
32 Mills (n 1) 198; Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 104. 
33 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 104; Mills (n 1) 198; Randall (n 17) 787. 
34 Mills (n 1) 198. 
35 ibid 199-200. 
36 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 104-105; Rabinovitch (n 8) 504. 
37 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 106-107; Kulesza (n 16) 8. 
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committed.38 Unlike the active personality principle, the status of passive personality 
under international law is controversial. While the principle is accepted with regard to 
acts of terrorism or crimes committed against foreign officials, the absence of an 
international convention makes it difficult to establish whether the principle is legal 
according to international law.39 As observed by some authors, however, State practice 
and the absence of international protest against the application of the principle seem to 
suggest that it might in fact be legal, although its use should be limited to the most serious 
crimes only.40  
Another basis for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the protective 
principle. According to the Restatement of the Law (Third) The Foreign Relations of the 
United States, the protective principle establishes that States can exercise jurisdiction over 
acts committed abroad by perpetrators that are not their nationals if these acts are directed 
against the State security or a limited class of State interests, such as the State’s right to 
political independence.41 The rationale behind the existence of this principle is that the 
acts in question might be perfectly legal in the State where they are carried out. Therefore, 
the protective principle would allow to fill a jurisdictional gap by allowing the State 
whose sovereignty or independence is threatened to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign 
acts.42  
Jurisdiction based on the protective principle can be exercised even if there is no 
actual harm suffered by the targeted State, for example if people conspire to commit a 
crime against the security of a foreign State, but their plan is stopped before its effects are 
felt within the targeted State.43 This point distinguishes the protective principle from the 
 
38 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 110; Mills (n 1) 198; Rabinovitch (n 8) 504; Randall (n 17) 787. 
39 Mills (n 1) 199; Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 110-111; Kulesza (n 16) 9. 
40 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 112. 
41 ‘Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1) (a) conduct that, wholly or 
in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present 
within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory; (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its 
territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the 
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests’, Sarah H Cleveland and Paul B Stephan 
(ed), Restatement of the Law (Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1st edn, American 
Law Institute Publishers 1987), section 402. See also Kulesza (n 16) 9-10; Rabinovitch (n 8) 505; Randall 
(n 17) 787-788. 
42 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 114; MR Garcia Mora, ‘Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for Treason and 
Offences Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory’ (1958) 19 U Pitt L Rev 576, 
587 (as cited in C Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd, Oxford University Press 2015) 114). 
43 ‘Two principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction recognized under international law are applicable here: the 
effects or "objective territoriality" principle and the "protective" principle […] Furthermore, although cases 
are rare, international law permits jurisdiction under these theories even if the act or conspiracy at issue is 
thwarted before ill effects are actually felt in the target state […] For that matter, jurisdiction may be proper 
even if no acts were committed in that state, especially where the statute does not require proof of an overt 
act’ United States v Evans et all 1987 SDNY 974, 980-981. See also Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 114. 
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objective territorial principle and the effects doctrine, which conversely presuppose the 
presence of adverse effects being felt within the targeted State.44  
As to the status of the protective principle under international law, its legality seems 
uncontested, and many affirm that this is indeed a well-established international law 
principle.45 However, there are controversies regarding the justification for the principle 
being States’ self-defence, since unlike self-defence, the protective principle can be 
applied after an act has occurred and even in the absence of an armed attack.46 In addition, 
due to the lack of an international convention regarding the protective principle, there is 
no international agreement regarding which crimes justify its adoption. This could be 
problematic since States could abuse the principle as they are free to determine what 
constitutes an act against their sovereignty or political independence. However, the lack 
of international protests following the adoption of the protective principle and the fact 
that it has been used rarely (usually in regard to offenses such as drug trafficking or 
forgery of foreign currency) support its uncontroversial nature.47 
Universal jurisdiction is the last international law principle related to the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is usually exercised in the field of 
international criminal law in regard to the most serious international crimes, such as 
piracy, crimes against humanity and genocide.48 The key characteristic of this principle 
is the absence of a nexus connecting the State exercising jurisdiction and the act upon 
which jurisdiction is exercised.49 Indeed, the universal jurisdiction principle allows States 
to exercise jurisdiction over acts that did not happen within their territory and whose 
perpetrators or victims are not their nationals. The most quoted rationale for the exercise 
of the universal jurisdiction principle is the nature of the crimes to which this principle 
applies that is so egregious that their perpetrators are considered as hostis humani generis 
who have violated erga omnes obligations. Therefore, every State in the international 
community has the right to prosecute those crimes.50  
 
44 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 114. 
45 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 114; Kulesza (n 16) 10; Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Insights and 
Highlights’ (2017), 48 Geo J Int'l L 735, 748. Talbot Jensen refers to the international law jurisdictional 
principles that apply to cyber activities committed in other States and includes the protective principle as a 
legitimate basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under international law. 
46 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 115. Ryngaert refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which establishes that States’ 
right of individual or collective self-defence is indeed linked to the occurrence of an armed attack. 
47 ibid 116-117. 
48 Therani and Manap (n 16) 694; Kulesza (n 16) 10; Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 127; Rabinovitch (n 8) 505.  
49 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 126; Rabinovitch (n 8) 505; Kulesza (n 16) 10; Therani and Manap (n 16) 695. 
50 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 127. Ryngaert at 126-127 also mentions two other rationales for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, namely that the crimes committed pose a danger to all States and therefore all States 
have a common interest in prosecuting those crimes and that the mere presence of the perpetrator on the 
territory of a State is a threat to that State since the perpetrator could reoffend; Ademola Abass International 
Law (1st, Oxford University Press 2012) 539; Vaughan Lowe ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcom D. Evans (ed) 
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The only condition for a State to exercise universal jurisdiction is that the perpetrator 
of the act is within its territory. However, this point is controversial, as there is an ongoing 
debate regarding whether international law allows for universal jurisdiction to be 
exercised even without the perpetrator of the act being present on the territory of the State 
exercising jurisdiction i.e. universal jurisdiction in absentia.51 The ICJ had an opportunity 
to clarify this issue in 2000 in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
where Belgium issued an arrest warrant in absentia against the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions 1949 and crimes against humanity committed in Congo.52 However, in its 
final submission the DRC dropped the claim according to which international law does 
not allow for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. Therefore, the ICJ did not 
examine this issue in its decision, unlike some judges who did so in their dissenting or 
separate opinions. However, there was no uniformity of views on this point. Judge Van 
den Wyngaert found that international law does allow for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia, while judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal agreed but 
submitted the exercise of jurisdiction in absentia to specific conditions.53 Finally, judges 
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Rezek and Bula-Bula found that customary international law does 
require the presence of the perpetrator within the territory of the State for that State to 
exercise universal jurisdiction.54 Notwithstanding the variety of views expressed, it does 
not appear that there is enough uniformity of State practice to conclude that in fact a norm 
of customary international law exists either prohibiting or allowing the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia. The majority of the States that have exercised universal 
jurisdiction according to international conventions in the form of the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle or translated it into their domestic laws have done so provided that the 
perpetrator was on their territory. However, there is not enough data showing that this 
State practice is accompanied by the related opinio juris.55 Therefore, this issue remains 
 
International Law (1st, Oxford University Press 2003) 343. As a rationale for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, Lowe also mentions that fact that there are some crimes that, although not egregious, are 
committed in a location that cannot be linked to any State, such as piracy which happens on the high seas. 
Therefore, universal jurisdiction is needed because otherwise those crimes would go unpunished. 
51 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 133-135; Rabinovitch (n 8). 
52 Rabinovitch (n 8) 502-504. 
53 ‘(1) all applicable immunities are respected; (2) the national State of the accused person is first given the 
opportunity to act upon the charges alleged; (3) the charges are laid by a prosecutor or juge d'instruction 
who acts in full independence, without links to or control by the government of the State; and (4) it is 
reserved for only the most heinous international crimes’ Arrest Warrant, [2002] I.C.J. at 80-81, [20021 41 
I.L.M. at 586 (joint separate opinion of Higgins, J. Kooijmans, J. & Buergenthal, J.) (as cited in Rabinovitch 
(n 8) 504). 
54 Rabinovitch (n 8) 504. 
55 Rabinovitch (n 8) 507; Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 134. 
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open and will be clarified once a more uniform State practice emerges in one direction or 
the other. 
As to the status of universal jurisdiction under international law, some authors believe 
that it is a norm of customary international law.56 However, this status is controversial, 
since State practice regarding the exercise of universal jurisdiction is not uniform.57 Even 
more relevantly, the modality of application of universal jurisdiction is unclear. For 
example, it is uncertain what crimes are subjected to universal jurisdiction and whether 
there are any restrictions that limit the application of this principle to reduce international 
conflict.58 
Universal jurisdiction in criminal law can be differentiated from other exercises of 
jurisdiction such as vicarious jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut judicare principle.  
Vicarious or representational jurisdiction allows States to act as representatives of the 
State where the unlawful act was committed and therefore to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes committed abroad by foreign perpetrators. Vicarious jurisdiction has rarely been 
exercised and is usually applied to crimes that are less serious than international crimes.59 
This jurisdictional principle is different from universal jurisdiction also because specific 
conditions apply in order for it to be carried out: that the perpetrator is on the territory of 
the State exercising jurisdiction, that the unlawful act is an offence both in the territorial 
State and in the forum State and that extradition is not possible for reasons that are not 
related to the nature of the crime.60 In addition, the rationale of vicarious jurisdiction is 
different from that of universal jurisdiction, since, as some authors have pointed out, the 
forum State exercises jurisdiction to protect the interests of the territorial State rather than 
those of the international community.61 However, this point is controversial as, rather 
than an autonomous jurisdictional head, vicarious jurisdiction has also been interpreted 
as an extension of universal jurisdiction or of the aut dedere aut judicare principle.62 
The aut dedere aut judicare principle is a norm of conventional international law. It 
establishes that States under whose jurisdiction the perpetrators of the offences defined 
in the conventions are found have the obligation to either extradite or prosecute them.63 
More specifically, as clarified by the ICJ with regard to the crime of torture, the obligation 
 
56 Therani and Manap (n 16) 695. 
57 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 132. 
58 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 133; Abass (n 50) 542. 
59 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 121. In particular, Ryngaert refers to § 7(2), 2° of the German StGB (as cited in 
Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 122) and to Article 113-8-1, § 1 French CP (as cited in Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 123). 
60 ibid 121. 
61 ibid 122. 
62 ibid 122-123. 
63 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 123; Lowe (n 50) 344.  
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for the States party to the UN Torture Convention is to prosecute the perpetrator of the 
crime, whereas extradition is to be considered as an option rather than an obligation.64 
The aut dedere aut judicare principle is different from universal jurisdiction since it 
applies only between the States that are party to the conventions rather than to all the 
States in the international community.65 However, especially in regard to terrorism there 
have been cases where States have applied the aut dedere aut judicare principle to 
nationals of States that were not party to the related anti-terrorism conventions.66 
Interestingly, these assertions of jurisdiction have not raised international protest on the 
part of the States not party to the conventions.67 Therefore, some have argued that if the 
absence of protest continues, in time the aut dedere aut judicare principle with regard to 
terrorism could develop into a norm of customary international law.68  
Finally, the last form of universal jurisdiction that should be discussed is universal 
tort jurisdiction. This is related to universal jurisdiction that is exercised by States in civil 
rather than criminal proceedings. In particular, domestic courts exercise universal tort 
jurisdiction when they hear claims for damages related to gross violations of international 
law that have no jurisdictional link with the State exercising jurisdiction.69 This form of 
jurisdiction is usually applied with regard to human rights violations and, similarly to 
universal criminal jurisdiction, the rationale for its application is the egregious nature of 
the unlawful act.70  
Universal civil jurisdiction has been applied mainly in the US where domestic courts 
have heard various civil cases with no jurisdictional connection to the US based on the 
Alien Tort Statute.71 However, whether a pure form of universal civil jurisdiction 
currently exists – jurisdiction over ‘foreign cubed’ cases, i.e. cases where the violation 
happened abroad, and both the claimant and the defendant are foreign - is debatable. 
Indeed, the US Supreme Court in the 2013 Kiobel case did place limits on the application 
of the Alien Tort Statute to ‘foreign cubed’ cases, saying that a case needs to ‘touch and 
 
64 ICJ, Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgement of 
20 July 2012, §§ 92-5 (as cited in Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 125). 
65 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 124; Lowe (n 50) 344. 
66 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 124-125. In particular, Ryngaert refers to federal courts in the United States that 
have extended the application of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft to citizens of non-State parties to those 
Conventions. 
67 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 125; Lowe (n 50) 344. 
68 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 125. 
69 ibid 135. 
70 ibid. 
71 Legal Information Institute ‘Alien Tort Statute’ Cornell Law School 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien_tort_statute> accessed 11 August 2020; See also Paul David Mora 
‘The Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel: the Possibility for Unlawful Assertions of Universal Civil Jurisdiciton 
Still Remains’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 699, 699-700. 
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concern’ the US to be tried there.72 In other words, it does appear that in order for US 
courts to exercise jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute a strong connection with 
the United States is needed. 
As to the status of universal civil jurisdiction under international law, it is unclear 
whether this form of jurisdiction reflects customary international law. Indeed, while only 
few States have exercised this form of jurisdiction, there is no sufficient State practice 
that shows that this is due to other States opposing to universal civil jurisdiction on legal 
grounds.73  
The doctrine of forum necessitatis is similar to universal civil jurisdiction, although 
this doctrine is part of private international law.74 It establishes that a State can exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign case if it is legally or practically impossible or unreasonable to 
bring the case before the forum which has stronger connections with it.75 The forum 
necessitatis doctrine has been applied in some countries in Europe (including 
Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and Netherlands) and Canada, whereas it does not exist 
as a separate basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States.76 Similarly to 
universal civil jurisdiction, the status of the forum necessitatis doctrine under 
international law is unclear. The courts that recur to this approach believe that this is in 
line with customary international law. However, due to scarcity of state practice it is not 
possible to conclude that this is the case. 
Having examined the international law regime related to State jurisdiction, the next 
section will look into how this concept has been defined in human rights law. 
4.3 The concept of State jurisdiction in human rights law 
In human rights law, the jurisdictional clauses contained in human rights conventions 
refer to the jurisdiction of the States parties to the conventions rather than the Courts 
whereby established. However, these two concepts are strictly related, since a Court will 
only have jurisdiction over a given act if that act was committed within the jurisdiction 
of the States parties or can be attributable to them. This also means that a State will only 
be bound to the provisions of human rights conventions if an act falls within its 
jurisdiction. Therefore, State jurisdiction in human rights law can be seen as a sine qua 
 
72 ‘even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application’ Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. 569 U.S. 108 (2013) Opinion of the Court, 14; see also Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 136, 139. 
73 Ryngaert 2015 (n 18) 136-137. 
74 ibid 139-140. 
75 ibid 139. 
76 ibid 139-140. 
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non condition for the application of the conventions.77 It follows that, although the 
jurisdictional issues are mostly dealt with at the admissibility stage of a proceeding, 
jurisdiction in human rights law is not a mere rule of procedure of the Courts established 
by the treaties since it impacts on the substantive rights contained in the human rights 
conventions.78  
The meaning of jurisdiction in human rights law is different from the meaning of 
jurisdiction in public international law. While in public international law jurisdiction is 
related to the legality of State action, in human rights law it can be seen as a factual test 
or power.79 The public international law rules of jurisdiction define the criteria according 
to which a State is entitled to regulate a given matter without infringing the sovereignty 
of other States. In contrast, according to human rights law a State has jurisdiction over a 
territory or a person when it exercises effective overall control over that territory or 
authority over that person, regardless of whether that exercise of jurisdiction is legal 
according to international law.80 The Loizidou case before the ECtHR provides an 
example of this point. In that case, the Court found that Turkey exercised jurisdiction over 
the Cypriot territory because Turkish troops had occupied that territory and therefore had 
effective overall control over it, regardless of whether the Turkish military occupation 
was legal according to international law.81 In this regard, as Wilde observes, ‘the notion 
that human rights obligations do not apply if the action in question is not itself lawful is 
perverse’.82 Indeed, it would be a paradox if human rights treaties would not apply 
because their violation was committed as a result of an act that is considered unlawful 
according to international law. As Milanović notes, not all the acts committed by States 
are an expression of States’ legal authority, as States can, for example, kill or torture 
without passing any domestic law that authorizes them to do so, in other words, without 
exercising prescriptive jurisdiction.83 Therefore, equating jurisdiction in human rights law 
to jurisdiction in international law would lead to the absurd result that acts such as State 
 
77 Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 1 of the Convention – Obligation to respect human rights 
– Concepts of “jurisdiction” and Imputability, 31 December 2019, [1]. See also Milanović, ‘From 
Compromise to Principle’ (n 1) 416. 
78 Milanović ‘From Compromise to Principle’ (n 1) 416-417. 
79 ibid 417; Milanović Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 39-41; R Wilde The 
“Jurisdiction” Test (n 1) 508. 
80 Milanović ‘From Compromise to Principle’ (n 1) 417-429; Wilde ‘The “Jurisdiction” Test’ (n 1) 507-
508. 
81 Loizidou v. Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECHR, 18 December 1996) para 52. 
82 Wilde ‘The “Jurisdiction” Test’ (n 1) 514; Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle’ (n 1) 422-426. 
83 Milanović Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 29. 
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torture would not be considered as an exercise of State jurisdiction even when committed 
on the domestic territory unless there is a domestic law that authorizes torture.84 
Notwithstanding the difference between the meaning of jurisdiction in public 
international law and the meaning of jurisdiction in human rights law, the ECtHR 
affirmed in Banković that these two concepts coincide. More specifically, the Court 
implied that the meaning of jurisdiction according to the ECHR reflects that of public 
international law.85 This view has attracted many critiques, since it contrasts with 
previous case-law from the ECtHR itself and with the interpretation of jurisdiction of 
other human rights bodies. Indeed, before Banković the European Commission or the 
European Court of Human Rights had never based the interpretation of Article 1 of the 
Convention on the international law rules on jurisdiction.86 In addition, the UN Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) in its General Comment No.31 did clarify that the obligations 
contained in the ICCPR apply to anyone within the power or effective control of a State 
party to the Covenant, regardless of the legality of that exercise of power.87  
Finally, while the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction outside States’ 
domestic territory are controversial and still evolving, there is no doubt that in human 
rights law as well as in public international law, States exercise jurisdiction when they act 
within their territory. Some human rights courts such as the ECtHR and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), for example, stated on numerous occasions 
that jurisdiction according to Article 1 of the ECHR and to Article 1.1. of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) is primarily territorial, while extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is exceptional.88 It is necessary then to examine the debate related to the 
nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights law together with the concept of 
legal space of human rights conventions. 
 
84 ibid 29-30. 
85 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001) paras 59-
61. 
86 Milanović Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 27.  
87 HRC General Comment No. 31 (26 May 2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, [10]. See also Wilde ‘The 
“Jurisdiction” Test’ (n 1) 513-514; Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle’ (n 1) 417-419, 422-426. 
88 Guide on Article 1 of the Convention 31 December 2019 (n 77) [2], [11]. The focus on the territorial 
aspect of jurisdiction in the ECHR is also reflected on the draft of article 1 of the ECHR prepared by the 
Committee on Legal and Administrative Affairs of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
The initial draft of the article stated that the contracting parties were bound by the obligations contained in 
the Convention with regard to anyone residing on their territory. However, the word ‘residing’ was later 
replaced by the expression ‘within their jurisdiction’ to include all those who were on the territory of the 
contracting parties, regardless of whether their presence could legally amount to residence. See also 
Banković (n 85) para 61; Soering v. The United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para 86; 
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004) para 312; Al-Skeini and 
Others V. The United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para 131; Medio Ambiente y 
Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (15 November 
2017), [104 (d)]. 
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4.3.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Human Rights Law 
Human rights conventions apply extraterritorially as well as within the territory of the 
Member states, as stated on various occasions by the ICJ and by many human rights courts 
and bodies with regard to the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR, the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).89 Therefore, as a matter of principle, States are 
liable for violations of the human rights conventions to which they are a party even when 
these violations happen outside their domestic borders. In this regard, some human rights 
bodies have affirmed that extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights law is exceptional 
and its exercise must be interpreted restrictively90 and requires special justifications.91 
The ECtHR in Catan and Others v. The Republic of Moldova and Russia, for example, 
stated that 
  
‘[j]urisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory 
[…]. Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, 
outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning 
of Article 1 only in exceptional cases’.92  
 
However, it is not clear whether the exceptional nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
human rights law is an inherent and defining characteristic of this concept in this area of 
law, as the ECtHR and the IACtHR have stated, or whether it could simply be a matter of 
 
89 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
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2005) para 71; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (n 85) paras 70-71; Solomou and Others v 
Turkey App no 36832/97 (ECtHR, 24 September 2008) paras 44–45; Andreou v Turkey Merits App no 
45653/99 (ECtHR, 27 January 2010), para 25; Coard at al v US, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Report N. 109/99 - Case 10.951, [37]; Committee Against Torture Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations: United 
States of America (25 July 2006) UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, [15]; Committee Against Torture General 
Comment No. 2 Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties (24 January 2008) UN doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 
[16];  Committee On The Rights Of The Child Thirty-first session Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention Concluding observations: Israel (9 October 2002) 
CRC/C/15/Ad 195, [2]; Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 227/99 (May 2003), [76], [79]-[81], [83]-
[84]. See also M Milanović, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ 
(2015) 56 Harv Int'l L J 81, 99-101 with reference to the ICCPR and the ECHR and R Wilde ‘Human Rights 
Beyond Borders at the World Court: the Significance of the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence 
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90 Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos (n 88) [104 (d)]. 
91 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (n 85) para 61; Issa and Others v. Turkey (n 89) para 68. 
92 Catan and Others v. The Republic of Moldova and Russia App no 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 
(ECtHR, 19 October 2012) para 104. See also Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (n 85) para 67; 
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fact.93 The ICJ, for example, explained the exceptional nature of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction according to the ICCPR by referring to the fact that States act less frequently 
outside their national borders than they do domestically.94 The difference between these 
two interpretations is that the view of ECtHR and of the IACtHR promotes a more 
restrictive approach to the definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights law. 
According to this view, even if a State acts outside its territory as a matter of fact, that 
action could still not be considered as an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a matter 
of law since extraterritorial jurisdiction according to the ECHR and the ACHR is 
exceptional and only happens in a limited number of circumstances.95 For some time, the 
ECtHR was the only human rights Court to maintain the ‘de jure exceptionalism’ of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights law.96 Other courts and bodies, such as the 
HRC and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights had never mentioned this 
theory. This changed recently, when, as mentioned above, the IACtHR issued its advisory 
opinion on the meaning of extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard to the right to life and 
personal integrity. The Court statement that ‘[e]l ejercicio de la jurisdicción bajo el 
artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, fuera del territorio de un Estado, es una 
situación excepcional que debe analizarse en cada caso concreto y de manera restrictiva’ 
confirms the ‘de jure exceptionalism’97 interpretation of the ECtHR.98 It remains to be 
seen whether other human rights courts will follow this approach in the future. 
Finally, strictly linked to the theme of the exceptional nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is the concept of legal space of human rights conventions. This concept was introduced 
with regard to the ECHR by the ECtHR in the Bankovic case, when the Court stated that 
 
‘the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating […] in an essentially regional 
context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. 
[…] The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in 
respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding 
a gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so far been relied on by the Court in 
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96 Wilde ‘The “Jurisdiction” Test’ (n 1) 514; Wilde ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders at the World Court’ (n 
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97 Wilde ‘The “Jurisdiction” Test’ (n 1) 514. 
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favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but 
for the specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention’.99 
 
This statement affirms the regional nature of the ECHR which applies primarily within 
the territory of its Member States. However, it could also be interpreted as saying that, 
although a State might meet the criteria for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under the ECHR, the ECHR would not apply if that exercise of jurisdiction was 
committed outside the territory of its Member States.100 If this idea were to be extended 
to all the human rights conventions, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this area 
of law would be severely restricted to include only extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction 
that involve States that are party to the same convention, thus leaving States free to 
commit human rights violations in the rest of the world.101 However, the ECtHR itself 
abandoned the ‘espace juridique’ concept in the Al Skeini case, where it found that the 
UK had exercised jurisdiction over the Iraqi applicants notwithstanding the fact that the 
violation of Article 2 of the ECHR had happened in Iraq, and therefore outside the legal 
space of the Convention.102 The legal space concept of jurisdiction has also been 
discarded by the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion, where it found that Israel’s obligations 
under the ICCPR and the CRC apply to the Palestinian Territories, which are not party to 
these treaties.103  
The next section will look into the two main models of extraterritorial State jurisdiction 
that have been developed throughout the years by human rights courts. 
 
4.3.2 Models of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Human Rights Law 
As stated above, the concept of State jurisdiction in human rights law is linked to a factual 
exercise of power or authority by the State. More specifically, two main models of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction have been developed by the human rights courts: the spatial 
model and the personal model.  
According to the spatial model, a State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction when it 
exercises effective overall control over a territory located outside its domestic borders. 
 
99 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (n 85) [80]. 
100 Wilde ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders at the World Court’ (n 89) 671-672; C Ryngaert ‘Clarifying the 
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102 See paragraph 4.4.2 for an expanded analysis of this point. See also Ryngaert ‘Clarifying the 
extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 100) 59. 
103 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 89) [109]-
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This model of jurisdiction is the most supported by both the text of some human rights 
treaties and the jurisprudence of the related courts.104 Indeed, some treaties such as the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) explicitly refer to jurisdiction as control over 
territories.105 Besides, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the HRC, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AComHPR), the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACommHR), the ICJ, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Committee Against Torture and the Committee on the Rights of the Child shows that 
this model has consistently been applied by human rights courts.106  
The threshold for the application of the effective overall control test is high, however the 
level of control exercised by the States on the relevant territory does not need to equate 
that exercised on their domestic territory to trigger jurisdiction.107 The acts that might be 
classified as effective overall control cover a wide range of activities which include, 
among other things, military occupying all or part of a territory, supporting an insurrection 
or civil war in another country and favouring or assisting the installation of a separatist 
regime.108 As to the criteria that are taken into account to determine whether effective 
overall control exists, the ECtHR, for example, refers mainly to the number of soldiers 
employed by the occupying State on the territory in question and to the extent of that 
State’s control and influence over the region exercised through its political, military or 
economic support for the subordinate local administration.109 
A factor that, according to some, should have a bearing on the level of control required 
to trigger State jurisdiction is whether the State exercising control over a territory is 
required to fulfil both its positive and negative human rights obligations with respect to 
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109 ibid [47]. 
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that territory.110 The ECtHR in the Banković case stated that the obligations contained in 
the ECHR could not be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’.111 Therefore, according to the 
Court, both these obligations apply, which is an argument in favour of setting a stringent 
level of control to trigger State jurisdiction. However, some authors have questioned a 
too high threshold, since States need different levels of control to fulfil their positive and 
negative obligations. While States do not need a high standard of control over a territory 
to comply with their negative obligations not to violate human rights in that territory, they 
do need a higher level of control to fulfil the more demanding positive obligations to 
ensure or secure human rights there.112 Nevertheless, this theory has little support from 
the text of the human rights treaties and the related jurisprudence.113  
At a first glance, the application of the spatial model of jurisdiction appears 
straightforward as it triggers jurisdiction every time that a State exercises control over a 
territory. Besides, some commentators have remarked on its capacity of combining the 
need for universality that is at the core of the normative aspect of human rights treaties 
with ensuring that these can be effectively applied.114 This is because on the one hand, 
this model ensures that States are bound to their human rights obligations every time that 
they exercise control over a territory, thus promoting the uniform application of the 
human rights norms. On the other, since States are in a better position to ensure the 
fulfilment of their human rights obligations when they have control over a territory, this 
model promotes the effective application of the human rights norms.  
Notwithstanding its positive aspects, there are various difficulties associated with the 
spatial model. The main shortcoming of this model is its uncertainty with regard to how 
big an area must be for this model to apply. While it is clear that an extended territory 
qualifies as an area, such as Northern Cyprus in the Loizidou case, the spatial model 
becomes less stable and more arbitrary the more the dimensions of the area shrink. It is 
not clear, for example, whether a building controlled by a State in a foreign territory or a 
room within that building could be considered as an area for the purposes of this model.115 
The main critique that has been moved to the spatial model is the fact that are no 
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legitimate grounds for extending its application to increasingly smaller places.116 
Interestingly, when the ECtHR dealt with cases where States acted within smaller places 
such as military prisons in a foreign State, embassies and consulates abroad, or ships and 
aircrafts registered or flying the flag of that State the Court relied on the personal model 
of jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction as authority or control over individuals, rather than on the 
spatial model of control over a place.117 There are, however, some exceptions, such as the 
cases Medvedyev and others v. France and Al Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom 
where the ECtHR found that the respondent States had jurisdiction based on both power 
exercised by their agents over the applicants and effective control over the premises, 
respectively a foreign ship and a military prison in Iraq.118 In addition, the application of 
the spatial model to places rather than areas was endorsed by the ECtHR in Al Skeini, 
where the Court, referring inter alia to Medvedyev and Al Saadoon stated: 
  
‘The Court does not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from the 
control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the 
individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power 
and control over the person in question’.119 
 
 
116 Milanović, for example, examined whether the spatial model as control over places can be extended to 
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This statement and, more specifically, the use of the word solely allows room for the 
application of the spatial model to places.120 Similarly to the ECtHR, the Committee 
Against Torture did openly endorse the spatial model as control over places and objects; 
however, in its jurisprudence related to acts committed by a State on a foreign ship, it 
adopted the personal model of jurisdiction instead.121 Ultimately, therefore, because there 
are no clear grounds for applying the spatial model to places rather than territories, either 
this model fails to address human rights violations when applied rigidly or it collapses 
into the personal model of jurisdiction.122 This is because according to a rigid application 
of the spatial model smaller places such as buildings in a foreign State are within the 
jurisdiction of that State, therefore if another State were to control the building and 
commit human rights violations there, that State could not be considered as exercising 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, to avoid this, the spatial model could be substituted by 
the personal one and the criterion of control over a place would be replaced by that of 
control over individuals, causing the spatial model to collapse into the personal model.123 
The personal model of jurisdiction is the second model developed by human rights courts. 
Its main characteristic is the focus on the relationship between the State and the 
individual, rather than the place where a human rights violation occurs.124 The notion that 
a State exercises jurisdiction when it has power or control over an individual, although in 
contrast with the text of some human rights treaties,125 has been endorsed in the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, both the 
Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights.126 The acts that have been classified 
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(n 89) para 71; Pad and Others v Turkey App no 60167/00 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007) para 53; Isaak and 
Others v Turkey, App no 44587/98 Admissibility Decision (ECtHR, 28 September 2006) 20-21; Solomou 
and Others v Turkey (n 89) paras 45, 51; Andreou v Turkey Admissibility Decision (ECtHR, 03 June 2008) 
9-10; Al Skeini and Others v The United Kingdom (n 88) paras 133-137. See also Milanović Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 175-187. 
 111 
as exercise of power over an individual comprise inter alia acts committed by diplomatic 
or consular agents, the exercise of public powers on the territory of another State with the 
latter’s consent and the use of force by State agents operating outside the related State’s 
territory.127  
The main objection that has been moved to the personal model of jurisdiction is that the 
criteria determining what constitutes an exercise of power or control are not clearly 
defined.128 For this reason, it is not clear how to limit the personal model of jurisdiction, 
which, if applied in its broadest sense, could mean that a State exercises jurisdiction every 
time that it violates the human rights of an individual, regardless of where in the world 
the violation happens. This in turn would equate to depriving the jurisdictional threshold 
embedded in human rights treaties of any meaning, as a broad application of the personal 
model ultimately translates into having no jurisdictional threshold at all.129 On the other 
hand, however, since the criteria defining what constitutes an exercise of power are not 
clear, limiting the application of this model to specific circumstances is challenging and 
could become arbitrary.130  
A general indication on how to limit the personal model of jurisdiction could be found in 
the Medvedyev case, where the ECtHR expressed some considerations on the kind of 
extraterritorial acts that are not included in the definition of jurisdiction according to 
Article 1 of the ECHR. In Medvedyev the ECtHR affirmed Banković and stated that an 
‘instantaneous extraterritorial act’ such as the bombing of the RTS Radio Station in 
Belgrade could not be considered as an exercise of jurisdiction as Article 1 does not 
support a ‘“cause and effect”’ notion of jurisdiction.131 Therefore, following Medvedyev 
and Banković, instantaneous acts such as killings caused by bombs dropped by the air 
force of foreign States cannot be characterized as exercising control over the victims of 
the bombing nor as exercising control over the territory targeted by the bombing. 
However, instantaneous acts such as killings committed by State agents have been 
 
127 Guide on Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights April 2019 (n 108) [29], [31]-[32], 
[37]. 
128 Milanović Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1), 173-174. 
129 ibid 173-174, 207-208. 
130 For an analysis on various ways of limiting the personal model of jurisdiction see ibid 187-205.  
131 Medvedyev and others v. France (n 118) para 64. The ECtHR in Medvedyev was referring to the spatial 
model of jurisdiction, rather than the personal one. However, its considerations can be extended to the 
overall meaning of jurisdiction according to Article 1, and consequently, to the personal model of 
jurisdiction. This is because the Court justified the finding that an instantaneous extraterritorial act does not 
give rise to effective overall control over a territory by saying that Article 1 as a whole does not admit a 
cause and effect notion of jurisdiction. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine whether, in an attempt of 
limiting the personal model of jurisdiction, only non-instantaneous acts can be considered as exercising 
power over an individual, as instantaneous acts give rise to a cause and effect notion of jurisdiction that is 
not contemplated in Article 1. See also Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(n 1), 186-187, 191. 
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classified by the ECtHR as exercising power or control over the victims even when the 
victims were not in custody of the State agents, which explains why these killings can be 
considered as instantaneous. Indeed, the Pad, Isaak, Solomou and Andreou cases, for 
example, are all related to killings committed by State agents who did not have custody 
of the victims.132 This fact shows that the personal model cannot be limited to non-
instantaneous acts, since the Court’s jurisprudence proves that instantaneous acts such as 
killings outside custody have in fact been considered as an exercise of power over an 
individual. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, limiting the personal model only 
to non-instantaneous acts such as killings committed while the person is in custody of 
State agents does not meet the universal rationale at the basis of human rights conventions 
and it might result in the absurd outcome of incentivising States to kill people rather than 
take them into custody.133 
A difference that can, however, be traced between the Pad, Isaak, Solomou and Andreou 
cases and Banković is that the first four cases, unlike Bankovic, happened within the legal 
space of the Convention, with the exception perhaps of the Pad case. One might therefore 
wonder if the location of the violation and whether it happened within the legal space of 
the ECHR could be used to limit the application of the spatial model. As mentioned above, 
Isaak, Solomou and Andreou are all related to killings committed in Cyprus, and therefore 
ultimately within the legal space of the ECHR, which is a factor in favour of considering 
the legal space of the Convention as a relevant criterion. The Pad case, however, seems 
to directly contradict this even though the location of the violation in Pad was never 
determined due to disagreements between the parties as to where the victims were 
killed.134 Ultimately, however, notwithstanding the unknown location, Pad can still be 
considered as disproving Banković regarding the legal space of the ECHR because in Pad 
the ECtHR found it irrelevant to determine where the violation had occurred to establish 
jurisdiction even if it was possible that the killings had happened outside the legal space 
 
132 Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1), 185-186, 191. 
133 ibid 191. 
134 Pad and Others v Turkey (n 126) paras 48, 51, 54-55. The applicants stated at para 48 that the killings 
had happened on Iranian territory and that therefore Turkey had acted extraterritorially, while the Turkish 
government affirmed at para 51 that these had happened on their territory which the victims illegally 
entered. The Court found at paras 54-55 that, since neither of the parties contested Turkey’s jurisdiction, it 
did not matter where the act had ultimately happened in order to establish jurisdiction. According to the 
Court, what brought the applicants within Turkey’s jurisdiction was the fact that Turkish agents had shoot 
them. While it is clear that the ECtHR in the Pad case interpreted jurisdiction as power or control over 
individuals, it is not clear whether this case is in fact about extraterritorial jurisdiction at all, since the 
location of the act has not been determined. If we take the Government’s position, then the case becomes 
about Turkey exercising jurisdiction on its own territory which renders the case irrelevant as far as the rules 
on extraterritorial jurisdiction are concerned. If, on the other hand, we take the applicants’ position, this 
becomes a case about extraterritorial jurisdiction in a place, Iran, that is not within the legal space of the 
ECHR. 
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of the Convention.135 The same goes for the Issa case, where the ECtHR openly admitted 
that both the personal and the spatial model of jurisdiction could be applied to alleged 
violations that happened in Iraq, and therefore outside the legal space of the ECHR.136 In 
any case, as mentioned above, the ECtHR abandoned the concept of legal space of the 
ECHR in Al Skeini where it stated that 
 
 ‘where the territory of one Convention State is occupied by the armed forces of another, 
the occupying State should in principle be held accountable under the Convention for 
breaches of human rights within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise would 
be to deprive the population of that territory of the rights and freedoms hitherto enjoyed 
and would result in a “vacuum” of protection within the “legal space of the Convention”. 
However, the importance of establishing the occupying State’s jurisdiction in such cases 
does not imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never 
exist outside the territory covered by the Council of Europe member States. The Court 
has not in its case-law applied any such restriction’.137 
 
It can therefore be said that, just like the instantaneous nature of the act, the legal space 
of the ECHR has no bearing on whether or not an act constitutes an exercise of power 
according to the personal model.  
However, the Al Skeini case introduced a new version of the personal model of 
jurisdiction linking the exercise of power over individuals by State agents with the 
exercise of public powers by the related State on the territory where the violation happens. 
In Al Skeini, the applicants were Iraqi citizens, five of whom were allegedly killed by UK 
troops during a patrolling operation in South East Iraq while the sixth was killed while in 
a detention facility controlled by the UK. The Court found that the UK had jurisdiction 
not simply because UK armed forces exercised power or authority over the victims, but 
also because the UK was exercising in that part of Iraq public powers, such as the 
maintenance of security, normally reserved to a sovereign government.138 Therefore, 
according to Al Skeini a factor that could limit the application of the personal model is the 
exercise of public powers by the State on the territory where the violation occurs. This is, 
however, in contrast with previous jurisprudence of the ECtHR, more specifically with 
Issa and Pad, where no reference was made to the respondent State’s exercise of public 
powers.139 For this reason, it can be concluded that the main objection moved to the 
 
135 Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 185. 
136 Issa v Turkey (n 89) paras 69, 71, 74-81. See also Milanović ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 
120) 124, 126. 
137 Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom (n 88) para 142. See also Milanović ‘Al-Skeini and Al-
Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 120) 129. 
138 Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom (n 88) para 149. See also Milanović ‘Al-Skeini and Al-
Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 120) 130-131. 
139 M Milanović ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 120) 130-131. 
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personal model, the fact that it cannot be effectively limited and that it therefore renders 
the jurisdictional threshold meaningless, remains valid. It will be interesting to see how 
the human rights courts will deal with the personal model in the future and how the law 
develops in this area. 
  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction according to 
public international law and human rights law. One point that has emerged from this 
analysis is that both these regimes present some uncertainties as to the rules defining the 
exercise of State jurisdiction. In particular, in international law the uncertainties 
surrounding the effects doctrine and the protective principle leave room for the potential 
abuse of these principles by States. This is because in both cases the definition of what 
constitutes an adverse effect or an act against the sovereignty of a State is left to each 
State that claims jurisdiction. Therefore, in the absence of an international agreement, this 
could translate to States abusing the discretion that is left to them and exercising 
jurisdiction over acts that present a feeble connection with their territory. However, in 
regard to the protective principle, the lack of international protest following its application 
and the fact that it has been used in a reduced number of cases seems to vouch for its 
unproblematic nature according to international law. The effects doctrine, on the other 
hand, seems to be more frequently applied, especially when it comes to acts that happen 
online and that have no physical connection with the State exercising jurisdiction, as we 
have seen in the two previous chapters. The problem posed by this doctrine is that when 
it is taken to the extreme it can equate to exercising universal jurisdiction in relation to 
acts that are not an international crime. This means that, unlike international crimes, those 
acts are not deemed by the international community as so egregious to justify an exercise 
of jurisdiction in absence of any of the other recognised jurisdictional heads. Ultimately, 
as observed by some commentators, the effects doctrine removes the limits to the exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction that were introduced thanks to the objective territorial 
principle. As far as the human rights law regime is concerned, the uncertainties 
surrounding this regime are related to the two jurisdictional models that have been created 
by the human rights courts to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. In particular, both the 
spatial and personal model of jurisdiction have been critiqued for the difficulty to limit 
their application and the consequent arbitrariness of their application by the courts, 
especially with regard to the ECtHR. 
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Finally, the most important observation that stems from the analysis conducted in this 
chapter is that the international law and the human rights regimes are fundamentally 
different when it comes to the meaning of State jurisdiction. Indeed, the public 
international law rules of jurisdiction define the criteria according to which a State is 
entitled to regulate a given matter without infringing the sovereignty of other States. In 
contrast, according to human rights law a State has jurisdiction over a territory or a person 
when it exercises effective overall control over that territory or authority over that person, 
regardless of whether that exercise of jurisdiction is legal according to international law. 
This fundamental difference has a bearing on the meaning of State jurisdiction online, 
which is the theme that will be explored in the next chapter.  
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This chapter aims at answering the first research question: when and under what 
conditions acts that happen online can be considered to have happened within a State’s 
jurisdiction according to the human rights conventions? In other words, what does online 
State jurisdiction mean in human rights law?  This question will be answered by first 
analysing in sections two and three how international law has so far dealt with the concept 
of online State jurisdiction, highlighting the challenges and criticalities that the Internet 
poses to the jurisdictional rules. Section four will then proceed by illustrating the case law 
of the human rights courts regarding online State jurisdiction in order to highlight how 
the Courts have so far dealt with jurisdictional issues in Internet-related cases. Section 
five will focus on the application of the personal and spatial models of jurisdiction to the 
online environment and with an analysis of the extraterritorial effects model of 
jurisdiction. Finally, section 6 will summarize the main conclusions reached. 
  
5.2. The International Law Rules Applicable to Cyber Operations: The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach 
A useful starting point in the discussion of the jurisdictional rules applicable to online 
acts according to international law is the Tallinn Manual 2.0, which is a guide for policy 
advisors and legal experts on how existing international law applies to cyber operations. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines cyber operations as cyber activities conducted during 
peacetime.1 According to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, States can exercise both territorial and 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over cyber activities as, in principle, these 
activities are subjected to the same jurisdictional rules as their offline counterparts.2 
However, the International Group of Experts who produced the Manual did recognise that 
 
1 M Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2017) 1. 
2 ibid 51, [1]-[2]. 
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the global nature of cyber activities and their ability to travel and produce effects in 
various States simultaneously could lead to multiple exercises of jurisdiction. Although 
these are allowed under international law, the Experts underlined that they could still lead 
to confusion and disputes between States.3 Therefore, according to the Experts, 
international cooperation, especially in the law enforcement field, is particularly 
important.4  
As to the jurisdictional rules governing cyber operations, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 has 
confirmed that States can exercise jurisdiction over cyber activities based on the objective 
and subjective territorial principles and on the effects doctrine.5 There was disagreement 
among the Group of Experts on whether the territorial jurisdiction principle allows States 
to exercise jurisdiction if the territorial connection between the State and the cyber 
operation is minimal, for example if the data merely transits in that State’s cyber 
infrastructure while it travels to reach the final destination.6 In regard to the objective 
territorial principle, the Group of Experts clarified that the exercise of jurisdiction based 
on this principle is legal if the cyber operation in question, which originated in a different 
State, was intended to culminate in the State exercising jurisdiction or was directed 
against people located there.7 Since, however, it might be difficult to determine when or 
where a given cyber operation starts or ends, the Tallinn Manual affirmed that 
jurisdictional rules have moved towards the effects doctrine.8 Based on this doctrine, a 
State has jurisdiction over a cyber activity if this produces effects within that State.9 
Although, according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 the effects doctrine can be considered as 
part of customary international law, it remains a controversial basis for the exercise of 
jurisdiction due to the fact that the criteria regulating its application are not fully settled 
in international law.10 Indeed, its unqualified use has caused disputes between States.11 In 
this regard, the Tallinn Manual has listed a series of conditions that render the exercise of 
jurisdiction over cyber operations based on the effects doctrine acceptable according to 
international law. These include the fact that the State exercising jurisdiction has a clear 
and internationally acceptable interest in doing so, the effects of the cyber operations must 
be direct, intended, foreseeable, and substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction does not 
 
3 ibid 54, [15]. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid 55, Rule 9. 
6 ibid 55, [3]-[4]. 
7 ibid 56, [5]. 
8 ibid 57, [9]. 
9 ibid 57, [10]. 
10 ibid 57-58, [11], [13]. 
11 ibid 57, [11]. 
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unjustifiably violate the interests of foreign States or nationals without a significant 
connection with the State exercising jurisdiction.12 Ultimately, the exercise of jurisdiction 
over cyber activities based on the effects doctrine must be reasonable so that the 
sovereignty of foreign States and the comity principle can be respected.13 As an example 
of a legitimate exercise of jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine the Tallin Manual 2.0 
mentions cyber operations conducted abroad that have a substantial effect upon a State’s 
territory, financial and economic activity and stability and legal order.14 In contrast, 
exercising jurisdiction over a website located abroad and operated by foreign nationals is 
not permitted if that website does not target persons or objects in the State exercising 
jurisdiction.15 In particular, a State cannot apply the effects doctrine to criminalise cyber 
operations conducted abroad and that are legal in that country, as that would lead to the 
violation of the foreign State’s sovereignty and legitimate interests. On the other hand, it 
would be legitimate for a State to exercise jurisdiction over cyber operations taking place 
abroad but resulting in violence against its government even if these cyber activities are 
legal in the country where they originate.16 
As to the international law rules regulating the exercise of prescriptive extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over cyber activities, the International Group of Experts recognised the 
validity of the active and passive nationality principle, of the protective principle and of 
the universal jurisdiction principle.17 Similarly to the exercise of the effects doctrine, the 
Tallin Manual underlined that the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction must 
be reasonable and must consider the interests and sovereignty of foreign States.18 The 
Experts also distinguished between the protective principle and the effects doctrine, 
underlying that States exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over cyber activities based 
on the protective principle can do so in a very limited number of instances, for example 
when the cyber operation in question compromises their national security, financial 
stability and other vital national interests.19 In addition, States can apply the protective 
principle even in the absence of any effect within their territory, unlike the effects 
 
12 ibid 58, [13]. 
13 ibid 58, [14]. 
14 ibid 59, [15]. 
15 ibid 59, [17]. 
16 ibid 60, [19]. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid 61, [2]. 
19 ‘Acts that are generally accepted as falling within this category include: attempts upon the life or physical 
safety of key State officials; acts that are directed at forcibly overthrowing a State’s government or seriously 
interfering with key State functions or national security, such as terrorism; and acts that are aimed at 
seriously compromising a State’s financial solvency and stability, such as counterfeiting its currency or 
seriously compromising its banking system. Since cyber activities can facilitate each of these activities, 
they are in principle subject to protective principle jurisdiction’, ibid 63, [11]. 
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doctrine, which requires such effect and which is not limited to a specific range of 
offences.20   
This section has provided an overview of the international law jurisdictional principles 
applicable to acts committed online as defined by the Tallinn Manual 2.0. The next 
section will focus on the current debate among the academic and the Internet community 
regarding online State jurisdiction and on some of the difficulties that exercising 
jurisdiction online poses. 
 
5.3 The concept of State jurisdiction online: territoriality, effects 
doctrine and targeting test 
The concept of State jurisdiction online has been the subject of multiple studies, many of 
which aimed at answering one fundamental question: how can the law, both domestic and 
international, deal with the transnational nature of the Internet? The answer to this 
question is, of course, not immediate nor simple, as evidenced by the contrasting and 
conflicting ways in which each State establishes jurisdiction online in various fields of 
the law. The current debate regarding tackling the online transnational legal challenges 
has moved away from whether regulation of the Internet is necessary to focus on how 
regulation might be possible. Indeed, while in the 1990s part of the academic debate was 
centred on whether existing laws applied to the Internet or whether Internet self-
regulation was a preferable alternative, the main concern today is how to overcome the 
multiple challenges associated with developing a global harmonized approach to Internet 
jurisdiction.21 The inadequacy of the existing jurisdictional concepts, regulatory 
fragmentation, and States’ aggressive assertions of jurisdiction online are among the 
challenges that have been identified in this regard.22 More specifically, Internet experts 
from various sectors (government, academia, civil society, Internet companies, technical 
operators and international organisations) have expressed concerns that the existing 
jurisdictional concepts are ill-equipped to deal with cross-border jurisdictional challenges 
online.23 Some believe that this is because these concepts have been developed for the 
 
20 ibid 64, [12]. 
21 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
1996) < https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence> accessed 18 November 2019; Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (Internet & Jurisdiction, 2019) 
<https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/uploads/pdfs/Internet-Jurisdiction-Global-Status-Report-2019-Key-
Findings_web.pdf> accessed: 16 October 2019, 42-43. 
22 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 26-28, 32-33.  
23 ibid 26. The Global Status Report Key Findings was published in May 2019 by the Internet & Jurisdiction 
Policy Network (I&J). The Report highlights some key challenges presented by online transnational 
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offline environment or are so vague and their application by States is so non-uniform that 
it is difficult to even identify what these concepts are.24 In contrast, others believe that 
while the current jurisdictional rules are sound, it is their application to the online 
environment that is problematic.25 Overall, a view held among many Internet experts is 
that there is a clear need for a new and simplified regulatory regime for Internet 
jurisdiction.26  
Another challenge to the harmonization of the jurisdictional rules applicable online is 
represented by regulatory fragmentation and ‘jurisdictional hyperregulation’.27 These two 
phenomena are interlinked and can be reconducted to the fact that there are multiple laws 
that simultaneously apply to the same acts/parties performed/operating online, which 
however makes compliance with all the laws impossible.28 At the same time, the 
increasingly aggressive exercises of jurisdiction by States have resulted in the imposition 
of heavy fines against parties located abroad but operating online to ensure compliance 
with local laws.29 These facts have led to an increasing fragmentation of the Internet, 
since companies and individuals rely more and more on technical and non-technical 
measures (such as geolocation and disclaimers/terms of service respectively) to avoid 
specific countries.30 This is why regulatory fragmentation and jurisdictional 
hyperregulation are seen as threats to the cross-border nature of the Internet as well as to 
the development of a globally harmonized regulatory regime.31 
 
jurisdictional issues and contains surveys conducted among more than 100 of the I&J stakeholders 
regarding various online regulatory trends. The I&J stakeholders are Internet experts representing States, 
Internet companies, technical operators, civil society, academia and international organizations. The list of 
all the experts interviewed can be found at pages 7-9 of the Report. When asked whether the right legal 
concepts are already applied to deal with online cross-border legal challenges, the majority (40.2%) of the 
I&J experts interviewed disagreed, however a consistent 36% could neither agree or disagree and only 18% 
strongly agreed. Looking at the breakdown of votes by category of interviewees, it is possible to see that 
while the majority of academics (43.8%), representatives of international organisations (66.6%), and 
technical operators (50%) believed that the right legal concepts are not being applied, the majority of State 
representatives (40.7%) and civil society (50%) could neither agree nor disagree. Internet companies were 
split on this point as the same percentage of interviewees (38.9%) disagreed with the statement and neither 
agreed nor disagreed. Overall, however, only a minority across all the categories of interviewees believed 
that the right legal jurisdictional concepts are already being applied, which shows that there is consensus 
on the inadequacy of the current jurisdictional framework.    
24 ibid 26-27. The Report refers to various reasons given by the interviewees regarding whether or not the 
right legal concepts are already being applied to tackle cross-border legal challenges. In regard to vagueness 
of some of the current concepts, the example provided in the Report is comity, which has a precise meaning 
within the US legal system, while it is quite a vague principle in international law. 
25 ibid 26. 
26 ibid 27-28. 
27 ibid 43. On regulatory fragmentation see also T Schultz, ‘Carving up the Internet: jurisdiction, legal 
orders, and the private/public international law interface’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 759. 
28 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 43-44. 
29 ibid 33. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid 33. 
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A crucial point that is at the heart of the ongoing online jurisdictional debate is the issue 
of territoriality. The territorial principle of jurisdiction is one of the main jurisdictional 
principles adopted by States. However, while this principle has a relatively clear 
application offline, the same cannot be said for the online environment. The primary role 
played by the principle of territoriality in establishing jurisdiction has, however, been 
contested by academics even with regard to the offline environment. Indeed, some have 
criticised the assumption that jurisdiction in international law is primarily territorial and 
have contested the effectiveness of the distinction between territorial and extraterritorial 
assertions of jurisdiction.32 In particular, with regard to the primacy of territorial 
jurisdiction in international law, some authors have observed that while enforcement 
jurisdiction is certainly primarily territorial, prescriptive jurisdiction is not, since many 
rules of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as the nationality, passive personality, protective 
and universal jurisdiction principles, are related to extraterritorial exercises of 
jurisdiction.33 Therefore, it cannot be argued that jurisdiction in international law is tout 
court primarily territorial. For this reason, in regard to the effectiveness of the distinction 
between territorial and extraterritorial, some have pointed out that ‘to speak of 
extraterritoriality is akin to describing cars as “‘horseless carriages’” – both descriptions 
are founded in a mistaken notion of what is “‘normal’”.34 Besides, the relevance of the 
territorial principle in the current jurisdictional landscape has been questioned, as some 
commentators believe that this principle is eroding in favour of other factors, such as the 
criterion of the centre of interests adopted by the CJEU in the eDate case.35 This point is, 
however, controversial, since the territorial principle, especially in its objective territorial 
version, is among the jurisdictional principles that States consistently apply not only 
offline but also online, as Chapters 2 and 3 have shown.36 The territorial principle is also 
regularly listed in international agreements among the jurisdictional rules that apply on 
the Internet. As mentioned in the previous section, for example, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
includes this principle – in the form of subjective and objective territoriality and the 
 
32 Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (1st, Oxford University Press 
2011) 22, 24-25; Dan Jenker B Svantesson ‘Nostradamus Lite – Selected Speculations as to the Future of 
Internet Jurisdiction’ (2016) 10 Masaryk UJL & Tech 47, 63-64; Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network 
‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 49. 
33 Milanović (n 32) 22, 24-25; Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key 
Findings’ (n 21) 49. 
34 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 49. For a critique 
of the term extraterritorial, see also Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (1st, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 7-9. 
35 Svantesson (n 32) 61-65. For a discussion of the eDate case, see Chapter 2. 
36 See Chapters 2 and 3 for an analysis of Internet-related cases where States refer to the territorial principle 
to establish jurisdiction online. 
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effects doctrine - among those that are applicable to cyber-operations.37 The same view 
is held by the International Association of Penal Law, which stated that ‘the principle of 
territoriality remains the primary principle of jurisdiction also in cyberspace’.38 Besides, 
Article 22 of the Convention on Cybercrime lists the territorial principle among those that 
can be used by States to establish jurisdiction over cybercrimes.39  
However, despite the fact that the territorial principle is both found to apply in the online 
environment and is in fact frequently adopted by States, this principle poses more than 
one problem when it is employed in Internet-related cases.40 Indeed, applying the 
territorial principle online allows multiple States to exercise jurisdiction in a universal-
like manner, since, as the access-based jurisdictional chapter showed, it is particularly 
easy to establish a territorial connection with content that is accessible simultaneously 
worldwide. This gives rise to unpredictable exercises of jurisdiction which prevent 
individuals and parties operating online from reasonably anticipating which domestic 
laws apply to them.41 Moreover, due to the ease with which territorial connections can be 
established with online content, the territorial principle fails in one of its main aims, that 
of identifying which State has a reasonable right to exercise jurisdiction.42 Besides, the 
online application of the territorial principle makes it difficult to differentiate between 
territorial and extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction. For example, with regard to the 
Microsoft Ireland case, some have observed that strictly applying the territorial principle 
leads to the impossible situation whereby the claims of both the parties to the case were 
plausible. This is because on the one hand it is technically true that accessing data stored 
in another country from computers located in the US does not require US enforcement 
 
37 Schmitt (n 1) 55, Rule 9; E Talbot Jensen, ‘The Tallin Manual 2.0: Insights and Highlights’ (2017) 48 
Geo J Intl L 735, 747. 
38 International Association of Penal Law, 'Nineteenth International Congress of Penal Law Topic: 
“Information society and penal law”' (AIDP) < http://www.penal.org/en/resolutions-last-congress> 
accessed 20 November 2019. In regard to the application of the territorial principle to cybercrimes, see also 
C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd, Oxford University Press 2015), 79 who lists objective 
territoriality and the constitutive elements approach as the jurisdictional principles related to Internet-based 
offences. 
39 Convention on Cybercrime (adopted 23 November 2011, entered into force 1 July 2004) ETS No.185, 
art 22. See also Ryngaert 2015 (n 38) 79. 
40 International Association of Penal Law (n 38); Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status 
Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 49. For a critic of the term extraterritorial, see also Ryngaert 2008 (n 34) 
7-9; Dan Jenker B Svantesson ‘A New Jurisprudential Framework for Jurisdiction: Beyond the Harvard 
Draft’ (2015) 109 AJIL Unbound 69, 69-70. 
41 ‘While the principle of territoriality remains the primary principle of jurisdiction also in cyberspace, it 
produces adverse effects when applied to offences in cyberspace, in that it de facto allows states to localise 
offences on their territory almost on a universality basis and leaves individuals in doubt as to which states 
may claim jurisdiction. States should exercise restraint in exercising jurisdiction in situations in which the 
effect is not “pushed” by a perpetrator into the state, but “pulled” into it by an individual in that state’ 
International Association of Penal Law (n 38). 
42 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 49. 
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authorities to physically act on the territory of that country. On the other, as Microsoft 
stated, since the sought-after data were stored in its Dublin datacentre that access could 
be seen as an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.43  
Ultimately, one of the main reasons why the territorial principle is not suited for the online 
environment is represented by what has been described as ‘the un-territoriality of data’, a 
collection of data’s distinctive characteristics which set them apart from their physical 
counterparts rendering territorial-based jurisdictional criteria meaningless.44. More 
specifically, data are extremely mobile, therefore when an email is sent from a given State 
the data have the potential to travel across many States at incredibly high speed and in an 
unpredictable way. This means that the Internet user who sent the email has more often 
than not no way of knowing where the data are at any given time or which country the 
data travelled to before reaching the recipient of the email.45 Similarly, data available in 
the cloud are highly divisible, meaning that they can be copied and stored in multiple 
locations at a speed which allows for several jurisdictions to have a territorial connection 
with their storage.46 Another key characteristic of data is that their location is independent 
from that of the users. This not only means that the data users do not know where their 
data are most of the time, but also poses serious problems to governments seeking to 
access the data. Indeed, even if the enforcement authorities knew the location of the data 
user, that information would have no bearing in identifying the location of the data and 
therefore the country that the enforcement authorities would need to contact in order to 
access them.47 Besides, data are often owned by more than one user, such as data in a 
group chat, and even if it is possible to determine the identity and location of each user, 
it is difficult to establish which location should count in order to select the domestic law 
that applies.48 Finally, users’ data are controlled by third parties, such as Internet 
companies, who have the potential to determine both where the data are stored and the 
legal regime that applies to them, which is usually the location of the Internet company. 
This highlights the fact that data are different from their tangible counterparts as 
sometimes it is the location of the Internet company rather than that of the data that counts 
as far as the domestic laws that apply are concerned.49   
 
43 Svantesson ‘A New Jurisprudential Framework for Jurisdiction’ (n 40) 69-70. 
44 Jennifer Daskal ‘The Un-Territoriality of Data’ (2015) 125(2) YLJ 326.  
45 ibid 366-368. 
46 ibid 368-369. 
47 ibid 373-375. 
48 ibid 375-376. 
49 ibid 377-378. 
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All these points show that there is a clear need to “disentangle” Internet jurisdiction from 
territoriality.50 Yet, due to the role played by territoriality in domestic and international 
law, this task appears herculean with domestic Courts struggling to adapt to the fluid 
nature of the online environment. Indeed, throughout the years domestic Courts, 
especially in Europe and North America, have switched between various ways of 
establishing jurisdiction online, moving from those based purely on the accessibility of a 
website to those involving an analysis of the activities conducted on the website, albeit a 
rudimentary one. Each of these jurisdictional approaches has, however, specific 
downsides, which render them less than ideal for the online environment. Indeed, as we 
have seen in Chapter 2, the accessibility of a website within the country exercising 
jurisdiction has been one of the main criteria through which domestic Courts have 
established jurisdiction in Internet-related cases. On some occasions, Courts have 
interpreted the fact that a given website was accessible within the domestic forum as proof 
that the online act complained of had in fact happened there, thus establishing jurisdiction 
based on the objective territorial principle. In the United States and Canada, for example, 
Courts in the 1990s interpreted the existence of a website as a clear proof that the out of 
State/foreign defendants had engaged in activities directed at the domestic forum, 
therefore satisfying the minimum contacts and the real and substantial connection 
doctrines.51 Other times, the accessibility of a website was considered as evidence that 
 
50 ‘It is well established and beyond intelligent dispute that international law’s focus on territoriality is a 
bad fit with the fluidity of the online environment, which is characterized by constant and substantial cross-
border interaction. Yet until recently, little had been done, and even less achieved, in the pursuit of 
disentangling internet jurisdiction from territoriality’, Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (2019) 
Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019 Key Findings’ (n 21) 49. 
51 ‘In the present case, Instruction has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free 
number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states. The Internet as well as toll-free numbers 
are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state […] Further, once posted on 
the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any 
Internet user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business within 
Connecticut. The court concludes that since ISI purposefully directed its advertising activities toward this 
state on a continuing basis since March, 1995, it could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being hailed 
into court here’ Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), 165; ‘Through 
its website, CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all internet users, 
knowing that such information will be transmitted globally. Thus, CyberGold's contacts are of such a 
quality and nature, albeit a very new quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, that they 
favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant’ Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 1333. ‘The Plaintiffs allege that the investing public were misled by the Defendant's 
financial performance in that the means by which the Defendant communicated its financial performances 
were through internationally accessible mediums. Public documents such as SEC filings, securities analysts' 
reports, and advisories about the company, press releases issued by the company, and media reports about 
the company, were all available to the Plaintiffs as a means of determining the financial future of this 
company.  When the Defendant made these research tools available to the investing public, and, in 
particular, Newfoundland investors, they ran the risk of having legal action initiated against them should 
any of these financial performance claims be shown to have been made negligently or in such a manner as 
to be intentionally misleading.  As to the Defendant's claim that it never made or issued any public 
statements to the Canadian financial or business press, the Plaintiffs state that any information disseminated 
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the online act complained of produced negative effects in the domestic forum, giving rise 
to the application of the effects doctrine. 52  However, in some of the cases involving the 
effects doctrine the accessibility of a website within the domestic forum was used in 
conjunction with other factors to establish jurisdiction, such as the possibility for those 
located in that forum to order goods from the website.53 The main problem with the 
access-based approach, be it based on the objective territorial principle or the effects 
doctrine, is that when it is the only factor used to establish jurisdiction, it gives rise to 
limitless assertions of jurisdiction. Indeed, every online act can be said to have happened 
within every domestic forum where it is accessible or can be found to produce adverse 
effects there. Therefore, this jurisdictional test is problematic, especially from the 
standpoint of the freedom of expression of Internet users and the predictability of the 
exercise of jurisdiction.54 However, in some late 1990s cases a different approach to 
Internet jurisdiction started to develop in the United States which was based on the nature 
and quality of the commercial activity conducted through a website. In particular, the 
active vs passive test of jurisdiction was introduced by Pennsylvania District Court in the 
Zippo case.55 According to this test, Courts could exercise jurisdiction over out of State 
 
by the various news wires and through the Internet are often picked up in news stories by the Canadian 
financial or business press’ Alteen v. Informix Corp (1998) N.J. No. 122 1997 No. C.B. 439, [13]. See also 
Michael A Geist ‘Is There a There There - Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction’ (2001) 16(3) 
Berkeley Tech LJ 1345, 1361-1364. 
52 ‘It is clear from the Court’s case-law that […] Article 5(3) does not require, in particular, that the activity 
concerned be ‘directed to’ the Member State in which the court seised is situated (see judgment in Pinckney, 
EU:C:2013:635, paragraph 42). Therefore, for the purposes of determining the place where the damage 
occurred with a view to attributing jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, it is 
irrelevant that the website at issue in the main proceedings is not directed at the Member State in which the 
court seised is situated. In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it must thus be held 
that the occurrence of damage and/or the likelihood of its occurrence arise from the accessibility in the 
Member State of the referring court, via the website of EnergieAgentur, of the photographs to which the 
rights relied on by Ms Hejduk pertain’, Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:28, paras 30-34; See also Edouard Treppoz ‘Jurisdiction in the Cyberspace’ (2016) 26 
Swiss Rev Int'l & Eur L 273, 277. 
53 For example, in the case Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd the Court found that ‘Limited's 
Internet activities were directed toward Crate & Barrel and Illinois. Limited allegedly registered an Illinois 
company's mark as its domain name and deliberately designed an Internet website using an Illinois 
company's mark with the knowledge that this conduct would likely injure Plaintiff in Illinois, its place of 
incorporation and principal place of business. In addition, Limited intentionally designed the website to be 
interactive, inducing Illinois and United States residents to order goods over the Internet with an order 
format specifically designed for United States "ship to" and "bill to" addresses, and providing for credit 
card usage for ease of billing’ Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd. 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000), 836. See also Geist (n 51) 1373-1374 and generally 1371-1380 for a discussion of the effects 
doctrine. 
54 See Chapter 2, section 2.5 for a detailed analysis of the negative implications of the access-based 
jurisdictional approach. See also Treppoz (n 52) 279: ‘In other words, after the Hedjuk case, any European 
court has jurisdiction for any cyber copyright infringement, even if the website is written in Japanese, offers 
the streaming of Japanese music with advertisements for local Japanese shops. Such a solution gives 
jurisdiction to Court having not clear proximity with the tort. What is more, such solution creates 
unpredictability for the defendant. No one could predict where he will be sued, since all court may have 
jurisdiction based on the Internet universality’. 
55 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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defendants if they maintained an active website through which they stipulated contracts 
with those living in the domestic forum and therefore conducted business there.56 On the 
other hand, according to this test, passive websites of a purely informative nature were 
immune from the exercise of jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that they were accessible 
within the domestic forum. The middle ground in this test was represented by interactive 
websites which involve the exchange of information with the user’s computer. In this 
case, domestic courts were encouraged to establish jurisdiction on a case by case basis 
depending on ‘the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 
information’ occurring on the website.57 Similarly to the access-based jurisdictional 
criterion, however, the active versus passive jurisdictional test poses problems due to its 
lack of predictability, notwithstanding the fact that it does involve a limited analysis of 
the activity conducted through a website. This is because, since not many websites are 
entirely active or passive, Courts needed more often than not to use their discretion in 
determining which category a website could be ascribed to, making it difficult for website 
owners to anticipate to which jurisdiction their website could be exposed.58 More 
importantly, with the evolution of technology, today the majority of websites can be 
considered to be highly interactive. Therefore, even if the Zippo test represents a more 
nuanced alternative compared to the access-based jurisdictional approach, it appears 
outdated with Courts increasingly resorting to either the effects doctrine or the targeting 
test instead.59 
The targeting test has been consistently used by the Courts of various countries, especially 
in Europe and North America, to establish jurisdiction in Internet-related cases.60 
According to this test, a given domestic Court can exercise jurisdiction over an online act 
 
56 ‘This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one end of the 
spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters 
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission 
of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 
F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996). At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted 
information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web 
site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for 
the exercise personal jurisdiction. E.g. Bensusan Restaurant Corp., v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 
(S.D.N.Y.1996). The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange 
information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining 
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. 
E.g. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D.Mo.1996)’ ibid 1124. See also Geist (n 51) 
1365-1367; G Heissl, ‘Jurisdiction for human rights violations on the Internet’ (2011) 2(1) EJLT, 4-5. 
57 Zippo (n 55) 1124. For a discussion of US and Canadian cases affirming Zippo see Geist (n 51) 1367-
1371. 
58 Geist (n 51) 1379. Geist at also criticizes the Zippo test because it provides inconsistent results and it 
does not differentiate between actual and potential sales conducted on active websites. 
59 ibid 1380. 
60 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (Internet & Jurisdiction, 2019) 
<https://form.jotformeu.com/93222419949364> accessed: 28 November 2019, 149. 
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that has territorial connections with more than one State if that act is targeting the 
domestic forum. The targeting test is often associated to the effects doctrine, as Courts 
tend to consider a series of targeting factors to substantiate the finding that a given online 
act produced effects on the domestic forum. The targeting test has been used in various 
areas of the law, including defamation, trademark infringement and consumer contracts, 
with some commentators suggesting that this test is due to expand to other legal fields 
and systems.61 A positive aspect of the targeting test compared to other jurisdictional 
criteria adopted online is that it gives rise to more predictable exercises of jurisdiction. 
This is because this test bases the exercise of jurisdiction over the identification of specific 
steps taken by a foreign actor to target a given forum, making it easier for the foreign 
actor to anticipate the exercise of jurisdiction by the targeted State.62 However, one of the 
major problems of this jurisdictional criterion is that there is no agreement as to what 
amounts to targeting. This question was at the heart of the 2010 consumer contract joint 
case Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof 
GesmbH v Oliver Heller (the Hotel Alpenhof case) before the CJEU. In the Hotel Alpenhof 
case, the Court was asked to clarify what factors could be used to establish that a trader 
advertising its services on a website was directing its activities towards the Member States 
of the domicile of the consumer, pursuant to article 15(1)(c) of the Regulation 44/2001 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters.63 The Court found that the trader’s clear intention to establish commercial 
relations with consumers in the relevant member State was central to the answer.64 
Interestingly, however, the Court excluded that the mere existence of a website could be 
considered as proof of such an intention, in contrast with the assumption on which the 
access-based jurisdictional approach rests.65 Overall, the judges found that a series of 
 
61 For example, according to the Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report, the targeting test has been 
adopted in data protection proposals in Argentina and Thailand, ibid 149. In regard to cases where the 
targeting test has been adopted see Young v New Haven Advocate et al, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) 
discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2 in the field of defamation, Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone Plc 
[2005] FCA 471, [37] and American Information Corp. v. American Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696 
(D. Md. 2001), [700] in regard to trademark infringement, and Joined Cases C-585/08 Peter Pammer v 
Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG (C-585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller (C-
144/09) [2010] 2010 I-12527 in regard to consumer contracts. See also: Treppoz (n 52) 280-281 for a 
discussion of the European approach to the regulation of consumer contracts; Geist (n 51) 1381-1382 and 
Heissl (n 56) 5-7 for a discussion of cases in the United States where the targeting approach has been used. 
62 Geist (n 51) 1381. 
63 Hotel Alpenhof (n 61) para 47. 
64 ibid para 75. 
65 ‘Whilst seeking to confer further protection on consumers, the European Union legislature did not go as 
far as to lay down that mere use of a website, which has become a customary means of engaging in trade, 
whatever the territory targeted, amounts to an activity ‘directed to’ other Member States which triggers 
application of the protective rule of jurisdiction referred to in Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001’ 
ibid para 72. 
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factors should together be taken into account to ascertain whether a trader is targeting a 
particular State, including: mentions that the services offered are available for consumers 
located in that State designated by name, the use of Internet referencing services offered 
by search engine operators to facilitate the access to the trader’s website to consumers 
located in that State66, ‘the international nature of the activity at issue, such as certain 
tourist activities; mention of telephone numbers with the international code; use of a top-
level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the trader is established, 
for example ‘.de’, or use of neutral top-level domain names such as ‘.com’ or ‘.eu’; the 
description of itineraries from one or more other Member States to the place where the 
service is provided; and mention of an international clientele composed of customers 
domiciled in various Member States, in particular by presentation of accounts written by 
such customers’.67 With regard to language and currency, the Court concluded that these 
factors are only relevant if the website gives the consumers the possibility to select 
different languages and currencies68, whereas the mere presence on the website of the 
trader’s contact details, (such as email address, physical address and phone number 
without an international code), and the possibility to conclude a contract through the 
website do not count as proof of targeting.69 This approach to targeting has also been 
adopted in other EU instruments, such as the General Data Protection Regulation.70 The 
reliance on factors such as use of language, currency and availability of service in a given 
country is also reflected in the criminal law field, where it received approval from the 
International Association of Penal Law.71  
 
66 ibid para 81. 
67 ibid para 83. 
68 ibid para 84. 
69 ibid paras 77-79. 
70 ‘In order to ensure that natural persons are not deprived of the protection to which they are entitled under 
this Regulation, the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or a 
processor not established in the Union should be subject to this Regulation where the processing activities 
are related to offering goods or services to such data subjects irrespective of whether connected to a 
payment. In order to determine whether such a controller or processor is offering goods or services to data 
subjects who are in the Union, it should be ascertained whether it is apparent that the controller or processor 
envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union. Whereas the mere 
accessibility of the controller's, processor's or an intermediary's website in the Union, of an email address 
or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller 
is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency 
generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and services in that 
other language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, may make it apparent that 
the controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union’, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJL 119/1, Recital 23; see also Internet & 
Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (n 60) 149. 
71 ‘In determining effects, states shall consider the existence of a particular nexus with the offence, such as 
the intent of the perpetrator as it may appear from the use of a given language, the provision of domestic 
payment facilities, a service offer in specific cities, etc. When a state localizes the effects of an offence 
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However, notwithstanding the fact that there seems to be greater consensus towards the 
adoption of the targeting test or some of the factors that this should be based on, there is 
still no international consensus on how to conduct this test whose application is 
controversial according to international law, as underlined by the Tallinn Manual 2.0.72 
It certainly seems that some progress has been made towards greater clarity in this regard, 
as the Hotel Alpenhof case shows. However, international harmonization in this field still 
seems far off. One of the main downsides associated to the use of the targeting test is that 
it could lead to Internet fragmentation, with companies increasingly relying on filtering 
measures to exclude specific jurisdictions from the reach of their websites.73 Another 
disadvantage of the targeting test is that it does still require a certain degree of Courts’ 
discretion in its application, which could lead to arbitrary and unpredictable assertions of 
jurisdiction.74 In addition, there are various uncertainties associated with the targeting 
test. For example, it is not clear how this test would work in regard to intangible activities, 
activities that do not require a payment or the stipulation of contracts and that do not have 
a place of delivery, such as streaming services offered on a free basis.75 Another 
uncertainty is represented by websites that do not rely on geolocation technologies to 
filter out specific audiences. It is not clear whether these websites might be considered as 
targeting a worldwide audience, especially if they use the English language and present 
advertisements from global rather than local companies.76 However, as mentioned above, 
notwithstanding its negative aspects and uncertainties, the targeting test appears as a 
preferable alternative to establishing jurisdiction online from a predictability point of 
view. Indeed, unlike the other tests examined so far, this test does contain clearer factors 
that online actors could rely on to predict which jurisdiction they are going to attract.  
Overall, it seems unrealistic that the various jurisdictional issues that arise online 
examined in this section can be resolved through an all-encompassing international 
agreement. Instead, some commentators believe that a more realistic possibility is gradual 
harmonisation, which might be easier to achieve in specific sectors such as data privacy.77  
 
within its borders, the principle of legality requires that the perpetrator could have had a reasonable 
expectation that his or her conduct would cause effects in that country’ International Association of Penal 
Law (n 38). 
72 Schmitt (n 1) 57-58, [11], [13]. 
73 Geist (n 51) 1381, 1405; Treppoz (n 52) 281. 
74 Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 2019’ (n 60) 149-150. See also Schultz (n 
27) 818-819 on the indeterminacy of the meaning of targeting. 
75 Treppoz (n 52) 282-283. 
76 ibid. 
77 Svantesson ‘Nostradamus Lite’ (n 32) 60; Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network ‘Global Status Report 
2019’ (n 60) 55. 
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Having examined the issues surrounding the general international law rules regulating 
State jurisdiction online, the next section will focus on the issues surrounding the human 
rights jurisdictional rules regarding Internet jurisdiction. 
 
5.4 The concept of extraterritorial online jurisdiction according to 
human rights conventions 
A starting point in the analysis of the meaning of online State jurisdiction according to 
human rights conventions is that these conventions apply to online acts as well as to their 
physical counterparts. As stated by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2012 in the 
resolution The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet ‘the 
same rights that people have offline must also be protected online’.78 While the HRC was 
expressly referring to the fact that two particular human rights conventions, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), apply to online acts, the same principle can be extended to other human rights 
treaties. In particular, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) have all been found to apply both offline and online.79  
What, however, needs to be clarified is the exact scope of the various human rights online 
together with the rules that define the jurisdictional threshold for their application to 
 
78 HRC, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet (29 June 2012) 
A/HRC/20/L.13. 
79 For the application of the ECHR to online acts see inter alia generally Research Division of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2015; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5[1] of the Committee of Ministers to member States on Internet freedom, 
[1]-[2], [5]; Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of Expression and the Internet, 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013. ISBN 978‑92‑871‑7702‑5, 19. In regard to the online 
application of the American Convention on Human Rights see inter alia Office of the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression 
and the Internet’ (31 December 2013), [2], [36]; see also generally Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open 
and Inclusive Internet’ (15 March 2017). As to the application of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to online acts, see inter alia The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Press 
Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the 
Continuing Trend of Internet and Social Media Shutdowns in Africa’ (Banjul 2019); African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Information and Expression on the 
Internet in Africa’ (Banjul 2016) ACHPR/Res.362(LIX)2016; The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa on the situation of freedom of expression and access to information in the Republic 
of Zimbabwe’ (Banjul 2019). See also generally The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information, ‘Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (1 June 2011). 
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online acts. While the first point is dependent on the circumstances of each case and can 
therefore be clarified by the human rights courts at the merits stage of the case, the second 
issue is a threshold one which affects who is entitled to the protection offered by the 
human rights conventions. In particular, as noted by the Research Division of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in regard to the ECHR, it is unclear under 
what circumstances a State can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant located outside its 
domestic borders in relation to an alleged violation of the Convention committed online.80 
The Research Division noted that this question needs to be answered primarily by 
domestic courts and through the application of the relevant principles of private 
international law on jurisdiction. In other words, according to the Research Division, the 
ECtHR is not directly concerned with this issue and will assume that the Member States 
have jurisdiction if the jurisdictional issue is not contested by the parties to an Internet-
related case.81 However, while this is true, a question that the ECtHR is certainly 
concerned with is when a violation of the Convention that has happened online or that is 
the result of an act committed online can be said to have happened within the Member 
States’ jurisdiction or is attributable to them.82 Unfortunately, the criteria according to 
which such a determination can be made are still unclear. In particular, it is not clear how 
to deal with those online cases that present a cross-border element. Indeed, while the 
Internet crosses the borders of multiple countries simultaneously, not all Internet-related 
cases raise extraterritorial jurisdictional issues. For example, it is relatively uncontested 
that a State can exercise jurisdiction over data uploaded from its territory by individuals 
living there and managed by Internet service providers established in that State. In these 
cases, there is no cross-border element and therefore from a jurisdictional point of view 
the cases do not differ from those that happen in the physical environment. This is true 
for most of the Internet-related proceedings brought before the ECtHR and the HRC, 
where the Internet-element of the cases is so clearly linked to the Member States 
exercising jurisdiction that neither party raised jurisdictional concerns.83 However, 
jurisdictional uncertainties remain for those online cases that are linked to more than one 
State because the online action at the centre of the case has been committed in foreign 
States or affects people located there. In these cases, it is not clear whether the human 
rights conventions apply to the extraterritorial online activities because the criteria 
 
80 Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (n 79) 4.  
81 ibid 4-5. 
82 ibid 5. 
83 See for example the case of Premininy v Russia App no 44973/04 (ECtHR, 26 June 2011) or Yildirim v 
Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013). 
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regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction online according to these conventions are 
uncertain. 
The ECtHR has been presented with the opportunity to clarify this jurisdictional point in 
a limited number of occasions, as observed by the Research Division of the ECtHR which 
quoted the Perrin v the UK case as the only Internet-related case that raised jurisdictional 
issues.84 However, notwithstanding the fact that Perrin does present a clear cross-border 
element, as the pictures for whose publication Mr Perrin had been arrested were uploaded 
from the US by his company, the case is not directly concerned with establishing whether 
the Convention applies to extraterritorial online acts.85 This is because in this case the 
ECHR applied based on the principle of territorial jurisdiction because Mr Perrin lived in 
the UK and was ipso facto in an area controlled by that State. Therefore, the Perrin case 
illustrates territorial jurisdiction, rather than the extraterritorial application of the ECHR 
to a foreign party, in this case Mr Perrin’s company, which did not present any links with 
the UK except for the fact that the pictures that it had uploaded online were accessible 
worldwide and therefore within the British territory as well. However, Perrin still 
provides an interesting precedent as far as clarifying whether certain extraterritorial 
exercises of jurisdiction by States over online content are compliant with the Convention. 
Indeed, in this case the applicant argued that in exercising jurisdiction based on access to 
online content the UK had violated his right to freedom of expression. More specifically, 
Mr Perrin claimed that the Obscene Publications Act 1959 was not sufficiently 
foreseeable nor precise to satisfy the law requirement of article 10(2) because the major 
steps towards the online publication of the pictures had happened in the US and not in the 
UK.86 In other words, in Perrin the ECtHR was asked to establish whether an exercise of 
jurisdiction based on access to online content is compliant with the clarity and 
foreseeability requirements of the freedom of expression obligations of the ECHR. 
Interestingly, the ECtHR found in the affirmative, as it stated that the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 was reasonably accessible to Mr Perrin as he lived in the UK and 
was also sufficiently precise because it did make it clear that it applied to electronic data 
as well.87 The ECtHR judgement in the Perrin case has attracted many critiques and poses 
more than one problem as far as the concept of predictability of the law is concerned. 
 
84 ‘[R]esearch reveals that there are very few Internet-related cases concerning “jurisdictional issues” at 
present. In particular, Perrin v. the United Kingdom (dec.) (no. 5446/03, ECHR 2005-XI) may be 
mentioned’, Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (n 79) 6. 
85 The Perrin case, both before the UK courts and the ECtHR, is examined in detail in Chapter 2. Therefore, 
this section will focus on some selected findings of the ECtHR only. 
86 Perrin v the United Kingdom App no 5446/03 (ECtHR, 18 October 2005), 5-6. 
87 ibid 6. 
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These points have been discussed in Chapter 2 and will also be examined in more detail 
in the next chapter, which looks into the compliance of some exterritorial exercises of 
jurisdiction online with the freedom of expression provisions of the human rights 
conventions. As far as the present discussion is concerned, it suffices to say that the Perrin 
case shows that according to the ECtHR establishing jurisdiction over cross-border online 
content based on access does not violate the freedom of expression provisions of the 
ECHR. 
A case that might provide more answers in regard to the application of the Convention to 
cross-border online acts is Tamiz v the UK. In this case the applicant, Mr Tamiz, a British 
national living in the UK brought a complaint related to some defamatory comments that 
had been published about him by anonymous third parties under a blog post. The blog 
post was hosted via the platform Blogger.com managed by the US-based Google Inc. Mr 
Tamiz argued before the ECtHR that the UK had violated the positive obligation to 
protect his reputation under Article 8 of the Convention since the domestic courts had not 
granted him remedy against Google Inc. notwithstanding the fact that the company could 
be considered responsible for the publication of those comments according to common 
law.88 The applicant had initially successfully obtained permission to serve the claim in 
libel against Google Inc. outside the UK jurisdiction by the domestic courts.89 However, 
this permission was subsequently set aside as the courts found that they had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case since no real and substantial tort had been committed within 
the domestic forum.90 More specifically, the Courts found that it was highly unlikely that 
the defamatory comments had been accessed by a significant number of readers within 
the timeframe that Google was responsible for their publication according to common 
law.91 Therefore, the damage to the reputation of the applicant was so trivial that it could 
not amount to a real and substantial tort.92 The ECtHR agreed with the domestic courts 
and found in favour of the UK. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, just like in Perrin, in 
Tamiz it is immediately apparent that the ECHR applies to the British applicant based on 
the principle of territorial jurisdiction, as he was a citizen and resident of the UK. 
However, the part of the Tamiz judgment that makes this case relevant to this discussion 
is that related to the ECtHR’s finding that the Convention applies to the US-based Google 
 
88 Tamiz v UK App no 3877/14 (ECtHR, 19 September 2017), para 57. 
89 ibid para 22. 
90 ibid para 39. 
91 The Court of Appeal found that the principles of the case Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 (as cited in 
Tamiz v Google Inc. [2013] EWCA Civ 68, [27]) applied to this case, Tamiz v Google Inc. [2013] EWCA 
Civ 68, [30], [34], [36]. 
92 ibid [50]. 
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Inc. and to its users as well. Indeed, the ECtHR found that the domestic courts had 
exercised ‘a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for his private life under 
Article 8 of the Convention and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 
10 of the Convention and enjoyed by both Google Inc. and its end users’.93 In particular, 
the Strasbourg judges found that in applying the test of a real and substantial tort ‘the 
national courts were, in fact, ensuring that there would be no interference with Google 
Inc.’s right to freedom of expression in a case where the interference with the applicant’s 
reputation was “trivial”’.94 This point is particularly significant because Google Inc. is a 
foreign company located outside the UK territory with users all over the world and yet 
the ECtHR had not hesitation in recognising that both Google Inc. and its users had 
freedom of expression rights under the Convention. Therefore, according to the Tamiz 
case the ECHR applies to a party that has no territorial connection with the State 
exercising jurisdiction apart from the fact that it manages online activities that can be 
accessed by Internet users located in that country. While, however, all the parties to this 
case took it for granted that the ECHR applied to Google Inc., it is not clear which 
jurisdictional model justifies this application. This point will be discussed in detail in the 
next section, which examines the application of the spatial and personal model of 
jurisdiction to cross-border Internet cases. What is worth highlighting here is that in the 
Tamiz case the ECtHR took it for granted that the Convention applies to Google Inc. and 
its users without examining the issue in more detail.  
This observation can be extended to another recent high-profile Internet-related case 
brought before the ECtHR that clearly showed an extraterritorial element. This is the case 
of Big Brother Watch and Others v the UK. The 16 applicants in this case were several 
individuals and organisations campaigning for civil liberties.95 They brought a complaint 
against the UK following the Snowden revelations regarding surveillance and 
interception programmes operated by the UK and the US intelligence agencies. The 
applicants believed that, due to the nature of their work, their electronic communications 
 
93 Tamiz v UK (n 88) para 90. 
94 ibid para 87. 
95 This case joins three different applications lodged before the ECtHR: Big Brother Watch and Others v. 
the United Kingdom, Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom and 10 
Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United Kingdom. The 16 applicants were: Human Rights 
Watch, Access Now, Bureau Brandeis, Center For Democracy & Technology, European Network of 
National Human Rights Institutions and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Helsinki 
Foundation For Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, Open Society Justice Initiative, 
The Law Society of England and Wales and Project Moore, the Center For Democracy & Technology, the 
Helsinki Foundation For Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, the National Union of 
Journalists and the Media Lawyers’ Association, Article 19, the Electronic Privacy Information Center and 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom Apps 
nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 13 September 2018), para 4. 
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had been intercepted by the UK or obtained by the UK from the US or from 
communications service providers.96 In particular, the applicants challenged the legality 
of three surveillance regimes: the bulk interception regime and the regime allowing the 
UK to obtain communications data from communications service providers – both of 
which were carried out according to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA)97 
– and the intelligence sharing regime which allowed the UK to receive material 
intercepted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) under the PRISM and Upstream 
programmes.98 The applicants argued that all three surveillance regimes violated their 
rights to privacy and freedom of expression according to Articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention.99 The ECtHR found in favour of the applicants as it did establish that there 
had been a violation of the right to privacy and freedom of expression in relation to two 
of the surveillance regimes, the bulk interception regime and the regime related to 
obtaining communications data from communications service providers.100 The ECtHR 
however found no violation of the ECHR in regard to the regime of sharing intelligence 
with foreign governments.101 The Big Brother Watch case is particularly relevant as far 
as the extraterritorial application of the ECHR to online acts is concerned. This is because 
 
96 ibid paras 7-8. 
97 Both the bulk surveillance regime and the regime related to obtaining communications data from 
communications service providers have undergone a significant number of changes introduced by the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which received the royal assent on 29 November 2016. For more details on 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as summarised by the ECtHR see Big Brother Watch and Others v. the 
United Kingdom (n 95) paras 195-201. 
98 ibid paras 10-18. 
99 ibid paras 270, 389, 450, 469. The third set of applicants also claimed at 501 that the domestic procedure 
for challenging surveillance actions violated Article 6 of the Convention. In addition, the applicants stated 
at 514 that Article 14 of the Convention read in combination with Articles 8 and 10 had been violated, 
because the bulk interception of communications discriminated against people outside the United Kingdom 
who were disproportionately more likely to have their communications intercepted. 
100 The Court found at 314 that, although conducting a bulk interception regime does not a priori violate 
the Convention, in this case the right to privacy was violated since there was no independent oversight 
under the RIPA regime in regard to the selectors and search criteria that were used to filter the 
communications to be intercepted, paras 340-347.  In addition, the judges found a violation of Article 8 in 
the regime regarding obtaining data from communications service providers because this regime was not 
in accordance with the law, paras 467-468.  As far as Article 10 is concerned, the ECtHR found that both 
the bulk interception and the obtaining communications regimes under RIPA violated freedom of 
expression because the safeguards in place for protecting access to confidential journalistic material were 
inadequate, paras 493, 495, 499-500. 
101 The judges found that the fact the UK had received material intercepted by the NSA did not violate 
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention as the regime of sharing intelligence with foreign governments was 
sufficiently foreseeable and it could be considered as necessary in a democratic society. In particular, in 
regard to the proportionality of the sharing of intelligence regime, the Court stated at 446 that as States 
were facing the threat of international terrorism it was ‘legitimate for Contracting States to take a firm stand 
against those who contribute to terrorist acts […]. Due to the nature of global terrorism, and in particular 
the complexity of global terror networks, the Court accepts that taking such a stand – and thus preventing 
the perpetration of violent acts endangering the lives of innocent people – requires a flow of information 
between the security services of many countries in all parts of the world. As, in the present case, this 
“information flow” was embedded into a legislative context providing considerable safeguards against 
abuse, the Court would accept that the resulting interference was kept to that which was “necessary in a 
democratic society”’, Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 95) paras 428-448. 
 136 
the case focuses on the interception of external communications, which section 20 of 
RIPA defines as communication that is sent or received outside the British Islands.102 
Accordingly, this case covers interception by the UK of electronic communication of both 
UK residents and people outside the UK.103 In addition, some of the applicants were 
located outside the UK, such as The American Civil Liberties Union, The Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, The Egyptian Initiative For Personal Rights, The Hungarian Civil 
Liberties Union and The Irish Council For Civil Liberties Limited. This means that in Big 
Brother Watch the ECtHR was called to examine the application of the ECHR to the 
extraterritorial surveillance of electronic communications of individuals located outside 
the territory of a Member State. However, the question of whether and according to which 
model the ECHR applies to individuals outside the UK was not asked to the Court. As 
the judges observed: 
 
‘[t]he Government […] did not […] raise any objection under Article 1 of the 
Convention; nor did they suggest that the interception of communications under the 
section 8(4) regime was taking place outside the United Kingdom’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The Court will therefore proceed on the assumption that the matters 
complained of fall within the jurisdictional competence of the United Kingdom’.104  
 
Therefore, it is fair to conclude that according to the Big Brother Watch case the ECHR 
applies to individuals located outside the territory of a Member State due to the online 
surveillance activities conducted by that Member State on its territory. This case 
highlights two main points: that the electronic surveillance activities have been 
considered as happening in the UK, and that the Convention applies based on the location 
of the interference with the applicants’ rights rather than the location of the applicants.105 
This is, however, a departure from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding the 
extraterritorial application of the Convention. Indeed, a key factor in applying the spatial 
model of jurisdiction is that the individual is within an area controlled by the State, while 
according to the personal model of jurisdiction the location of the individual is irrelevant 
 
102 ibid para 69. 
103 The only communications that could not be subjected to interception according to RIPA were 
communications between two individuals both located in the UK (ex. two people emailing each other while 
both were in the UK, regardless of the location of server hosting the communication).  In contrast, according 
to RIPA all those communications where at least one of the recipients, either the sender or the receiver, was 
located outside the UK were considered as external communications. Similarly, communications from 
people in the UK who used a search engine overseas or who posted a public message on social media were 
considered as external communications according to RIPA, Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United 
Kingdom (n 95) paras 70-71. 
104 ibid para 271. 
105 Marko Milanovic, ‘ECtHR Judgment in Big Brother Watch v. UK’ (EJIL: Talk!, 17 September 2018) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/ecthr-judgment-in-big-brother-watch-v-uk/> accessed: 02 March 2020. 
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as what matters is the exercise of power or authority by the State over the victim.106 In 
other words, although it seems natural that the Convention would apply to acts that 
happen on the territory of a Member State, it is unclear the conceptual model upon which 
this application is based. This point will however be examined in more details in the next 
section. A final point worth mentioning here in regard to Big Brother Watch is that the 
Court made another significant assumption concerning the extraterritorial application of 
the ECHR.107 Indeed, when examining the regime allowing the UK to receive intelligence 
data collected by foreign governments, the Court stated that the applicants could ‘claim 
to be victims of the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention occasioned by the 
existence of an intelligence sharing regime’.108 This means that, as some commentators 
have observed, the Court assumed that individuals outside the UK whose communications 
were intercepted outside the UK by another country ‘have Convention rights vis a vis the 
UK’.109 The Big Brother Watch case is ongoing as it is currently being examined before 
the Grand Chamber of ECtHR after having been referred to it in February 2019.110 It will 
be interesting to see how the Grand Chamber will deal with all the complex issues raised 
by this case. 
The question of the application of the Convention to individuals located outside a Member 
State due to the surveillance of their communications operated by that State had however 
been presented to the ECtHR even before the Big Brother Watch case. More specifically, 
in the 2006 case Weber and Saravia v Germany two applicants who lived in Uruguay, 
one of whom was a German citizen, claimed that their rights under the Convention had 
been violated due to the interception of their telecommunications by Germany.111 The 
German government argued that the application was incompatible ratione personae 
because the applicants lived in Uruguay and the alleged violation of their Convention 
rights had happened in Uruguay, and therefore outside the German jurisdiction.112 The 
ECtHR, however, avoided addressing the jurisdictional issue altogether as it found that 
the application was inadmissible as ‘manifestly ill-founded’ on the merits.113 While in 
 
106 M Milanović, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ (2015) 56 
Harv Int'l L J 81, 124-126. 
107 Milanovic, ‘ECtHR Judgment in Big Brother Watch v. UK’ (n 105).  
108 Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 95) para [419]. The Court however 
subsequently found no violation of the Convention in regard to the intelligence sharing regime, see note 
101. 
109 Marko Milanovic, ‘ECtHR Judgment in Big Brother Watch v. UK’ (n 105). See also Big Brother Watch 
and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 95) paras 419-421.  
110 This information is accurate as of 03 September 2020.  
111 Weber and Saravia v Germany App no 54934/00 (ECtHR, 29 June 2006), paras 63-65. 
112 ibid para 66. 
113 ibid [156]. ‘The Court does not consider it necessary in the present case to rule on the objections made 
by the Government since, even assuming that the application is compatible ratione personae with the 
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Weber and Saravia the ECtHR had been explicitly presented with the objection by a 
Member State that individuals located in foreign States could not be found within that 
Member State’s jurisdiction due to surveillance operations allegedly conducted by that 
State, in Liberty and Others v the UK  this objection was never raised. In that case, the 
applicants were one British and two Irish organisations established in London and Dublin 
respectively operating in the civil liberties field.114 They claimed that their right to privacy 
under the Convention had been violated by the UK due to the interception of their 
telephone and electronic communications conducted by UK officials within the domestic 
territory.115 The ECtHR found that the UK had indeed violated the applicants’ Article 8 
rights under the Convention. Therefore it can be said that, since the jurisdictional point 
was never raised by any of the parties, the Court assumed that the ECHR applied to Irish 
residents whose privacy had been violated by the UK due surveillance operations 
conducted there.116 Therefore, Liberty can be seen as another example of those cases that 
show that a State exercises jurisdiction according to the ECHR when it commits an act 
within its territory that affects the rights of people located abroad. 
Finally, the ECtHR was asked to examine the jurisdictional issues that arise in regard to 
extraterritorial online surveillance in the case Privacy International and Others v the 
United Kingdom. The case was communicated to the UK in November 2018 and was 
declared inadmissible by the ECtHR on 7 July 2020. In this case, the 6 applicants were 
NGOs, privacy activists, and Internet and communications service providers from the 
UK, Germany, United States and South Korea.117 They claimed that the UK violated their 
rights to privacy and freedom of expression since the UK Government Communications 
Headquarter (GCHQ) committed equipment interference, i.e. hacked their equipment 
pursuant to section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA).118 Section 7(1) of ISA 
 
Convention, that domestic remedies have been exhausted and that both applicants can claim to be victims 
of Convention violations, it considers that the application is in any event inadmissible’ ibid para 72. 
114 Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom App no 58243/00 (ECtHR, 01 October 2008), para 1. 
115 ibid para 42. The applicants at 71 also claimed that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the ECHR, 
however having found a violation of Article 8, the Court decided that there was no need to examine this 
complaint separately. 
116 ibid paras 69-70. 
117 The applicants are the NGO Privacy International registered in London, the internet service providers 
GreenNet Limited registered in London, Media Jumpstart Inc. registered in the United States and Korean 
Progressive Network Jinbonet registered in South Korea, the communications service provider Riseup 
Networks Inc. registered in the United States and the “‘hactivists’” association Chaos Computer Club E.V. 
registered in Germany, Privacy International and Others v the United Kingdom App no 46259/16 Statement 
of Facts and Questions (ECtHR, 19 November 2018) para 1. 
118 ‘The applicants complain under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that the power under section 7 of 
the Intelligence Services Act 1994 is not in accordance with the law in the absence of a code of practice 
governing its use. Moreover, they complain that that section contains no requirement for judicial 
authorisation; there is no information in the public domain about how it might be used to authorise 
Equipment Interference; and there is no requirement for filtering to exclude irrelevant material. The 
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provides that if a person ‘would be liable in the United Kingdom for any act done outside 
the British Islands, he shall not be so liable if the act is one which is authorised to be done 
by virtue of an authorisation given by the Secretary of State’.119 In the domestic 
proceedings, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) considered the jurisdictional issue 
of whether Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR apply to equipment interference committed 
outside the UK.120 The IPT found that, since the equipment interference under discussion 
is an act committed outside the UK, that act would not normally fall within the meaning 
of jurisdiction according to the ECHR, which in IPT’s opinion is primarily territorial. 
Accordingly, persons living abroad who find themselves subjected to hacking committed 
by GCHQ abroad pursuant to section 7 ISA could not normally be found to be within the 
territorial scope of the ECHR.121 However, the IPT did not exclude that there could be 
some exceptional circumstances bringing those individuals within the scope of the 
Convention. The claimants, for example, argued that such circumstances would arise if 
the victim of the interference was in the UK while the computer or the information was 
abroad or if the equipment interfered with was brought back to the UK.122 However, the 
applicants also conceded before the IPT that 
 
‘in most cases where someone who is the subject of an authorisation granted under 
s.7 is abroad it was difficult to argue that such person is within the territorial scope 
of the Convention, and in any event that there would be a “very limited number of 
circumstances” in which there was going to be a breach of the Convention’.123 
 
On the jurisdictional point, the UK Tribunal concluded that, due to the various difficulties 
raised by jurisdiction, there was an insufficient factual basis in the present case to reach 
a specific conclusion on this point.124 The question ‘[d]id the facts of which the applicants 
complain in the present case occur within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom?’ was 
asked by the ECtHR to the parties to the case and it was at the centre of the Court’s July 
2020 admissibility decision.125 However, the Court did not examine this issue as it found 
the application to be inadmissible since the applicants had not exhausted the domestic 
 
applicants also argued under Article 13 that the IPT did not provide an effective remedy as it did not rule 
on the Section 7 regime in the domestic litigation’ ibid paras 31-32. 
119 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 7(1). 
120 Privacy International and Greennet & Others v.s (1) The Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (2) The Government Communications Headquarters [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, 
[48]. 
121 ibid [49]-[51]. 
122 ibid [52]. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid [53]. 
125 Privacy International and Others v the United Kingdom Statement of Facts and Questions (n 117) 10. 
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remedies available to them in violation of article 35(1) of the ECHR.126 In particular, the 
ECtHR found that, as claimed by the Government, the applicants had conceded before 
the IPT that, as Section 7 of ISA was related to acts that occurred outside the UK, there 
was no jurisdiction under the ECHR.127 Therefore, the European judges found that the 
applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies since they had not argued the 
jurisdictional point before the IPT.128 In this regard, the Court refused the applicants’ 
argument that they had not pursued the jurisdictional point before the UK Tribunal 
because they wanted the ECtHR to examine this issue. Indeed, the judges found that such 
an argument violates the Court’s case-law on the exhaustion of domestic remedies as well 
as the principle of subsidiarity of the Court.129 The ECtHR also found that the domestic 
remedies had not been exhausted since the applicants could have applied for judicial 
review of the IPT’s decision.130 Ultimately, the judges found that the applicants had not 
provided the domestic courts with the opportunity of addressing, preventing or rectifying 
the alleged violation of Article 8 and 10.131 
Overall, the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR examined so far shows that there 
is a tendency on the Court’s part to base the application of the Convention on the location 
of the interference with people’s rights rather than on the location of the individuals 
whose rights have been violated. In particular, the ECtHR has been more likely to find 
that the ECHR applies to individuals located in foreign States whose rights have been 
interfered with as a result of an act committed online if that act is considered to have 
happened on the territory of a contracting State. This fact represents a departure from the 
 
126 Privacy International and Others v the United Kingdom App no 46259/16 Admissibility Decision 
(ECtHR, 7 July 2020), paras 43, 46-48. 
127 ‘In the context of the present case there is no doubt that addressing the question of jurisdiction called for 
an assessment of a number of highly complex legal and practical issues. However, the applicants appear to 
have conceded before the IPT that there was no jurisdiction and the IPT indicated in its “no determination” 
letter that it “has not been required to consider, and has not considered” the question of jurisdiction’, ibid 
para 42. 
128 ‘Taking into account the Court’s subsidiary role, the nature of the common law system, the role of the 
IPT and the novelty of the issue before it, the Court considers that there can be no question that the 
applicants needed to argue the question of jurisdiction before the IPT in order to exhaust their domestic 
remedies’, ibid para 43. 
129 ibid. 
130 ‘As to the necessity of seeking judicial review in the circumstances the Court recalls that extraordinary 
remedies cannot, as a general rule, be taken into account for the purposes of applying Article 35 § 1 […] It 
also considers that it was not fully clear at the time the applicants made their application to this Court that 
pursuing a judicial review of the IPT decision was possible. However, it cannot overlook the fact that the 
first applicant did attempt such proceedings, was successful and that as a result judicial review proceedings 
concerning the complaint under section 5 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 are currently pending (see 
paragraph 21 above). As those developments concern the same case and one of the applicants as in the 
present application, in the circumstances the Court does not regard that attempt at judicial review as an 
extraordinary remedy and concludes it was therefore a remedy to be exhausted by the applicants’ ibid para 
46. 
131 ibid para 47. 
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jurisprudence of the Court on extraterritorial jurisdiction, as will be explained in the next 
section.  
The ECtHR is, however, not alone in finding that the related human rights convention 
applies to individuals located in foreign States due to cross-border online activities. 
Indeed, the HRC issued declarations to a similar extent in its 2014 and 2015 Concluding 
Observations in relation to State surveillance operations conducted by the US, UK and 
France. In these Concluding Observations, the HRC stated that the ICCPR applies to 
surveillance operations conducted through the Internet by domestic security agencies both 
inside and outside the domestic territory of its Member States.132 This statement could 
indicate that people located in foreign countries whose data have been subjected to 
surveillance operations committed by Member States of the ICCPR inside their territory 
or abroad might have ICCPR rights vis a vis those States.133 Therefore, according to this 
view, a Member State could exercise jurisdiction according to article 2(1) of the ICCPR 
when it conducts online surveillance activities of foreign people’s data both from within 
its domestic territory and outside. If this view is confirmed in the future practice of the 
HCR, it could be considered as an expansion of the concept of jurisdiction according to 
the ICCPR, which so far adhered to the spatial and personal model of jurisdiction. It might 
also be considered as an expansion of the meaning of jurisdiction compared to the ECtHR, 
 
132 ‘The Committee is concerned about the surveillance of communications in the interest of protecting 
national security, conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) both within and outside the United 
States […] through PRISM (collection of communications content from United States-based Internet 
companies) and UPSTREAM (collection of communications metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic 
cables carrying Internet traffic) and the adverse impact on individuals’ right to privacy. […] While 
welcoming the recent Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, which now extends some safeguards to non-
United States citizens “to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the national security”, the 
Committee remains concerned that such persons enjoy only limited protection against excessive 
surveillance. Finally, the Committee is concerned that the persons affected have no access to effective 
remedies in case of abuse (arts. 2, 5 (1) and 17). […] The State party should: (a) Take all necessary measures 
to ensure that its surveillance activities, both within and outside the United States, conform to its obligations 
under the Covenant, including article 17’ HRC Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of 
the United States of America (23 April 2014) CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, [22]; ‘The Committee is concerned: (a) 
that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), that makes a distinction between “internal” 
and “external” communications, provides for untargeted warrants for the interception of external private 
communication and communication data which are sent or received outside the United Kingdom without 
affording the same safeguards as in the case of interception of internal communications […] The State party 
should: (a) Review the regime regulating the interception of personal communications and retention of 
communication data […] with a view to ensuring that such activities, both within and outside the State 
party, conform to its obligations under the Covenant, including article 17’, HRC Concluding observations 
on the seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (17 August 
2015) CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 [24]; ‘The Committee is concerned about the powers granted to the intelligence 
services for digital surveillance both within and outside France […] The State party should take all 
necessary steps to guarantee that its surveillance activities within and outside its territory are in conformity 
with its obligations under the Covenant, in particular article 17’ HRC Concluding observations on the fifth 
periodic report of France (21 July 2015) CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5, [12]. 
133 Gerald L. Neuman ‘Has the Human Rights Committee Extended its Reach?’ (Just Security, 29 July 
2015) <https://www.justsecurity.org/25022/human-rights-committee-extended-reach/> accessed 26 March 
2020. 
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which as observed above, appears keener to find an exercise of jurisdiction when the 
online surveillance operation happens within the territory of a Member State rather than 
abroad. Similarly to what has been observed in regard to the ECtHR, it remains to be seen 
which jurisdictional model might accommodate this new meaning of jurisdiction.134 It is 
worth highlighting, however, that the HRC Concluding Observations do not equate to a 
finding of a violation of the ICCPR, nor do they represent the ultimate legal conclusions 
of the HRC.135 Indeed, in the Follow Up on Concluding Observations on State Party 
Reports, a member of the HRC, Ms. Seibert Fohr, stated in relation to the Concluding 
Observations with regard to the United States that the Committee should limit ‘its 
subsequent evaluation to measures taken with regard to surveillance activities within the 
United States’.136 This might indicate a disagreement within the Committee as to the 
implications of applying the ICCPR to surveillance activities conducted outside the 
territory of a Member State.137 Overall, as has been observed by some commentators, the 
Concluding Observations examined so far ‘do not definitely establish that the committee 
has adopted a new definition of “jurisdiction” for purposes of article 2(1). They do 
suggest, however, that the committee might need to modify either its definition or its 
practice’.138 As to the case-law of the HCR on cross-border Internet cases, unlike the 
ECtHR, there are no cases that deal directly with this issue. The case of Griffiths vs 
Australia, for example, had at its centre an act committed over the Internet, and in 
particular the production by an Australian resident, Mr Griffiths, of ‘copies of software 
and computer games made available to download’ for the members of an Internet group 
of which Mr. Griffiths was part.139 Notwithstanding the fact that Mr Griffiths had operated 
from Australia, he was indicted with criminal copyright infringement and conspiracy to 
violate copyright laws by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
Indeed, the US Court found that the copyright infringement had happened in the United 
States based on the access-based jurisdictional criterion, as the material was downloaded 
by Internet users located there.140 The jurisdictional issue of where the alleged copyright 
infringement had happened was debated before the Australian Courts as well and, 
notwithstanding an early determination by the New South Wales Court that the facts 
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extradited to the United States.141 This was following the finding by the Federal Court of 
Australia that the acts had happened within the US jurisdiction regardless of Mr Griffiths’ 
physical presence in Australia.142 The jurisdictional issue was however not debated before 
the HRC, as the applicant’s complaint focused on a violation on Australia’s part of articles 
9, 13 and 14 of the ICCPR in relation to his detention in Australia before extradition and 
the lack of fairness in the extradition proceedings.143 Therefore, it is possible to conclude 
that this case shows that the ICCPR is applied based on the spatial model of jurisdiction, 
as Mr Griffiths resided in Australia, rather than providing any insight on the meaning of 
online jurisdiction according to the ICCPR. 
Finally, as far as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and Commission on 
Human Rights and the African Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
are concerned, there are no Internet-related cases to date that have been presented before 
the Courts. There are also no cases where the exercise of State jurisdiction in regard to 
cross-border online acts has been discussed. As far as the Inter-American system is 
concerned, some experts144 have affirmed that the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights has not yet had the opportunity to examine cases related to the impact of 
technology on human rights, while others have underlined, however, that Internet-related 
cases are being examined before the domestic courts of Latin America and that these 
cases will inevitably be brought before the Inter-American Court in the future.145 In any 
case, both the Inter-American and the African human rights institutions have, however, 
recognised that the ACHR and the ACHPR apply offline as well as online and have issued 
various reports and declarations that deal with the protection of human rights online.146 
These documents will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
5.5 Applying the spatial model and the personal model of jurisdiction 
to online acts 
There are many difficulties associated with applying the spatial and personal model of 
jurisdiction contained in the human rights conventions to online acts. Some of these 
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challenges pertain to the cross-border nature of the Internet, whereas others are linked to 
the uncertainties surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction in human rights law. As 
observed in section 5.3, the Internet poses multiple challenges when it comes to 
establishing jurisdiction, one of the most difficult of which is related to the application of 
the territorial principle to un-territorial data147 and the consequent need to “disentangle” 
Internet jurisdiction from territoriality.148 While a jurisdictional principle that is ideal for 
the online environment has not been agreed upon, this is especially true for human rights 
law, where only recently some human rights courts have been confronted with complex 
cross-border online jurisdictional issues.149 In particular, the cases presented before the 
ECtHR and the HCR show that online acts such as the publication of comments on 
websites managed by foreign companies or surveillance of Internet communications of 
foreign citizens are considered to have happened within the territory of the Member State 
exercising jurisdiction notwithstanding their non-physical, cross-border nature. This 
indicates that, similarly to domestic law, online acts are presented as territorial acts before 
human rights courts as well. The rationale for the application of the territorial principle 
to online acts, however, varies according to the specificities of each case. In particular, in 
Liberty, the interception of the Irish applicant’s electronic communications operated by 
the UK Ministry of Defence had happened within the territory of the UK, and specifically 
from the Electronic Test Facility in Cheshire, using two British Telecommunications 
Radio Stations.150 In this case, therefore, the non-physical act complained of had clear 
ties with the UK territory since the interception had been conducted from and using 
infrastructure located in the UK. The Big Brother Watch case is, in this respect, slightly 
different because in this case it is unclear where the bulk surveillance operations carried 
out by GCHQ took place. Indeed, the location of the Internet cable bearers accessed by 
GCHQ as well as the place from where GCHQ had accessed the bearers are not mentioned 
in the case. In regard to this last point, one could assume that CGHQ had operated from 
within the UK territory as the UK government never contested this point, however 
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whether that is the case for sure does not emerge from the proceedings before the ECtHR. 
On the other hand, in the Griffiths, Perrin and Tamiz cases, the territorial principle took 
the form of the access-based jurisdictional approach according to which the online content 
at the centre of the cases was considered to have been published within the territory of 
the US in the Griffiths case and UK in the Perrin and Tamiz cases, because it could be 
downloaded or viewed on computer screens located there. However, the access-based 
approach applied in the Tamiz case is a qualified one because the criteria used to establish 
whether the defamatory comments had been published in the UK relied on the number of 
readers that had accessed those comments in the domestic forum.151 Finally, in Weber 
and Saravia the act complained of was the interception by German authorities of the 
applicants’ telecommunications while they were located in Uruguay. There is no 
information in the case presented before the ECtHR regarding where the interception took 
place. The German government argued that since the applicants resided in Uruguay, the 
act had happened outside its territorial jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the ECtHR 
never pronounced on the issue as it found that the case was ill-founded on the merits. 
From the analysis conducted above it emerges that the online acts at the centre of the 
cases brought before the ECtHR and the HRC have been characterized as acts that 
happened on the territory of the Member States exercising jurisdiction regardless of their 
non-physical cross-border nature. In some cases, such as Liberty, this characterization is 
furthered by the presence of clear links between the interception of foreign 
communication and the territory of the UK. In other cases, such as Big Brother Watch the 
online act is considered to have happened within the territorial jurisdiction of the UK 
notwithstanding the absence of information as to whether such physical links with the 
domestic territory existed. In this regard, the Big Brother Watch case is particularly useful 
as it clearly shows the difficulties associated with establishing where online acts take 
place. Indeed, as explained in the case, each single Internet communication is divided into 
packets of data which travel on many occasions separately within multiple Internet 
bearers via a combination of the cheapest and quickest route depending also on the 
location of the server.152 Therefore, a communication between two individuals may cross 
the borders of multiple countries simultaneously. In any case, understanding how each 
Internet-related act that is at the centre of the cases has been presented before the ECtHR 
and the HCR is useful because it has an impact on how the Courts interpret these online 
acts. It is certainly true that, as the Research Division of the ECtHR stated, it is first and 
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foremost up to the Member States to establish when an act falls within their jurisdiction, 
and that therefore the Court will assume that a State has jurisdiction if this point is not 
contested by the parties.153 However, whether an online act is considered to have 
happened on the territory of the Member States will have a direct impact on how the 
human rights Courts will interpret the jurisdictional issue and therefore on the meaning 
of State jurisdiction according to the related human rights conventions. This is especially 
true considering, as observed in section 5.4, that there is a tendency on the ECtHR’s part 
on basing the application of the ECHR on the location of the interference rather than the 
location of the victim. In other words, the ECtHR has been more likely to find that the 
ECHR applies to individuals located in foreign States whose rights have been violated as 
a result of an act committed online if that act is considered to have happened on the 
territory of a Member State. Establishing jurisdiction based on the location of the 
interference, however, rather than that of the victim is a departure from both the personal 
and spatial models of jurisdiction of the human rights conventions.154 This is because both 
models apply to individuals who are either in a territory controlled by a State Party to the 
human rights conventions or are subjected to the power or authority of that State. 
However, as will be shown below, this way of establishing jurisdiction is not new to the 
case-law of the human rights Courts. Before examining this point, however, it is important 
to highlight that, as stated in Chapter 4, unlike international law, jurisdiction in human 
rights law is related to the exercise of a factual power or authority by a State rather than 
to the legality of the use of power by that State. Therefore, the challenge of applying the 
human rights law models of jurisdiction to Internet-related cases is how to define when a 
State exercises a factual power or authority over individuals in the absence of physical 
power. 
As far as applying the personal model of jurisdiction is concerned, this model could 
become particularly useful to deal with all those Internet-related cases where both the 
victim of an online violation and the violation itself are located outside the territory of the 
Member State, as happened in the Privacy International case.155 This is because the 
personal model allows the bypass of the problem of the physical location of the victim to 
focus on the relationship between the latter and the State. This characteristic also renders 
the personal model prima facie better suited than the territorial model to deal with acts 
that happen on the Internet. However, as stated above, the main problem posed by the 
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personal model of jurisdiction is how to define power or control over an individual when 
the alleged violation is non-physical. Indeed, so far the acts that have been considered as 
an expression of the personal model of jurisdiction are mainly physical acts, such as 
arrest, detention and the use of force by the authorities of a State Party to the human rights 
conventions.156 In order to apply the personal model of jurisdiction to online acts, such 
as, for example, surveillance of electronic communications of foreign citizens, it could be 
useful to focus on the effects of those non-physical acts over the victims and to equate 
their ability to affect the targeted individuals to the ability that a comparable physical 
action might have on them, such as search and seizures of communications.157 In this 
regard, some have argued that the effective control test should be replaced by a virtual 
control test.158 This would allow the inclusion of online State actions in the personal 
model of jurisdiction, such as the remote control of communications of foreign nationals, 
based on the fact that these acts render States’ presence in certain contexts even more 
persistent than the corresponding control that States are able to exercise through physical 
actions.159 The problem with translating the application of the personal model of 
jurisdiction to the cyberspace is that there is no non-arbitrary way of limiting the 
application of this model and therefore distinguishing what amounts to virtual control and 
what does not.160 Indeed, it is not even clear which actions define the exercise of virtual 
control over individuals. Consequently, similarly to what happens for physical acts, the 
personal model of jurisdiction collapses because, in the absence of a non-arbitrary way 
of limiting its application, potentially all the virtual acts exercised by a State could be 
included in the meaning of jurisdiction with the result of not having a jurisdictional 
threshold at all.161 
In regard to the application of the spatial model of jurisdiction to online acts, if both the 
victim of a human rights violation committed over the Internet and the violation itself 
happen in a territory controlled by a State, that State would certainly have jurisdiction 
according to the related human rights conventions.162 This represents the most 
straightforward scenario for the application of the human rights conventions to online 
acts, such as for example a violation of the privacy of individuals who are subjected to 
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surveillance operations of their electronic communications while they are located in a 
territory controlled by the State and the surveillance is performed from within that 
territory. However, as mentioned above, there are difficulties associated with determining 
where an online act takes places since in many cases its location is unknown and the act 
itself by its nature is linked to multiple State simultaneously. In any case, if the State has 
control over the territory where an online human rights violation occurs, then it has the 
duty to both respect the human rights of the individuals who are in that territory and to 
secure those rights.163 This means that both positive and negative human rights 
obligations apply, which implies that the State must adopt domestic laws to secure the 
protection of those rights within its territory. The State would also need to act in due 
diligence to prevent third parties located in that territory committing human rights 
violations.164 
However, a more complicated scenario for the application of the spatial model of 
jurisdiction to online acts arises if the online human rights violation happens in a territory 
controlled by a State whereas the victim of the violation is in another country. As 
mentioned above, this is the scenario that the ECtHR has been confronted with more often 
with regard to online acts and in relation to which the Court found that the ECHR applied. 
Interestingly, this way of exercising jurisdiction is not new in the jurisprudence of the 
human rights courts, as there are various cases brought before the ECtHR and the HRC 
where the Courts found that their respective conventions applied to acts that happened 
within the domestic territory while the alleged victims were abroad.165 Indeed, the cases 
Gueye et al v France, Varela Nunez v Uruguay, Samuel Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, Mabel 
Pereira Montero v. Uruguay and Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay of the HCR and the 
cases Sejdovic v. Italy, Mullai and Others v. Albania, Vrbica v Croatia and Markovic v. 
Italy of the ECtHR are all related to the exercise by the States Parties of some form of 
legal power towards people located in foreign States. In particular, in Gueye v France the 
HRC found that the ICCPR applied to retired Senegalese members of the French armed 
forces residing in Senegal who claimed that they had been discriminated against as French 
legislation provided a different treatment in regard to their pension rights compared to 
retired French soldiers.166 In Varela Nunez v Uruguay, Samuel Lichtensztejn v Uruguay, 
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Mabel Pereira Montero v. Uruguay and Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay the HCR found 
that Uruguay was responsible for the exercise of jurisdiction over Uruguayan nationals 
that were living abroad due to its refusal to issue its citizens with a new passport. In all 
these cases, Uruguay claimed that the authors of the communications could not be 
considered to be within its jurisdiction as they resided abroad.167 However, the HCR 
consistently dismissed this point since it stated that issuing a passport is clearly an 
exercise of State jurisdiction regardless of where in the world the recipient of the passport 
is located.168 As to the ECtHR, the case Vrbica v Croatia is related to Croatia’s failure to 
enforce a judgment that had been issued by Montenegrin courts against two Croatian 
companies in favour of the applicants which lived in Montenegro.169 Conversely, the legal 
proceedings at the centre of the cases Mullai and Others v. Albania, Sejdovic v. Italy and 
Markovic v Italy took place in Albania and Italy respectively, while the applicants resided 
abroad. In Mullai and Others v. Albania the ECHR was found to apply to the refusal by 
Albanian authorities to enforce a court judgement which recognized the validity of a 
building permit in favour of the Albanian applicants notwithstanding the fact that some 
of them resided in Italy and in the US.170 Similarly, in Sejdovic v. Italy the ECHR was 
found to apply to a trial of the applicant held in absentia by Italian courts while the 
applicant was in Germany.171 Finally, the Markovic v Italy case shows that applicants 
located in the former Serbia and Montenegro had fair trial rights against Italy regarding 
legal proceedings before Italian Courts.172 Overall, all the cases discussed show that the 
ECHR and the ICCPR apply to acts that happened within the territory of the Member 
States whose victims were abroad. What is unclear is which jurisdictional model justifies 
this application. A possible solution for the application of the spatial model in these cases 
might be interpreting the act that has happened within the territory of a Member State as 
having extraterritorial effects and therefore negatively affecting victims located abroad.173 
Some authors, however, have criticised this justification for the application of the spatial 
model of jurisdiction because they find it not conceptually sound, since any act that 
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happens within the territory of a State can be said to have some extraterritorial 
consequences.174 Interestingly, however, this theory is supported by the Drozd and 
Janousek v. France and Spain case of the ECtHR, where the Court stated that States 
exercise jurisdiction according to the Convention due to acts of their authorities that have 
extraterritorial effects.175 Therefore, it does appear that the extraterritorial effects of acts 
committed within the domestic territory are relevant as far as determining whether a State 
exercises jurisdiction according to the ECHR. However, it is important to underline that 
in Drozd and Janousek the ECtHR was referring to the personal model of jurisdiction, 
rather than to the application of the territorial one.176 This means that, following Drozd 
and Janousek, a State exercises jurisdiction when its authorities produce acts within the 
domestic territory that have effects abroad. The extraterritorial effects model of 
jurisdiction could be particularly useful when it comes to justifying the application of the 
personal model of jurisdiction to online acts. This is because according to the 
extraterritorial effects model, online acts could be interpreted as acts of the authorities of 
a State, such as State surveillance, that have extraterritorial effects and that therefore 
equate to the exercise of power over individuals located abroad. In other words, by 
interpreting online acts as acts that have extraterritorial effects it could be possible to 
bypass the impasse of the absence of physical power in the personal model of jurisdiction.  
The model of State jurisdiction based on extraterritorial effects of domestic acts however, 
seems to have been confirmed as a new stand-alone basis for the exercise of State 
jurisdiction in a relatively recent pronouncement of the IACtHR, the Advisory Opinion 
on Environment and Human Rights of the IACtHR. In particular, the Advisory Opinion 
of the Inter-American Court covers the meaning of extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard 
to the right to life and personal integrity. The Opinion was requested by Colombia with 
regard to States’ obligations under the ACHR for infrastructure work that could 
significantly damage the marine environment in the Wider Caribbean Region. More 
specifically, the opinion is related to States’ environmental obligations that derive from 
the duty to respect and ensure the rights to life and personal integrity under the ACHR.177 
In the Advisory Opinion, the Court recognized the exceptional nature of extraterritorial 
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jurisdiction according to the ACHR.178 It also found that States exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction when they exercise authority or effective control over people who are located 
either inside or outside their domestic borders, thus reinstating the spatial and personal 
models of jurisdiction.179 However, the Court added an additional jurisdictional criterion, 
that of having effective control over acts carried out within the State’s territory but that 
cause the violation of the rights of those who are located outside that State. In other words, 
according to article 1(1) of the ACHR, a State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
the people whose rights have been violated outside that State’s borders if it had effective 
control over the actions carried out within its territory that caused the extraterritorial 
violation of those rights.180 The difference between this new jurisdictional criterion and 
the effective control over people or territory is that in this case a State exercises 
jurisdiction even when it does not have any effective control over the territory or people 
whose rights are violated. Indeed, this jurisdictional link is based on having effective 
control over the actions carried out within the State’s territory but that have extraterritorial 
effects. However, according to some commentators, although this new jurisdictional 
criterion broadens the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it does not equate to the 
cause and effect jurisdiction that ECtHR dismissed in Banković according to which 
everyone who is adversely affected by an action of a State is within that State’s 
jurisdiction, no matter where in the world they are located.181 Indeed, according to this 
theory, the difference between the extraterritorial effects criterion and the cause and effect 
jurisdiction is that under the first a State is only responsible if it failed to prevent the 
action that caused the violation within its territory.182 Some commentators believe that 
this principle broadens the due diligence principle and its main novelty is that it imposes 
 
178 See Chapter 4 section 4.3 for a discussion of this point. 
179 ‘The concept of jurisdiction under Article 1(1) of the American Convention encompasses any situation 
in which a State exercises effective control or authority over a person or persons, either within or outside 
its territory’ Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos (n 177) [104 e]. 
180 ‘The exercise of jurisdiction arises when the State of origin exercises effective control over the activities 
that caused the damage and the consequent human rights violation’, ibid [104 h]. 
181 ‘In the first place, the applicants suggest a specific application of the “effective control” criteria 
developed in the Northern Cyprus cases. They claim that the positive obligation under Article 1 extends to 
securing the Convention rights in a manner proportionate to the level of control exercised in any given 
extra-territorial situation. The Governments contend that this amounts to a “cause-and-effect” notion of 
jurisdiction not contemplated by or appropriate to Article 1 of the Convention. The Court considers that the 
applicants’ submission is tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a 
Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is 
thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention’ Banković 
and others v Belgium and others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001), para 75; Antal Berkes ‘A 
New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link Recognised by the IACtHR’ (EJIL: Talk!, 28 March 2018) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-link-recognised-by-the-iacthr/> accessed 15 
April 2020. 
182 Berkes (n 182). 
 152 
both positive and negative obligations on States with regard to extraterritorial effects. 
This is because not only States need to refrain from violating the rights of those who are 
abroad, but they have to take reasonable steps to protect those rights, by for example 
preventing that companies within their territory violate them.183 The main problem of this 
new jurisdictional criterion, is the absence of clear limits regarding its application. Indeed, 
the ACtHR failed to clarify how serious the adverse impact of the act with extraterritorial 
effects need to be for the State’s jurisdiction to apply. Other points that need clarification 
are also whether this jurisdictional criterion applies to all the rights under the ACHR or 
only to the right to life and how to determine that a causal link exists between the domestic 
act and the extraterritorial consequences.184 This points will need to be clarified by the 
ACHR in the immediate future for this jurisdictional link to apply. 
Overall, the extraterritorial effects jurisdictional principle seems the best equipped to deal 
with online jurisdiction, because it is the principle that best adapts to the non-physical 
nature of the online environment. Whether this principle will receive enough traction in 
the jurisprudence of the human rights Courts for it to be applied consistently to online 
acts remains, however, to be seen. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
The analysis conducted in this chapter shows that there are multiple challenges associated 
with establishing jurisdiction online. The territorial principle is one of the jurisdictional 
principles that are applied more often in domestic law with regard to Internet-related 
cases. However, the un-territoriality of data shows that there is a clear need to disentangle 
Internet jurisdiction from territoriality. The jurisprudence of the human rights courts 
shows that there are very few Internet-related cases where the jurisdictional issue has been 
examined by the Courts, with the ECtHR as the only human rights court that has been 
presented with these issues more frequently. Notwithstanding the small number of cases, 
a tendency has emerged in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to establish that States have 
jurisdiction in Internet-related cases based on the location of the violation rather than that 
of the victim. Although this represents a departure from both the personal and spatial 
models of jurisdiction, establishing jurisdiction based on the location of a violation is 
supported from the jurisprudence of both the HRC and the ECtHR. Since the application 





related mainly to establish how States exercise power or control over individuals in the 
absence of physical power, the extraterritorial effects model of jurisdiction seems more 
promising. Indeed, this model, which can be seen as both an adaptation of the personal 
model of jurisdiction or as a new jurisdictional head, is better suited for the online 
environment. This is because by interpreting online acts as acts that have extraterritorial 
effects this model allows to reflect the ability of non-physical acts to negatively impact 
on the rights of people located in foreign States. This model, however, is not immune 
from criticalities, such as the fact that it is not clear how to limit its application and how 
to define when an online act is able to have extraterritorial effects abroad. 
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6. Compliance of the Extraterritorial Application of Domestic 
Laws with Freedom of Expression Provisions in International 
Human Rights Law 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the second research question: are the extraterritorial exercises 
of State jurisdiction over online content examined in Chapters 2 and 3 compliant with the 
freedom of expression provisions contained in the human rights Conventions? In 
particular, this chapter aims to understand whether these exercises of jurisdiction are 
compliant with the accessibility and foreseeability requirements that laws restricting 
freedom of expression must respect so that they can be considered as prescribed by law 
according to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention of Human 
Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). To 
answer this question, section two will illustrate the framework for the protection of 
freedom of expression both offline and online, while section three will investigate the 
permissible restrictions to freedom of expression according to the human rights 
Conventions, with a focus on the meaning of ‘prescribed by law’ according to the Courts’ 
jurisprudence. Section four will investigate the claim that the extraterritorial exercises of 
jurisdiction over online content illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3 cannot be considered 
compliant with the accessibility and foreseeability requirements of the freedom of 
expression provisions. The analysis will highlight the necessity to adapt the interpretation 
of these requirements in a way that takes into account the global nature of content 
published online. Finally, section five will summarise the main conclusions reached. 
 
6.2 The right to freedom of expression offline and online according to 
the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHPR and the ACHR  
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental human rights protected by human rights 
conventions.1 The protection of freedom of expression is considered to be paramount to 
 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 
19; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (adopted 4 November 1950, 
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the functioning of any democratic society, as well as to the enjoyment of other human 
rights. 2 This is especially true considering the dual dimension of this right, which is an 
individual as well as a collective right, as it enables not only individuals but also social 
groups to express their views and beliefs.3 In this regard, freedom of expression is 
considered as a ‘multiplier or meta right’ because the fulfilment of freedom of expression 
facilitates the enjoyment of many other human rights.4 The articles related to freedom of 
expression in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) follow 
 
entered into force 03 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (European Convention on Human Rights) art 10;  
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted  7 March 1966, 
entered into force 12 March 1969) UNTS 660 195 art 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19; 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
1144 UNTS 123 (Pact of San José) art 13;  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (entered into 
force  27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter) art 9; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) art 12 and 13. 
2 HRC General Comment No. 34 (12 September 2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, [2]; Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman 
v. Sudan, Comm. 220/98, 15th ACHPR AAR Annex V (2001-2002), [40]; Media Rights Agenda v. Nig., 
Comm. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96, 12th ACHPR AAR Annex V (1998-1999), [54]; Monim Elgak, 
Osman Hummeida and Amir Suliman v Sudan, Comm. 379/09, 
https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr15eos_decision_379_09_eng.pdf accessed: 4 
September 2020, [114]; Open Society Justice Initiative v. Cameroon, Comm. 290/2004, 20th ACHPR AAR 
Annex IV (2006-2007), [126]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (OAU Banjul 2019), Principle 
1; Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of Expression and the Internet, Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2013. ISBN 978‑92‑871‑7702‑5, 24;  Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, 
Protecting the Right to Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2017, 11; Handyside v UK App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), 
para 49; Hertel v. Switzerland App no 25181/94 (ECtHR, 25 August 1998) para 46; Steel and Morris v. the 
United Kingdom App no 68416/01 (ECtHR 15 May 2005) para 87; Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 
(ECtHR, 10 December 2007) para 101; The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of 
the Media, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information, ‘Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (1 June 2011), 
Preamble; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (31 December 2013), [1]; Compulsory 
Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-
5/85 Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No. 5 (13 November 1985), [70]; Claude-Reyes et 
al. v. Chile, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 151 (19 September 2006), [85]; Herrera-
Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 107 (2 July 2004), [112]; Ricardo 
Canese v. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 111 (31 August 2004), [82]; Ríos 
et al. v. Venezuela, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 194 (29 January 2009), [105]; 
Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 195 (28 January 2009) 
[116]. 
3 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression Mr. Frank La Rue (20 April 2010) A/HRC/14/23, [29]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open 
and Inclusive Internet’ (15 March 2017), [71]. 
4 Michael O'Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No 34’ (2012) 12(4) HRLRev 627, 
632. 
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roughly the same scheme. They first illustrate the scope of the right and then list the 
circumstances under which it is permissible to limit the enjoyment of freedom of 
expression.5  
As to the scope of the right to freedom of expression, this right includes freedom of 
opinion, also defined as freedom of thought, freedom to express one’s opinion, i.e. 
freedom of expression, and freedom of information.6 Unlike the other freedoms 
associated with freedom of expression, freedom of opinion enjoys absolute protection. 
Indeed, article 19(1) of the ICCPR expressly mentions that freedom of opinion cannot be 
subjected to limitations.7 This also applies to the ECHR and to the ACHPR.8 As to the 
American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13 does not expressly mention that 
freedom of thought cannot be subjected to restrictions. However, article 13(1) states that 
the right to freedom of thought and expression includes the right to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas, whereas article 13(2) states that the exercise of the right 
listed in 13(1) can be subjected to restrictions. The right to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas, however, is different from freedom of thought, because freedom 
of thought is the freedom to have an opinion rather than to seek, receive and impart one. 
It can therefore be assumed that when article 13(2) states that the rights listed in 13(1) 
can be subjected to restrictions, the rights affected by these restrictions are the rights to 
seek, receive and impart information rather than the right to freedom of thought. This 
assumption finds confirmation in a document published by the Office for the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. Indeed, the report, The Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to 
Freedom of Expression states that 
  
 
5 In this regard, however, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights represents an exception, since 
Article 9 introduces the right for every individual to receive information and express and disseminate their 
opinions without referencing any permitted restrictions of this right. However, a list of justifiable limitations 
to the right of freedom of expression according to Article 9 is contained in Principle 9 of the Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa (n 2). 
6 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 10; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive 
Internet’ (n 3), [68]; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [11]; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 23-24; 
Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 13-15. 
7 ICCPR (n 1) art 19(1); HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [9]-[10]. As to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, article 8 does not expressly mention freedom of opinion, as the article refers to freedom 
of conscience. However, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information 
in Africa (n 2) affirms in Principle 2 that freedom of opinion is indispensable to the exercise of freedom of 
expression and that this freedom cannot be subjected to any restrictions.  
8 Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 27; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 13; African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ 
(n 2), Principle 2. 
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‘[t]he legal framework of the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights is 
probably the international framework that provides the greatest scope and the broadest 
guarantees of protection to the right to freedom of thought and expression […] From a 
comparative perspective, when the texts of Article 13 of the American Convention, 
Article IV of the American Declaration, and Article 4 of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter are contrasted with the relevant provisions of other international human rights 
treaties–specifically with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights or with Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms—it is clear that the Inter-American framework was designed 
by the American States to be more generous and to reduce to a minimum the restrictions 
to the free circulation of information, opinions and ideas’.9  
 
It therefore follows that if the ECHR, the ICCPR and the ACHPR grant absolute 
protection to the right of freedom of thought, it is reasonable to assume that the ACHR 
does the same.  
As to freedom of information, this can be defined as the right to impart and also receive 
information and ideas. Given the crucial role played by the media in a democratic society, 
freedom of information is usually associated with the right of the media to provide the 
public with information and with the corresponding right of the public to receive it.10 In 
regard to freedom of expression, this right is considered to have horizontal effects in that 
not only States but also third parties, such as private companies, media owners and 
intermediaries should refrain from violating people’s freedom of expression rights.11 It 
follows that States have a positive obligation to protect individuals from freedom of 
expression violations perpetrated by third parties.12  
The protection of the right to freedom of expression extends to both the content of the 
expression and the means by which this is communicated. Indeed, many forms of 
expression such as political discourse, commentary, canvassing, discussions on human 
rights, journalism, cultural expression, teaching and religious discourse are included in 
the protection.13 Artistic expression is also protected14, together with information that is 
 
9 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (30 
December 2009), [3]-[4]. 
10 ‘Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right 
to receive them’, Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) para 41; Bychawska-Siniarska 
(n 2) 14. 
11 Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 24. 
12 Fuentes Bobo v Spain App no 39293/98 (ECtHR, 29 February 2000) para 38; Dink v Turkey App no 
2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 et 7124/09 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) para 106; Benedek and 
Kettemann (n 2) 24-25; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [7]. 
13 HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [11]. 
14 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 10; American Convention on Human Rights (n 1) art 
13(1); ICCPR (n 1) art 19(2); HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [11]; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 33; 
Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 14. 
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false, or offends, shocks or disturbs.15 A special degree of protection is reserved for 
political speech and speech related to questions of public interest, speech regarding 
candidates for public office and the way in which public officials perform their duties, 
and speech associated to the identity and dignity of the person.16 It follows that States 
should be particularly mindful of any restriction that they impose on this type of speech, 
given the special role played by it in a democratic society. Commercial speech is also 
included in the category of protected expression,17 although to a lesser extent than 
political speech. The ECtHR, for example, grants States a wider margin of appreciation 
when it comes to restricting commercial speech compared to political expression.18 As to 
the means by which information and ideas are expressed, oral, written and printed 
expression are protected, together with any other form of communication.19 However, in 
regard to the ICCPR, some commentators have observed that while it is clear that article 
19 covers all forms of verbal and artistic expression, it is unclear whether it covers non-
verbal forms as well. More specifically, while some forms of non-verbal expression such 
as raising a banner have been considered by the HRC as protected expression, others such 
as the defacement of road signs have been excluded from the scope of article 19.20 It is 
 
15 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 23(3); Ríos et al. v. Venezuela (n 2), [105]; Perozo et 
al. v. Venezuela (n 2), [116]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [72]; 
HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [11]; Handyside v UK (n 2), para 49; Benedek and Kettemann, (n 2) 
23-24; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 75-77. 
16 Tristán Donoso vs. Panama, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 193 (27 January 2009), 
[115]; Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 135 (22 November 
2005), [83]; Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica (n 2) [82]; Kimel v. Argentina, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 177 (2 May 2008) [87]-[88]; Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 207 (20 November 2009), [83]; López-Álvarez v. Honduras, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 141 (1 February 2006), [169]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal 
Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [32]-[56]; African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in 
Africa’ (n 2), Principle 21 (1)(b); Bodrožić v. Serbia and Montenegro (2005) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003, [7.2]; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [34]; O'Flaherty (n 4) 637; Benedek 
and Kettemann (n 2) 49; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996) 
para 58; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR, 13 July 2012) para 61; Ceylan 
v Turkey App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) para 34; Research Division of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe/European 
Court of Human Rights, 2015, 32. 
17 HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [11]; Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada (1993) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993), [11.3]. 
18 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 14. 
19 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 10; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework 
regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [19]-[29]; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 17-18; HRC 
General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [12]. 
20 O'Flaherty (n 4) 638. Regarding raising a banner as a form of protected expression see Kivenmaa v 
Finland (1994) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990 (1994), [9.3]. As to the defacement of road signs see 
S.G. v France (1991) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/347/1988 at 8 (1991), [5.2]. 
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also unclear whether hunger strikes and expression through clothes as well as forms of 
expression of gender identity are included in the protection offered by article 19.21  
A right that is also associated with the right to freedom of expression is the right of access 
to information. This right is included in the protection of freedom of expression 
guaranteed by article 13 of the ACHR, article 19 of the ICCPR, article 9 of the ACHPR 
and article 10 of the ECHR.22 However, in regard to the latter, the recognition of the right 
of access to information as part of article 10 is a relatively recent development. Indeed, 
the original position of the ECtHR was that the right to receive information, from which 
the right of access to information derives, included only a negative obligation for States 
not to interfere with people’s freedom to receive information rather than a positive one to 
grant people access to documents held by public authorities.23 For this reason, the right 
of access to information was first associated with the right to respect for private and 
family life granted by article 8 of the ECHR, especially in the Court’s case-law on 
environmental and health-related issues.24 However, in more recent case-law the ECtHR 
broadened its interpretation of the freedom to receive information recognising that the 
public authorities’ refusal to grant access to information that they held constituted a 
violation of article 10 of the ECHR.25 As to the scope of the right of access to information, 
this right shares with freedom of expression the dual nature of individual and collective 
right as well as the central role in facilitating the enjoyment of other human rights.26 The 
right of access to information gives people the right to access information held by public 
 
21 O'Flaherty (n 4) 638-639. In regard to the possibility of considering hunger strike as a form of protected 
expression, the Human Rights Committee in Baban v Australia (2003) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 
(2003) was asked to examine the issue. However, at [6.7] it declared the application inadmissible as it was 
not sufficiently substantiated. As to clothes, in the case Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan (2004) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2004) the Human Rights Committee found that the State’s refusal to allow a 
student to wear hijab was a violation of her right to freedom of religion. As to whether the refusal was also 
a violation of article 19, the HCR found at [5.3] that the author of the communication had failed to 
substantiate the claim. For this reason, the application was considered inadmissible in this regard. 
22 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 26; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive 
Internet’ (n 3), [163]; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [18]; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 15; Társaság 
a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary App no 37374/05 (ECtHR, 14 July 2009) para 35; Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria App no 39534/07 (ECtHR, 28 February 
2014) para 41. 
23 Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (n 16), 41. 
24 Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (n 16), 42-43; Guerra and Others v. Italy 
App no 14967/89 (ECtHR, 19 February 1998) para 60; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom App no 
21825/93 23414/94 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998) para 101.  
25 Internet: Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights (n 16), 41; Guerra and Others v. Italy (n 24) 
para 60; Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (n 22) para 35; Österreichische Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria (n 22) para 41; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia 
App no 48135/06 (ECtHR, 25 September 2013) para 20. 
26 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [163]-[164]. 
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authorities in a timely and inexpensive manner and following the principles of maximum 
and proactive disclosure.27 The principle of maximum disclosure establishes that all 
information held by public authorities must be subject to disclosure and that restrictions 
on access should be the exception rather than the norm. Besides, these restrictions should 
be narrowly defined, provided by law and should also comply with human rights law.28 
At the same time, according to the principle of proactive disclosure, public and relevant 
private bodies should make information of public interest available even without a 
specific request from the public.29 Similarly to freedom of expression, the right of access 
to information is not absolute as it can be subjected to restrictions. These, however, must 
follow the three-part test developed by human rights Courts regarding legitimate 
limitations to freedom of expression which will be examined in more detail in the next 
section. In addition, any exception to the right of access to information can only apply 
when there is a risk of substantial harm to the protected interest and the harm is greater 
than the public interest in accessing the information.30 
Lastly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the protection of freedom of expression is 
of paramount importance not only offline but also in the online environment. In this 
regard, various commentators and authorities in the field of freedom of expression have 
underlined how the norms regarding freedom of expression of the human rights 
conventions apply to the Internet as well.31 Similarly to freedom of expression offline, 
freedom of expression on the Internet is considered as a facilitator for the fulfilment of 
 
27 Organisation of American States, ‘Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information’ General 
Assembly Res AG/RES. 2607 (XL-O/10) (8 June 2010), [2]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), 
Principle 26 (1) (a), Principle 26 (1) (b), Principle 28, Principle 29; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), 
[19]; UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression (4 September 2013) A/68/362, [76]. 
28 Organisation of American States, ‘Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information’ (n 27), 
[2]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [168]; African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (n 27), [76]. 
29 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 29. 
30African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 33; Organisation of American States, ‘Model Inter-
American Law on Access to Public Information’ (n 27), [41]; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [19]; 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression (n 27), [75]-[76]; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 17; Internet: Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (n 16), 43. 
31 Yaman Akdeniz, Freedom of Expression on the Internet, Vienna: The Representative on Freedom of the 
Media, 2012. ISBN 978-92-9234-638-6, 50; Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet 
(n 2), [1] (a); Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 24, 29; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive 
Internet’ (n 3), [97]. 
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other human rights.32 In this regard, the ECtHR affirmed in the Times Newspapers Ltd 
(nos. 1 and 2) v. The United Kingdom case that ‘[i]n light of its accessibility and its 
capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an 
important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination 
of information generally’.33 These concepts have been echoed by the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, who affirmed that the Internet has 
democratised freedom of expression.34 By making it possible for a greater number of 
people to express their opinion, the Internet has made public debate more accessible and 
less controlled by professional journalists who used to act as gatekeepers.35 At the same 
time, however, various commentators and human rights courts have underlined how the 
Internet has the potential of amplifying the negative impact of problematic speech.36 The 
ECtHR, for example, in the case Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine 
affirmed that online content poses a greater risk to the enjoyment of human rights 
compared to that posed by the press and that this justifies a different regulation of content 
posted on the two media.37 In addition, the special characteristics of the Internet, more 
specifically its impact, accessibility, durability and asynchronicity must be taken into 
account when protecting and promoting freedom of expression online.38 
An argument that is usually discussed in relation to freedom of expression on the Internet 
is the right of access to the Internet. The Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression 
of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations 
 
32 Wolfgang Benedek and Kettemann, (n 2) 18; M Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 187; Office of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [2]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive 
Internet’ (n 3), [2], [5]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on the Right to 
Freedom of Information and Expression on the Internet in Africa’ (Banjul 2016) 
ACHPR/Res.362(LIX)2016. 
33 Times Newspapers Ltd (nos. 1 and 2) v. The United Kingdom App no 3002/03 23676/03 (ECtHR, 10 
June 2009) para 27. 
34 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [80]-[81]; The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the Continuing Trend of Internet and Social Media 
Shutdowns in Africa’ (Banjul 2019). 
35 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [81]. 
36 Akdeniz (n 31) 19; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 25. 
37 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine App no 33014/05 (ECtHR, 5 August 2011) para 
63. 
38 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine (n 37) para 63; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 
25, 27. 
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(UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights have affirmed that in order to fulfil freedom of expression 
States have an obligation to promote universal access to the Internet.39 This seems to 
suggest that access to the Internet can be considered a human right because, as stated by 
the Special Rapporteurs, due to the centrality of the Internet in everyday life, Internet 
access is fundamental to the realisation of other human rights, such as the right to 
education, assembly and free elections.40 However, there are contrasting opinions 
regarding whether access to the Internet can be considered as a human right. The 
International Group of Experts who produced the Tallinn Manual 2.0, for example, have 
argued that access to the Internet is not a human right according to customary 
international law since technology is an enabler of rights, rather than a right in and of 
itself.41 However, one point where there is consensus is the necessity for States to respect 
the guarantees contained in human rights conventions when restricting access to the 
Internet.42 In particular, as showed by the Yildirim v Turkey and the Kalda v Estonia case 
of the ECtHR, States need to respect the limits contained in article 10(2) ECHR when 
imposing restrictions on access to the Internet or specific websites.43 
After having examined the contextual framework regarding the protection of freedom of 
expression both offline and online, the next section will explore the conditions under 
which it is possible to limit the enjoyment of this right, with a special focus on the 
meaning of the expression ‘prescribed by law’. 
 
 
39 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (n 2), 6(a). See also The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the Continuing Trend of Internet and Social Media 
Shutdowns in Africa’ (n 34); Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [84]. 
40 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (n 2), 6(a); Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 
42. 
41 Schmitt (n 32) 195; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 42. 
42 Schmitt (n 32) 195; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (n 3), [86]-[90]; The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information in Africa on the Continuing Trend of Internet and Social Media 
Shutdowns in Africa’ (n 34); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Resolution on the Right 
to Freedom of Information and Expression on the Internet in Africa’ (n 32); The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Press Release by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa on the situation of freedom of expression and access to information in the 
Republic of Zimbabwe’ (Banjul 2019); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Press Release 
on the growing trend of stringent regulation of the internet in East African States’ (Banjul 2018); Council 
of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5[1] of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on Internet freedom, Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5, [2.1.6]. 
43 Yildirim v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013); Kalda v Estonia App no 17429/10 (ECtHR, 
6 June 2016); Cengiz et al. v. Turkey App no 48226/10 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1 March 2016). 
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6.3 Restrictions to freedom of expression and the meaning of ‘prescribed 
by law’ 
As mentioned in the previous section, the right to freedom of expression, both offline and 
online, is not absolute since it can be subjected to restrictions. These restrictions, however, 
need to respect specific conditions set in the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the 
ACHPR so that they can be justified according to these conventions. In particular, 
restrictions on freedom of expression must be prescribed by law, pursue one of the 
legitimate aims listed in the human rights conventions and be necessary and proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued.44 All these conditions, which are also known as legality, 
legitimacy and proportionality respectively, must be met simultaneously so that a 
restriction can be justified according to the human rights conventions and the burden of 
proof of the conformity of a restriction with the Conventions is with the State.45 Out of 
these three conditions, legality and legitimacy have a particular importance. Indeed, if, 
for example, a restriction pursues a legitimate aim but is not prescribed by law nor 
proportionate to the aim pursued, the restriction is found to be in violation of the human 
rights conventions.46  
The first condition that a restriction on freedom of expression must fulfil to be justified 
according to the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR is legality, which means 
that the restriction must be prescribed by law. The expression ‘prescribed by law’ 
indicates that the restriction must have some basis in the domestic law. 47 As to a 
 
44 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, ‘Social Media and Human Rights’ in Human Rights in a Changing Media 
Landscape, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2011. ISBN 978-92-871-7198-6, 185; Douwe Korff, 
The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital world, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2014, 10; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5[1] of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on Internet freedom, [3]; Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5[1] 
of the Committee of Ministers to member States on Internet freedom (n 42), [2.4.1]; Information Society 
Department Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law, Freedom of Expression in 2018, Council 
of Europe, 2019, 17; Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of 
Expression Online and Offline, Brussels, 2014, [20]; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 33; HRC General 
Comment No. 34 (n 2), [21]-[22]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [52], [55]; 
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica (n 2), [120]; Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law 
for the Practice of Journalism (n 2) [35];  Francisco Martorell v Chile, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series L V II.95 (3 May 1996), [55]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the 
Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [61], [68]; Kimel v. Argentina (n 16) [54]; Palamara-Iribarne v. 
Chile (n 16) [79]; Tristán Donoso vs. Panama (n 16), [110]; Ríos et al. v. Venezuela (n 2), [106]; Perozo et 
al. v. Venezuela (n 2), [117]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles 
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9. 
45 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 
9), [68]; Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 33; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [27]. 
46 Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 47. 
47 Yildirim v Turkey (n 43) para 57; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [58]. 
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definition of law, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has explained that law is ‘a 
general legal norm […] passed by democratically elected legislative bodies established 
by the Constitution, and formulated according to the procedures set forth by the 
constitutions of the States Parties’.48 Although the term law certainly includes written 
rules adopted by Parliament, restrictions to freedom of expression can also be based on 
unwritten rules, such as the common law of contempt of court, on the rules of public 
international law and on the law of parliamentary privilege.49 Conversely, restrictions 
based on administrative orders50, or traditional, religious and other similar customary law 
are not admitted within the definition of prescribed by law.51 The expression prescribed 
by law, however, does not refer only to the necessity that a law exists that foresees a given 
restriction. It also refers to specific qualities that the law must possess to be considered 
as such. In particular, the law imposing a restriction on freedom of expression must be 
sufficiently accessible to the individuals concerned, foreseeable, compatible with the rule 
of law and applied by an independent body in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory 
way.52 In order to comply with the accessibility requirement it is sufficient that the law is 
made public, which means that it is published53 or, in the case of international law, it is 
 
48  The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
6/86 Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No. 6 (9 May 1986), [38]. This definition of law 
applies specifically to article 30 of the American Convention of Human Rights. However, at [17] the Inter-
American Court clarified that ‘the criteria of Article 30 are applicable to all those situations where the word 
"laws" or comparable expressions are used in the Convention in referring to the restrictions that the 
Convention itself authorizes with respect to each of the protected rights’.  
49 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 39; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) App no 6538/74 
(ECtHR, 26 April 1979) paras 46-53 where the ECtHR found that the law of contempt of court can be 
considered as law within the meaning of article 10(2) of the ECHR; Groppera Radio Ag and Others v. 
Switzerland App no 10890/84 (ECtHR, 28 March 1990) para 68 in regard to the compliance of international 
telecommunications law with the requirement of prescribed by law of article 10(2) of the ECHR; HRC 
General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [24]; Robert W. Gauthier v. Canada (1999) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (1999), [13.5] regarding the compliance of the law of parliamentary privilege with 
the prescribed by law requirement of article 19(3). 
50 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [58]. 
51 HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [24]. 
52 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 39-43; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [25]; Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of 
Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [58]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right 
to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [69]; Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 45; Office of the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression 
and the Internet’ (n 2), [56]; Yildirim v Turkey (n 43) para 57. 
53 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) ( n 49) para 49; Kokkinakis v. Greece App no 14307/88 
(ECtHR, 25 May 1993) para 40; G. V. France App no 15312/89 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995) para 25; 
Müller and Others v. Switzerland App no 10737/84 (ECtHR, 24 May 1988) para 29; Custers, Deveaux and 
Turk v. Denmark App no 11843/03, 11847/03 and 11849/03 (ECtHR, 3 August 2008) paras 82-83; 
Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2020, 
[26]. Although this guide examines inter alia the meaning of prescribed by law according to article 7 of the 
ECHR, the Guide states at [8] that ‘[t]he concept of “law” […] as used in Article 7 corresponds to that set 
out in other Convention articles, covering both domestic legislation and case-law, and comprises qualitative 
requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability’. Therefore, the analysis conducted in the 
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incorporated into domestic law and therefore appears in an official publication.54 In 
contrast, unpublished norms cannot not be considered accessible because the person 
concerned cannot not be aware of their existence.55 As to the foreseeability requirement, 
this indicates that the law must be clear and predictable, sufficiently unambiguous, 
transparent and precise so as to allow the individuals concerned to regulate their conduct 
and foresee the consequences of the law.56 In other words, the individual concerned must 
be able to understand from the wording of the law, if necessary resorting to legal advice 
or aided by the courts’ interpretation of the law, which actions will give rise to liability 
and what the related penalty is.57 However, due to the necessity to avoid excessive rigidity 
and to cover the ever evolving nature of human affairs, the wording of the law does not 
need to be absolutely precise for the law to respect the requirement of foreseeability.58 
Therefore, laws that are to a certain extent vague and whose interpretation and application 
depend on practice will still likely be considered as foreseeable, provided that they are 
found to be sufficiently clear in the majority of cases.59 It follows that if a person needs 
to resort to legal advice for the interpretation of a norm, that norm will still be considered 
foreseeable, especially if that person is carrying out a professional activity, as in that case 
they are expected to proceed more cautiously than normal and take special care in 
assessing the risks of carrying out their profession.60 As explained by the ECtHR, there 
 
guide regarding the accessibility and foreseeability requirements of article 7 can be extended to those of 
article 10 of the ECHR. 
54 Korbely v. Hungary App no 9174/02 (ECtHR, 19 September 2008) paras 74-75; Directorate of the 
Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 53), [26].  
55 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 42. 
56 Gaweda v Poland App no 26229/95 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002) para [40]; Yildirim v Turkey (n 43) para 
57; RTBF v. Belgium App no 50084/06 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) para 103; Altuğ Taner Akçam v 
Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR 25 January 2012) para 87; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [25]; 
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [58]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom 
of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal 
Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [69]. 
57 Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, (n 53), 
[27]. 
58 ibid [29]. 
59 ‘When the legislative technique of categorisation is used, there will often be grey areas at the fringes of 
the definition. This penumbra of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not in itself make a provision 
incompatible with Article 7 (art. 7), provided that it proves to be sufficiently clear in the large majority of 
cases. The role of adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as 
remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice’ Cantoni v. France App no 17862/91 (ECtHR, 
11 November 1996) para 32. The Cantoni v France case is related to article 7 of the ECHR rather than 
article 10. See above note 53 on the fact that the meaning of law contained in article 7 corresponds to that 
of other Convention articles; RTBF v. Belgium (n 56) para 104; Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey (n 56) para 
87; Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 
53) [29]. 
60 Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 53), 
[30]; Kononov v. Latvia App no 36376/04 (ECtHR, 17 May 2010) para 235; Cantoni v. France (n 59) para 
35. 
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are some factors that the Court takes into account to establish foreseeability. These are 
the content of the law, the field that that law covers and the number and status of those to 
whom the law applies.61 In this regard, examples of restrictions that have been found to 
be in violation of the foreseeability requirement are inter alia those at the centre of the 
Rotaru v. Romania,  Petra v. Romania, Gawęda v. Poland and Yildirim v Turkey cases of 
the ECtHR and the Usón Ramirez v Venezuela case of the IACtHR.62 In these cases, the 
Courts have clarified that any law containing a restriction of a Convention right must also 
contain some guarantees against the arbitrary interference of the authorities to be 
considered foreseeable. This means that the law must indicate clearly the scope of any 
discretionary power left to the authorities, and how this discretion will be exercised.63 In 
the Usón Ramirez v Venezuela case, for example, the Inter-American Court  of Human 
Rights found that the terms in which the domestic law defined the crime of slander against 
the armed forces could not be considered compliant with the legality requirement because 
they failed to define accurately the key elements of the crime, thus leaving an unfettered 
margin of discretion to the authorities.64 Similarly, in Rotaru v. Romania case the ECtHR 
stated that secret surveillance laws must illustrate with sufficient precision the 
circumstances under which the State can store and make use of personal information.65 
Therefore, surveillance laws that contain no indication as to the limits of the exercise of 
power by the authorities, no definition of the information that can be recorded and of the 
category of people that can be subjected to surveillance, no indications regarding when 
surveillance can be applied and which procedure will be followed and that contain no 
supervisory mechanisms regarding how surveillance will be conducted cannot be 
considered as foreseeable.66 The same applies to the law regarding the monitoring of 
prisoners’ correspondence at the centre of the Petra v. Romania case. In this case, the 
domestic law was found to be in violation of the foreseeability requirement because it 
was formulated in such vague terms that it rendered the monitoring process ‘automatic, 
 
61 Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 53), 
[30]; Kononov v. Latvia (n 60) para 235; Cantoni v. France (n 59) para 35. 
62 The Rotaru v Romania App no 28341/95 (ECtHR, 4 May 2000) case and Petra v Romania App no 
27273/95 (ECtHR, 23 September 1998) case are related to the meaning of prescribed by law of article 8 of 
the ECHR, rather than article 10. However, the Court’s observations can be extended to article 10 as well. 
63 On the necessity not to grant unlimited discretionary power to the authorities, see also HRC General 
Comment No. 34 (n 2), [25]. 
64 Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela (n 16), [56]. ‘Article 505 of the Organic Code of Military Justice whereby 
“whoever slanders, offends, or disparages the National Armed Forces or any of its units shall be subject to 
three to eight years in prison”’ Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela (n 16), [38]. See also Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-
American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [73]. 
65 Rotaru v Romania (n 62) para 56. See also Bychawska-Siniarska, (n 2) 40. 
66 Rotaru v Romania (n 62) paras 57-59. 
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independent of any decision by a judicial authority and unappealable’.67 Similarly, in the 
Yildirim v Turkey case, the ECtHR found that the domestic law regulating Internet 
publications could not be considered foreseeable since it granted extensive powers to the 
domestic administrative body in the implementation of a blocking order issued in relation 
to a website.68 In addition, the law did not impose any obligation for the domestic courts 
to examine whether it was necessary under article 10 of the ECHR to block all Google 
Sites, nor did it provide any safeguards to avoid that a blocking order directed against a 
particular website being used as a way of blocking access in general.69 In contrast, the 
reason why the ECtHR found that Poland had violated the foreseeability requirement 
under article 10 of the ECHR in the Gawęda v. Poland case had to do not with the 
domestic law in itself, but rather with the domestic court’s interpretation of the law. 
Indeed, although the ECtHR found that the domestic law regulating the registration of 
newspapers was to a certain extent vague as it stated that a request for registration could 
be refused if ‘“inconsistent with the real state of affairs”’, the real problem was 
represented by the way in which the domestic court interpreted this last requirement.70 In 
particular, the domestic court found that registration could be refused if the title of the 
newspaper ‘conveyed an essentially false picture’.71 However, the ECtHR stated that the 
expression ‘inconsistent with the real state of affairs’ meant that registration could be 
refused if the request for registration did not respect the technical requirements indicated 
in the domestic law, rather than imposing an additional requirement, that according to 
which the title had to correspond to truthful information.72 The ECtHR therefore 
concluded that ‘the interpretation given by the courts introduced new criteria, which could 
not be foreseen on the basis of the text specifying situations in which the registration of a 
title could be refused’.73  
 
67 Petra v Romania (n 62) para 37. See also Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 40. 
68 Yildirim v Turkey (n 43) para 63. 
69 ibid paras 66, 68. 
70 Gaweda v Poland (n 56) paras 42-43. The expression ‘“inconsistent with the real state of affairs’” was 
contained in Section 5 of the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice on the registration of periodicals. See 
also Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 40. 
71 Gaweda v Poland (n 56) para 43. The title of the applicant newspaper was The Social and Political 
Monthly – A European Moral Tribunal. The Bielsko-Biała Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request 
for registration because ‘[t]he court considered that in accordance with the Press Act and the Ordinance of 
the Minister of Justice on the registration of periodicals, the name of a periodical should be relevant to its 
contents. The name as proposed by the applicant would suggest that a European institution had been 
established in Kęty, which was untrue and would be misleading to prospective buyers. Moreover, the 
proposed title would be disproportionate to the periodical's actual importance and readership as it was 
hardly conceivable that a periodical of a European dimension could be published in Kęty’, Gaweda v 
Poland (n 56) para 6. 
72 Gaweda v Poland (n 56) para 43. 
73 ibid. 
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The second condition with which a restriction on freedom of expression must comply to 
be justified according to the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR is legitimacy. 
A restriction is legitimate if it pursues one of the legitimate aims listed in these human 
rights conventions.74 In regard to the legitimate aims, there is a difference between the 
ECHR and the other three Conventions as the list of legitimate aims contained in the 
ECHR is longer and more detailed than those of the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR.75 
Indeed, while the last three Conventions admit mainly two categories of legitimate aims, 
namely the protection of the rights and reputations of others and the protection of national 
security, public order, public health and morals, the ECHR also admits restrictions that 
pursue territorial integrity, the prevention of disorder or crime, the prevention of 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or restrictions that protect the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary.76 In any case, according to all four Conventions the list 
of the legitimate aims is exhaustive and no new aims can be added by the States. States 
are not free to interpret the legitimate aims in any way that they might see fit, since there 
are specific criteria that they must respect when interpreting these aims. For example, the 
legitimate aims must always be interpreted in light of the principles of a democratic 
society.77 Therefore, as explained by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, restrictions on freedom of 
expression in the name of national security cannot consist of intercepting or using private 
communications of dissidents.78 However, in assessing the existence of a pressing social 
 
74 ICCPR (n 1) art 19(3); American Convention on Human Rights (n 1) art 13(2); African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9(3); European Convention on Human Rights (n 1) article 10(2). 
75 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not list the aims that a restriction on freedom 
of expression must pursue to be justified. However, this list is contained in Principle 9(3) of the Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa issued by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (n 2). 
76 ICCPR (n 1) art 19(3); American Convention on Human Rights (n 1) art 13(2); African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9(3); European Convention on Human Rights (n 1) article 10(2); 
Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 46; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [28]-[32]; Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of 
Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [59]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right 
to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [74]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9(3); 
O’Flaherty (n 4) 640-641. 
77 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 43; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [59]-[60]; Office 
of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [66]; 
O’Flaherty (n 4) 640-641; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles 
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9(1). 
78 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [59]-[60]. 
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need, some human rights Courts grant the States a margin of appreciation. More 
specifically, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is applied by the ECtHR and it 
consists of leaving Member States of the ECHR a margin of discretion in assessing the 
existence of a pressing social need that justifies the restriction.79 Nevertheless, the ECtHR 
does retain a supervisory role in the application of the margin of appreciation by the 
States. Indeed, as explained by the Court in the Ovchinnikov case 
 
‘[t]he Court's task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the 
national authorities, but rather to review under Article 10, in the light of the case as a 
whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to their margin of appreciation. In so doing, 
the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in 
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based 
their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts’.80 
 
The margin of appreciation, which has occasionally been applied also by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights81, however, has been openly rejected by the HRC 
which in General Comment No 34 stated that the scope of freedom of expression is not 
to be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation and that it will be for the 
Committee itself to determine whether there might have been circumstances which made 
the restriction of freedom of expression necessary.82  
Finally, so that a restriction can be justified according to the human rights Conventions 
mentioned above, it must be proportional and necessary in a democratic society to achieve 
the legitimate aim pursued.83 This criterion, also known as proportionality or necessity, 
 
79 Benedek and Kettemann (n 2), 48. 
80 Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia App no 24061/04 (ECtHR, 16 March 2011) para 46. 
81 Marie Ghantous ‘Freedom of Expression and the "Margin of Appreciation" or "Margin of Discretion" 
Doctrine’ (2018) 31 RQDI 221, 228-229. For a discussion on the application of the margin of appreciation 
by the Inter-American Court see also Andreas Follesdal ‘Exporting the Margin of Appreciation: Lessons 
for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 15 ICON 359. 
82 HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [36]; see also Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Findland (1992) UN Doc. 
CCPR / C / 52D / 511 / 1992, [9.4] in regard to the scope of the margin of appreciation with reference to 
article 27 of the ICCPR. However, O’Flaherty (n 4) observes at p. 650 that when the HRC in the General 
Comment No 34 stated that the scope of the right to freedom of expression is not to be assessed by reference 
to a margin of appreciation, the Committee officially departed from its previous case-law. Indeed, in 
Hertzberg v Finland (1985) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, which is the only case where the HRC openly 
invoked the margin of appreciation, the Committee found at [10.3] that since public morals differ widely 
as there is no common understanding of morals, a certain margin of appreciation must be left to the State 
in this regard. This doctrine was, however, subsequently reversed by the HRC in Kyu Sohn v Republic of 
Korea (1995) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/518/1992 at [10.4] when it stated that it will be the Committee itself 
to evaluate whether the restriction was necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose invoked by the State. 
83 European Convention on Human Rights (n 1) article 10(2); Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 44; Benedek and 
Kettemann (n 2) 45; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [33]-[34]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and 
the Internet’ (n 2), [61]-[64]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to 
Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [83]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9 (1) (c). In 
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means that States imposing restrictions to freedom of expression must show that there is 
a pressing social need that requires for that specific restriction to be introduced.84 In other 
words, States must show that there is a verifiable, sure and credible threat to the basic 
conditions for the operation of democratic institutions and that the imposed restriction on 
freedom of expression is the least restrictive means to achieve the legitimate aim 
pursued.85 In this regard, the HRC has clarified that the State Parties must ‘demonstrate 
in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity 
and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and 
immediate connection between the expression and the threat’.86 This requirement sets a 
high threshold for restrictions thus furthering the protection of freedom of expression.87 
In order to assess proportionality, the Courts will take into account a series of factors, 
such as the circumstances of the publication, their content and context, the existence of 
public interest, and the severity of the sanction.88 For example, in case of restrictions on 
freedom of expression that are necessary to protect the rights and reputations of others, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has explained that the factors that it considers 
to establish proportionality are: the severity of the violation of the competing right, the 
importance of fulfilling this right, and whether fulfilling this right justifies the restriction 
on freedom of expression.89 Besides, in cases of restrictions on the operation of websites, 
various human rights Courts and bodies have underlined how restrictions should be 
content specific and limited only to content that is illegal according to international law. 
Therefore, generic bans on websites are generally not in line with the freedom of 
 
relation to the American Convention of Human Rights, Article 13(3) states that restrictions to freedom of 
expression must not be introduced by indirect means, such as the abuse of government controls over media. 
In addition, Article 13(4) specifies that restrictions on freedom of expression in regard to public 
entertainment must not amount to prior censorship, unless this is necessary for the moral protection of 
childhood and adolescence. 
84 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 44; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 
26 November 1991) para 59(c); Başkaya And Okçuoglu v. Turkey App no 23536/94 and 24408/94 (ECtHR, 
8 July 1999) para 61; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 9 (4) (a). 
85 Benedek and Kettemann (n 2) 45; HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [34]; Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-
American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [83]-[86]; Office of the 
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‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [61]-[62]; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (n 2), 
Principle 9 (4). 
86 HRC General Comment No. 34 (n 2), [35]; see also Shin v. Republic of Korea (2004) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, [7.3]. 
87 O’Flaherty (n 4) 649-650. 
88 Bychawska-Siniarska (n 2) 45; Başkaya And Okçuoglu v. Turkey (n 84) para 61(iii). 
89 Kimel v. Argentina (n 16), [84]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to 
Freedom of Expression’ (n 9), [88]-[89]. 
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expression provisions of the human rights Conventions.90 In particular, as observed by 
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, when evaluating the proportionality of a freedom of expression restriction 
on the Internet, it is important to take into account not only the impact that that restriction 
could have on the private parties affected by it, but also the repercussions of that 
restriction on the functioning of the Internet and the freedom of expression of all users.91 
 
6.4 Compliance of the extraterritorial application of domestic laws with 
the freedom of expression provisions of the human rights Conventions  
Chapters 2 and 3 have explored two particular ways in which States have exercised 
jurisdiction in Internet-related cases. These are the access-based jurisdictional approach 
and the extraterritorial application of domestic laws to regulate content published online. 
The access-based jurisdictional approach is characterised by the exercise of jurisdiction 
over content published online but uploaded and hosted in foreign countries by foreign 
parties based on the fact that that content can be accessed on the territory of the State 
exercising jurisdiction. As to the cases illustrating the extraterritorial application of 
domestic laws such as those discussed in Chapter 3, these cases are characterised by the 
imposition by domestic courts of measures that have extraterritorial reach, such as global 
de-listing rather than de-listing applied only to the local domain names of a search engine.  
Both these approaches have been criticised because they impact negatively on the 
freedom of expression of Internet users located in foreign States and subjected to foreign 
jurisdictions.92 The key objection that can be moved to both approaches is that they extend 
the application of domestic laws beyond the national borders to regulate online content 
that is linked to foreign jurisdictions and that is not illegal according to international law. 
In regard to the access-based jurisdictional approach, all this also happens in the absence 
of a clear nexus linking the acts over which jurisdiction is exercised to the country 
exercising jurisdiction.  
 
90 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (n 2), [3]; HRC General Comment No. 34 
(n 2), [43]; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [84]-[85]; African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa’ (n 2), Principle 38 [1]. 
91 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (n 2), [53]. 
92 For an in-depth analysis of these two approaches and the critiques that have been moved to them see 
Chapter 2 on the access-based jurisdictional approach and Chapter 3 on the extraterritorial application of 
domestic laws in Internet-related cases. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Special Representatives on Freedom of Expression of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), 
the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) stated in the 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
that in order to protect freedom of expression online, ‘[j]urisdiction in legal cases relating 
to Internet content should be restricted to States to which those cases have a real and 
substantial connection, normally because the author is established there, the content is 
uploaded there and/or the content is specifically directed at that State’.93 Therefore, 
according to the Special Representatives on Freedom of Expression, so that an exercise 
of jurisdiction over online content is compliant with freedom of expression it must be 
justified by clear links between the content and the State exercising jurisdiction. These 
clear links, however, are absent in the access-based jurisdictional approach while, 
although they might be present in the case of global de-listing94, they cannot justify the 
global reach of domestic laws.95 
A question that is worth considering is whether these exercises of jurisdiction could be 
considered illegal according to the freedom of expression provisions of the human rights 
Conventions. In particular, this analysis aims to understand whether the extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws examined in Chapters 2 and 3 can be considered as 
prescribed by law according to the human rights conventions, and therefore compliant 
with the accessibility and foreseeability requirements that restrictions to freedom of 
expression should respect. In other words, the research hypothesis that needs to be 
verified is whether the foreign parties who are at the receiving end of these exercises of 
jurisdiction can reasonably be expected to have accessed or even predicted such an 
application of domestic laws. For example, following the Perrin case and the finding that 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959 applies both when material is uploaded in the UK but 
also when it is downloaded there, how foreseeable is it for a foreign party operating in a 
foreign jurisdiction to predict that the UK domestic law applies to them because the 
content that they published online is accessible worldwide and therefore in the UK as 
well? The same question can be extended to the Yahoo! Auction case as well as all the 
defamation cases96 discussed in Chapter 2: is expecting that foreign publishers comply 
 
93 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (n 2), [4] (a). 
94 As stated in Chapter 3 section 3.3, in the CNIL and Equustek cases the exercise of State jurisdiction over 
the foreign defendants was justified by the fact that the foreign defendants were operating in the States 
exercising jurisdiction or targeted an audience located there. 
95 See Chapter 3 section 3.3 for an analysis of this point. 
96 As to the defamation cases discussed in Chapter 2, a limit to the exercise of jurisdiction in these cases is 
the requirement that the victim of defamation has a reputation in the forum State. For an analysis of this 
point, see Chapter 2 Section 2.4. 
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with the laws of all the countries where the online content can be accessed a predictable 
restriction to their freedom of expression? As to the de-listing cases, is the fact that 
Google is expected to carry out delisting globally based on the application of a domestic 
law compliant with the requirement that freedom of expression restrictions are predictable 
and accessible?97  
So far, Perrin v the United Kingdom is the only case presented before a human rights 
court expressly dealing with the question of whether the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
Member State over content published online from abroad, based on the accessibility of 
that content within the Member State, could be considered as ‘prescribed by law’ 
according to the freedom of expression provision of the Convention. In that case, the 
ECtHR found that the Obscene Publications Act 1959 under which Mr Perrin was 
convicted was sufficiently clear to satisfy the prescribed by law requirement of article 
10(2) of the ECHR because it did make it clear that its provisions covered electronic as 
well as more traditional publications.98 The Obscene Publications Act 1959 was also 
considered sufficiently accessible to Mr Perrin since he was a UK resident. Indeed, in this 
regard the ECtHR concluded that since Mr Perrin was carrying out a professional activity 
in the UK, as he was the owner of the company responsible for uploading the pictures, he 
should have sought legal advice to clarify the local norms regulating his activity.99 A 
point that the ECtHR failed to appropriately take into account, however, is the unique and 
ubiquitous nature of online content which is instantly available worldwide. Surely, Mr 
Perrin lived in the UK and therefore could have expected that UK laws were applicable 
to him. However, due to the uncertainties surrounding the exercise of State jurisdiction 
online and the immediate global accessibility of online content, it is certainly more 
difficult for the owner of a company established abroad and which uploaded content 
online that was legal in the country of upload, to anticipate that that content was going to 
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the UK. This complexity was completely glossed over 
by the Court, which relied on its classic interpretation of accessibility and foreseeability 
of the law as if Internet content could be assimilated to printed content. In fact, as 
observed by Korff, the Court referred to the case Chauvy and Others v France to 
underline the point that as Mr Perrin was carrying out a professional activity in the UK 
as the owner of a company, he should have sought legal advice to clarify which laws were 
 
97 These questions assume that the human rights conventions are applicable to the online acts attributed to 
the foreign parties responsible for the acts. However, see Chapter 5 for a discussion of this point and of the 
application of the personal, spatial and extraterritorial effects models of jurisdiction to online acts. 
98 Perrin v the United Kingdom App no 5446/03 (ECtHR, 18 October 2005) 6. 
99 ibid. 
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applicable to him.100 The Chauvy and Others v France case, however, is related to 
defamation proceedings brought against French citizens who authored and published a 
printed book in France.101 In other words, there was no transnational, cross-border 
element in the case referred to by the Court to justify the point made in Perrin.102  
Ultimately, the analysis regarding the meaning of prescribed by law according to the 
ECHR, the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR conducted in section 6.3 shows that the 
accessibility requirement is satisfied if the law introducing the restriction is published, 
whereas the foreseeability requirement is satisfied if the law is sufficiently clear so as to 
allow the individuals affected to regulate their conduct, if necessary resorting to legal 
advice or courts’ interpretation. However, the problem of laws that regulate content 
published online by foreign parties and linked to foreign jurisdictions is that, although 
domestic laws might technically be found to be compliant with the prescribed by law 
requirements of the human rights Conventions, often these requirements do not take into 
account the special difficulties associated with content that is accessible globally, as the 
Perrin v the UK case shows. In particular, as observed by Khol, there are some extra-
legal factors that influence the accessibility of the law that cannot be as easily applied in 
the global context. These are: common knowledge and intermediaries.103 Indeed, in a 
given country, common knowledge is more likely to alert individuals of the presence of 
a law regulating a certain conduct rather than the official publication of the norm, even 
though common knowledge does not necessarily provide people with the details of the 
regulation.104 At the same time, similarly to common knowledge, intermediaries facilitate 
the compliance of people’s behaviour with the law because often intermediaries are the 
direct subject of the law and therefore if they comply with it the general public will as 
well.105 An example provided by Khol in this regard is that of the laws that regulate the 
sale of firearms. These laws are primarily directed at shops that sell firearms, therefore 
people who want to buy firearms do not need to know the details of the law regulating 
the purchase so that they can complete it. Indeed, it will be the shops selling the firearms 
that will likely be required by law to inform those who buy them of their rights and duties 
ultimately facilitating people’s compliance with the law.106 However, as mentioned 
above, common knowledge and intermediaries do not work well when applied to the 
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global context. This is because global common knowledge does not go further than a 
generic assumption that certain acts, such as theft for example, are likely to be prohibited 
abroad as well.107 However, different States have different standards, and therefore 
common knowledge might not be particularly helpful in this regard. Besides, even 
admitting that online publishers knew through some form of global common knowledge 
that different countries have different rules, they might interpret the law of a foreign 
country in a way that is similar to the law that applies in their country, and this might 
prevent them from realising that in certain respects the foreign law might be different.108 
In addition, especially individual or small publishers that do not have access to special 
legal counsel might not even be aware that there is a foreign law that is applicable to 
them.109 In other words, as Khol observes ‘the global village lacks key notice 
mechanisms, such as the common knowledge and knowledge hotspots, which in the 
domestic context play a critical role either in bringing rules to the attention of their 
subjects or in relieving them of knowing them’.110 These considerations which impact on 
the accessibility and foreseeability of foreign laws should be taken into account together 
with the complexities of the online environment by human rights Courts when assessing 
the exercise of jurisdiction by a Member State over online content published by foreign 
parties. However, as Kohl concludes ‘[w]hether […] it can really be expected of a judge 
to take these concerns into account […] is doubtful. It would seem that, in the name of 
certainty, the judiciary is likely to view accessibility as requiring no more than the formal 
publication of the law.’111 
 
6.5 Conclusions  
The analysis conducted in this chapter has illustrated the framework for the protection of 
the right to freedom of expression online and offline together with the conditions under 
which freedom of expression can be restricted according to the ECHR, the ICCPR, the 
ACHR and the ACHPR. In particular, it has shown that the human rights Courts have 
recognised the dual nature of the Internet as a catalyst for the fulfilment of human rights 
online but also as a multiplier of the negative impact caused by the publication of harmful 
content in the cyberspace. In addition, the study of the permissible restrictions to freedom 
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of expression according to article 13 of the ACHR, article 19 of the ICCPR, article 9 of 
the ACHPR and article 10 of the ECHR has clarified the conditions under which Member 
States can restrict freedom of expression in a way that is justified under the Conventions. 
More specifically, the analysis of the meaning of ‘prescribed by law’ has shown that the 
accessibility requirement is satisfied if the law restricting freedom of expression is 
published, whereas the predictability requirement is satisfied if the law allows those who 
are affected by it to regulate their conduct with sufficient clarity, if necessary resorting to 
legal advice. However, the research into whether the extraterritorial exercises of 
jurisdiction such as those illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3 are compliant with the prescribed 
by law requirements of the human rights Conventions has shown that although domestic 
laws might technically be found to be compliant with the accessibility and foreseeability 
requirements, often these requirements do not take into account the special difficulties 
associated with content that is accessible globally. Indeed, as shown by the Perrin case, 
the ECtHR judges approached the case by interpreting the accessibility and foreseeability 
requirements as if the publication at the centre of the case were a printed publication 
rather than an online one assimilating it to a case where no transnational cross-border 
elements were present. In addition, the research has shown that there are some extra-legal 
factors, namely common knowledge and intermediaries, that influence the accessibility 
of the law in the domestic context. These factors do not work well when translated into 
the global context, which makes it even more difficult for foreign parties to access 




This thesis focussed on the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction online 
according to human rights law. In particular, it aimed at answering two main research 
questions: what does online State jurisdiction mean in human rights law and are specific 
instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction by States over content published online compliant 
with the freedom of expression provisions of the human rights Conventions? 
In order to answer these two research questions, Chapters 2 and 3 have identified specific 
instances of extraterritorial exercise of State jurisdiction over online content through the 
analysis of some key Internet-related domestic cases. The analysis of the access-based 
jurisdictional approach conducted in Chapter 2 has allowed to highlight the distinctive 
characteristics of this approach, i.e. the fact that the domestic courts in the cases analysed 
have exercised jurisdiction over content published online but uploaded and hosted in 
foreign States based on the fact that, having been published online, the content was 
accessible from within the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction. This analysis has 
allowed to highlight two main points. The first is related to application of the objective 
territorial principle and the effects doctrine to content published online. In particular, the 
cases analysed have shown that, when applied to online content, the objective territorial 
principle and the effects doctrine tend to conflate into each other. This is because it is not 
always possible to distinguish whether domestic courts establishing jurisdiction over 
online acts have done so based on the fact that some components of those acts physically 
happened within the domestic territory or whether the exercise of jurisdiction was 
justified by the fact that, although the online acts happened abroad, they produced 
negative effects within the domestic territory. In other words, due to the global, non-
physical and worldwide accessible nature of online content, it is difficult to distinguish 
which country is physically affected by that content and which is affected only by its 
negative effects. The result is that the application of the objective territorial principle to 
online acts leads to exercises of jurisdiction that are as limitless as those associated with 
the effects doctrine. The second point that has emerged from the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 2 is related to the negative consequences of the application of the access-based 
jurisdictional approach. In particular, the analysis has highlighted that if all the countries 
claimed that the application of their national laws extended globally based on the fact that 
online content is accessible worldwide, the principle of freedom of expression and the 
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right to access information, as well as the principle of certain and predictable laws could 
be compromised. Overall, the main critique that can be moved to establishing jurisdiction 
based on access to online content is the absence of any analysis on whether factors other 
than the accessibility of the content within the domestic territory existed linking the 
country exercising jurisdiction to the online content. That analysis could have helped the 
domestic Courts to limit the exercise of jurisdiction only to those online cases that 
presented a clear and close nexus with the country exercising jurisdiction, as indicated by 
the Special Representatives on Freedom of Expression of the United Nations (UN), the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the American Commission 
on Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.1 
The objective territorial principle has also been at the heart of the domestic cases analysed 
in Chapter 3. These cases provide an outline of other instances of the extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws to regulate content published online, in particular in the field 
of data protection and access to data. In the cases analysed in this chapter, there was no 
doubt that the domestic courts had jurisdiction over the defendants, many of whom were 
established abroad, based on the objective territorial principle as those defendants were 
conducting business within those States. However, the controversial element of the 
exercises of jurisdiction examined in this chapter is represented by the global nature of 
the measures imposed by the domestic courts. In particular, ordering global delisting 
based on the application of the domestic law on data protection and copyright, as 
happened in the CNIL and Equustek cases respectively, is problematic because it violates 
the principle of comity between States and the freedom of expression of foreign Internet 
users. Indeed, the disagreement between the Canadian and the American Courts in the 
Equustek case is a direct proof that foreign States’ interests are affected by a measure with 
global jurisdictional reach. Ordering a measure with worldwide effect based on domestic 
rather than international law and in the absence of specific connecting factors linking the 
content over which jurisdiction is exercised to the country exercising jurisdiction equates 
to imposing the laws of one country to other States and has the effect of preventing 
Internet users located in those States from accessing content that might be perfectly legal 
there. Different countries have different laws and each country conducts a balance 
 
1 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of 
American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, ‘Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (1 June 2011), 4(a); Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of 
Expression and the Internet’ (31 December 2013), [66]. 
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between competing rights that is tailored to the values and legal system of that country. 
Therefore, ordering global delisting equates to imposing a very specific balance between 
the right to privacy and freedom of expression which might be right for the country that 
ordered the global measure, but that does not necessarily reflect the values of other 
countries. As outlined by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in regard to 
the so-called right to be forgotten, for example, in the Americas 
 
‘[p]eople want to remember and not to forget. In this sense, it is important to 
recognize the particular context of the region and how a legal mechanism such as the 
so-called “right to be forgotten” and its incentive for de-indexation might impact the 
right to truth and memory’.2  
  
Ultimately, exercising jurisdiction through the imposition of measures with a global effect 
and without a close connection between the online act and the country exercising 
jurisdiction equates to exercising universal jurisdiction over acts that are not international 
crimes. 
Having examined the main pitfalls of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over online 
content, Chapter 4 analysed the rules regulating the exercise of State jurisdiction 
according to both international law and human rights law. This analysis set the ground 
for answering the research questions at the centre of this research as it clarified the 
jurisdictional rules applicable in these two fields. It also highlighted the uncertainties 
surrounding the exercise of State jurisdiction according to both these regimes. The effects 
doctrine and the protective principle represent some of the most uncertain subjects as far 
as the international law jurisdictional rules are concerned. The main criticalities 
associated to these two jurisdictional principles are that the definition of what constitutes 
an adverse effect or an act against the sovereignty of a State is left to each State that 
claims jurisdiction. This leads to States potentially abusing these principles and 
establishing jurisdiction over acts that are not closely related to them. The uncertainties 
surrounding the use of these principles have led to disagreements between States, 
especially due to an unqualified use of the effects doctrine in association to online acts. 
As to the jurisdictional rules governing the exercise of State jurisdiction according to 
human rights law, the analysis has highlighted the problems associated with the spatial 
and the personal model of jurisdiction, which have been criticised due to the difficulty of 
limiting their application and the consequently arbitrary way in which Courts apply them, 
 
2 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, ‘Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet’ (15 March 2017), [134]. 
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with particular reference to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Overall, 
Chapter 4 has allowed to highlight the differences between the international law and the 
human rights law jurisdictional rules, underlining the fundamentally different meaning of 
State jurisdiction according to these two regimes. Indeed, while in international law State 
jurisdiction is related to the legality of the use of power by States, in human rights law 
this term indicates a factual exercise of power by States, regardless of whether that 
exercise of power is legal according to international law.  
The association of State jurisdiction with the exercise of a factual power that is central in 
human rights law influences the meaning of online State jurisdiction according to this 
regime. This theme was explored in Chapter 5, whose primary aim was indeed to answer 
the first research question by clarifying the rules regulating the exercise of State 
jurisdiction online according to regional and international human rights conventions. 
Chapter 5 answered this question by first highlighting some of the main difficulties 
associated with exercising jurisdiction online according to international law. In particular, 
this analysis confirmed that, although international law allows for multiple exercises of 
State jurisdiction, it also requires States to refrain from the unqualified application of the 
effects doctrine to online acts and to limit the exercise of State jurisdiction only to those 
acts whose adverse effects on the State are direct, intended, foreseeable and substantial.3 
The analysis also highlighted the difficulties related to the application of the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction online and evidenced the need to move away from territoriality 
as the main jurisdictional principle applicable to online acts. At the same time, however, 
Chapter 5 also explored the problems associated with establishing jurisdiction online 
based on alternative criteria such as the targeting test, whose parameters regulating its 
functioning are still left to each domestic Court to set. As to the meaning of State 
jurisdiction online in human rights law, the analysis of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the African 
Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Inter-American Court and 
Commission on Human Rights revealed that there are very few Internet-related cases 
presented before the Courts where these were asked to clarify the meaning of online State 
jurisdiction according to the related Conventions. The ECtHR and the HRC, however, 
have had more opportunities to examine Internet-related cases compared to the Courts of 
the Inter-American and African system. More specifically, the analysis of the Internet-
related jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HCR allowed to highlight an important point. 
 
3 M Schmitt (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2017) 58, [13]. 
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There is a tendency on the ECtHR’s part, also confirmed in the some opinions issued by 
the HCR, to find that the ECHR applies to individuals located abroad whose rights have 
been violated due to an act committed online if that act is found to have happened on the 
territory of a Contracting State. This fact highlights that online acts such as the publication 
of comments on websites managed by foreign companies or surveillance of Internet 
communications of foreign citizens are found to have happened within the territory of the 
Member State exercising jurisdiction regardless of their transborder and non-physical 
nature. This indicates that, just like domestic courts, human rights courts tend to interpret 
online acts mainly as territorial acts. However, the tendency of the ECtHR to establish 
that Member States have jurisdiction over foreign people based on the location of the 
online act represents a departure from both the personal and spatial models of jurisdiction 
of the human rights conventions. This is because both models apply to individuals who 
are either in a territory controlled by a State Party to the human rights conventions or are 
subjected to the power or authority of that State. Notwithstanding this apparent departure 
from the application of the spatial and personal model of jurisdiction, establishing 
jurisdiction based on the location of the violation is supported by the case-law of both the 
HCR and ECtHR. What is, however, unclear is which jurisdictional model justifies the 
application of the human rights Conventions in this case. This point is directly linked to 
the application of the spatial and personal models of jurisdiction to Internet-related cases. 
Both models present more than one problem when applied to online acts. The main 
difficulty that arises in both cases is related to how to establish when a State is exercising 
power or control over a territory or a person in the absence of physical power. The 
analysis conducted in Chapter 5 therefore focussed on an alternative jurisdictional model, 
that of the extraterritorial effects, according to which an online act that is considered to 
have happened on the territory of a Member State could be interpreted as a domestic act 
with negative extraterritorial effects on people located abroad. The extraterritorial effects 
model of jurisdiction could be particularly useful to deal with online acts as it could be 
used to reinterpret the personal model of jurisdiction as involving an exercise of power 
over individuals located abroad through the commission of online acts that, although 
happened within the domestic territory, have extraterritorial effects and thus violate the 
rights of foreign people. Although this model seems to have found confirmation in recent 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in regard to the right to life, 
it is not immune from criticisms, especially with regard to the fact that the rules regulating 
how to define when an online non-physical act is capable of producing extraterritorial 
effects are not clear. Notwithstanding this, Chapter 5 concluded that the extraterritorial 
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model represents a better alternative than the personal and spatial models to interpret 
online State jurisdiction in human rights law. 
Finally, Chapter 6 answered the second research question by conducting an analysis into 
whether the extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 are 
compliant with the freedom of expression norms of the human rights Conventions. The 
claim at the centre of this chapter was that the application of domestic laws to foreign 
parties due to the publication of online content, typical of the access-based jurisdiction 
and of global delisting measures, is not accessible nor predictable and cannot therefore 
be considered as prescribed by law according to the human rights Conventions. This is 
because it does not seem particularly predictable for foreign parties who publish content 
online that is lawful according to both their domestic law and international law to 
anticipate that they could be subjected to an exercise of jurisdiction by other countries in 
the absence of specific links between the content published online and the foreign country 
exercising jurisdiction. At the same time, it does not seem that domestic laws that apply 
globally can be considered as accessible to all the foreign parties that these laws purport 
to regulate. However, the analysis of the permissible restrictions to freedom of expression 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
showed that in order to satisfy the accessibility requirement the domestic laws introducing 
the restriction to freedom of expression must simply have been published, whereas the 
foreseeability requirement is met if the law is sufficiently clear so as to allow the 
individuals affected to regulate their conduct, by recurring to legal advice or courts’ 
interpretation if necessary. In addition, the analysis of the Perrin case, which is so far the 
only case discussed before a human rights court where the “prescribed by law” 
requirement of the domestic law establishing jurisdiction over online content published 
from abroad has been discussed, showed that the ECtHR interpreted the accessibility and 
foreseeability requirements by assimilating the online publication at the centre of the case 
to a printed one with no transnational elements. In other words, the Court glossed over 
the complexities that are typical of worldwide accessible Internet content, sticking to an 
interpretation of the accessibility and foreseeability requirements that is appropriate for 
printed publications. Therefore, it can be concluded that, according to the jurisprudence 
of the human rights courts, domestic laws such as those examined in Chapters 2 and 3 are 
in fact compliant with the prescribed by law requirement of the human rights 
Conventions. Nonetheless, the research conducted in this Chapter observed that the 
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accessibility and foreseeability requirements should be adapted to Internet-related cases 
so as to reflect the complex nature of online content. This is especially so considering that 
there are some extra-legal factors, such as common knowledge and intermediaries, that 
contribute to making a domestic law accessible to the public. While however, these 
factors alert the public to the existence of a new law in the country where the law is 
adopted, they do not work well in the global context. For this reason, in the absence of 
these two extra-legal factors, it seems particularly difficult for a foreign party, especially 
a small company or a private individual rather than an international corporation, to 
anticipate that the laws of another country might be applicable to them. The accessibility 
and foreseeability requirements of the human rights conventions should reflect this 
complexity. It seems, however, difficult, that the human rights courts might take extra-
legal factors into account in their future evaluations of Internet-related cases. It will 
certainly be interesting to see how the law develops in this regard.
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